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IS THE ELECTORAL COUNT ACT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
VASAN KESAVAN"
This Article takes on one of the most unasked questions of Bush v.
Gore-whether the Electoral Count Act, the federal statutory
scheme at issue in that case, is constitutional. Enacted in 1887 and
hardly discussed for the past 114 years, the Electoral Count Act
sets forth complicated regulations for counting (and not counting)
electoral votes. This Article argues that Section 15 of Title 3 of the
United States Code, the heart of the Electoral Count Act, is
unconstitutional.
Since 1800, Congress has attempted to enact legislation regulating
the electoral count, finally succeeding in 1887. This Article traces
these principal congressional efforts to regulate the electoral count
and the surrounding constitutional text and structure to show why
the Electoral Count Act is unconstitutional. The Electoral Count
Act may seem like a good statutory scheme to deal with the
problems of the electoral count, but not every good statutory
scheme is a constitutional one. Some problems may only be
remedied by constitutional amendment, not by statute. Anyone
who wishes to argue that the Electoral Count Act is constitutional
bears a very high burden of proof.
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The first three of these questions might seem downright
outlandish, and prior to the presidential election of 2000, the fourth
was too. Now is a good time to remember that these four questions
were not at all outlandish in the spring of 1800 when America faced
her first electoral crisis of "Jefferson v. Adams. '3  These four
3. The presidential election of 1800 and the electoral count of 1801 were truly a
constitutional crisis of the first magnitude, leading to the adoption of the Twelfth
Amendment in 1804. The electoral count on February 11, 1801 was inconclusive because
there were two persons who had the requisite majority of the whole number of electors
appointed. (The original Constitution did not require or even permit electors to cast
separate votes for President and Vice President). Democrat-Republican and then-Vice
President Thomas Jefferson and Democrat-Republican Aaron Burr each received
seventy-three votes; Federalist and then-President John Adams and Federalist Charles C.
Pinckney received sixty-five and sixty-four votes, respectively; Federalist John Jay
received one vote.
The choice of President thus devolved on the House of Representatives. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 provides:
The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such
Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there
be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes,
then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of
them for President .... But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by
States, the Representation from each State having one Vote ....
The House, controlled by Federalists, was forced to choose between Democrat-
Republicans Jefferson and Burr. On February 11, the House balloted nineteen times with
no success: each time eight states voted for Jefferson, six for Burr, and two were divided.
On February 12, the House balloted nine times with no success; on February 13, once;
February 14, four times; and February 16, once. On February 17, after another such
round, the House chose a President-elect on the thirty-sixth round of balloting: ten states
voted for Jefferson, four for Burr and two did not vote. For the basic facts of the election
of 1800 and the electoral count of 1801, see BERNARD A. WEISBERGER, AMERICA
AFIRE: JEFFERSON, ADAMS, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY ELECTION OF 1800, at 227-77
(2000).
To complicate this saga further, Democrat-Republicans Jefferson and Burr only
had a majority of the whole number of electors appointed because Vice President
Jefferson, presiding over the electoral count, decided to count four "improper" votes from
the State of Georgia in favor of Jefferson-Burr. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
Without these votes, Jefferson and Burr would have had sixty-nine votes each, exactly one
half and not a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, and the choice of
President would have devolved on the House of Representatives. But importantly, the
original Constitution provided that "if no Person have a Majority, then from the five
highest on the List the said House in like Manner chuse the President." U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 1, cl. 3 (emphasis added). There is little doubt that the Federalist-controlled House
would have elected Federalists John Adams and Charles C. Pinckney as President and
Vice President, respectively.
Perhaps most intriguingly, the Federalist-controlled Legislature of Maryland,
aware of the popular support for Democrat-Republicans Jefferson-Burr,
seriously contemplated that the legislature should repeal the law under which the
electors were chosen by the people, and should choose them by the legislature;
and this on the avowed ground that it was necessary to defeat the candidate
whom it was supposed that the majority of the people preferred.
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INTRODUCTON
Bush v. Gore1 is history. We all have plenty to think about. So
here are four questions that are well worth considering before
Election Day 2004, or at least January 6, 2005, the date specified by
federal law for counting electoral votes 2 What if an elector votes for
a presidential or vice presidential candidate who is not a natural born
citizen, at least thirty-five years of age, and who has not been a
resident of the United States long enough? What if an elector who is
constitutionally ineligible to be an elector votes? What if an elector
votes for inhabitants of her state for both President and Vice
President? What if two sets of electors from the same state both
claim that they are the lawfully appointed electors of the state?
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
2. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) ("Congress shall be in session on the sixth day of January
succeeding every meeting of the electors.").
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questions were the paradigm problems of the electoral count debated
in the Sixth Congress.4 Federalist Senator Ross of Pennsylvania
firmly stated that "such cases might happen and were very likely to
happen."5  Democrat-Republican Senator Pinckney of South
Carolina, more sanguine, stated that these cases "may not happen
once in a century."' 6  In addition to these four problems of the
electoral count, a fifth problem has proved much more likely
throughout history: What if an elector is "faithless" and votes for a
President or Vice President in contravention of the popular vote?7
13, at 443 (1877) [hereinafter COUNTING ELECrORAL VOTES] (remarks of Sen.
Anthony). This should sound familiar. This action was not carried out, but had it been,
Maryland's ten electoral votes would have been given solely to Federalists Adams and
Pinckney, instead of having been given equally to Jefferson and Adams. Adams would
have received 70 votes; Pinckney 69 votes; Jefferson 68 votes; Burr 68 votes; and Jay 1
vote. Adams and Pinckney would have become President and Vice President respectively.
According to Senator Anthony, "[T]he election would have been strictly and
unquestionably legal and constitutional." Id. This point is subject to serious debate today.
There may be a constitutional right to vote for presidential and vice presidential electors,
at least in some cases. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV;
Michael C. Dorf, We Need A Constitutional Right To Vote in Presidential Elections (Dec.
13, 2000), at http://writ.fndlaw.comtdorf/20001213.html (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). But see Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 ("The State, of course, after granting the
franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint
electors.") (citation omitted).
The presidential election of 1800 and the electoral count of 1801 is currently the
subject of a fascinating, timely, and forthcoming book by Professor Bruce Ackerman.
BRUCE ACKERMAN, AMERICA ON THE BRINK: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OF THE
EARLY REPUBLIC (forthcoming 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). For
two rich discussions of the election of 1800, see generally Joanne B. Freeman, The Election
of 1800: A Study in the Logic of Political Change, 108 YALE L.J. 1959 (1999); John J.
Janssen, Dualist Constitutional Theory and the Republican Revolution of 1800, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 381 (1995). For a recent book-length treatment, see WEISBERGER, supra.
4. For specific reference to these four questions, see, for example, 10 ANNALS OF
CONG. 29 (1800) (remarks of Sen. Ross); id. at 131 (remarks of Sen. Pinckney); id. at 133
(remarks of Sen. Pinckney).
5. Id. at 29.
6. Id. at 132.
7. Thankfully, the problem has been a very small one, with approximately a dozen
electors of over 25,000 casting votes in opposition to the wishes of the voters in the course
of 213 years. See Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the
Popular Vote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665, 667 (1996). There is no consensus on the exact number
of faithless electors since the Founding. The paradigm case is that of Samuel Miles, a
Federalist elector from Pennsylvania, who in 1796, just eight years after the adoption of
the Constitution and in the third presidential election, voted for Democrat-Republican
Jefferson instead of Federalist Adams. This action prompted a Federalist voter to
exclaim: "Do I chuse Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas
Jefferson shall be President? No! I chuse him to act, not to think." E. STANWOOD, A
HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY 51 (August M. Kelley Publishers 1975) (1928).
The faithless elector problem was of particular concern in the presidential election
of 2000: Any two faithless votes by Bush electors would have thrown the election into the
House of Representatives, and any three faithless votes would have thrown the election to
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What does the Constitution say about these potential problems?
The relevant text of the Constitution simply provides that "[t]he
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House
of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then
be counted."8 It ought to be obvious that the Constitution does not
provide any answers to these tricky problems of the electoral count.9
The Framers and Ratifiers simply did not contemplate the
possibilities of unconstitutional or faithless electoral votes.
The critical question is whether we can fix the casus omissus of
the Constitution short of constitutional amendment. The counting of
the electoral votes is no trivial matter. It is the critical step in the
election of the President and Vice President. As one leading scholar
has stated, it seems to be "the magic, formal moment of vesting in
which the winning candidate is elected as 'President.' "10 Some might
quibble with this formalist point, but at the founding, when there
were no telegraphs, telephones, or television, and when electoral
former Vice President Gore. Going into December 18, 2000 (the date specified by federal
law for the giving of electoral votes by the electors), the expected electoral count was 271
votes for Bush and 267 votes for Gore. The final electoral count for President was 271
votes for Bush and 266 votes for Gore. See 147 CONG. REC. H44 (2001). One Gore-
Lieberman elector from the District of Columbia, protesting the District's lack of
statehood, refused to cast her votes for President and Vice President. See Charles
Babington, Electors Reassert Their Role; Bush Wins Vote; Protest Costs Gore, WASH.
POST., Dec. 19,2000, at Al. For additional discussion of the faithless elector problem, see
infra notes 176-191, 590-592 and accompanying text.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The only differences between this text of the Twelfth
Amendment and the text of the original Constitution are in punctuation and
capitalization. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 ("The President of the Senate shall, in the
Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the
Votes shall then be counted."). The Twelfth Amendment overwrote U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 3, but not two other clauses that relate to the Electoral College mode of
presidential election, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2, 4. For ease of exposition, I will
variously refer to these clauses as the "Electoral College Clauses."
9. As Justice Joseph Story described:
In the original plan, as well as in the amendment, no provision is made for the
discussion or decision of any questions, which may arise, as to the regularity and
authenticity of the returns of the electoral votes, or the right of the persons, who
gave the votes, or the manner, or circumstances, in which they ought to be
counted. It seems to have been taken for granted, that no question could ever
arise on the subject; and that nothing more was necessary, than to open the
certificates, which were produced, in the presence of both houses, and to count
the names and numbers, as returned.
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1464, at 327 (1833) [hereinafter STORY'S COMMENTARIES]; see also 17 CONG. REC. 815
(1886) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (discussing specific problems of the electoral count); 18
CONG. REC. 50-51 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Adams) (same).
10. Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the
Constitution's Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215,217 (1995).
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votes were more secret, there was no way of knowing the identity of
the winning candidates until the electoral votes were formally
counted. Recent history should be a powerful reminder of the
significance of the electoral count. One key lesson of the presidential
election of 2000 is that the President-elect is not elected by "We the
People" on election day, or even by the electors on the day they cast
their votes, but by the joint convention of the Senate and House of
Representatives on the day the electoral votes are formally counted.
The counting function appears to be a ministerial duty of
tabulation imposed by the Constitution because each of the electoral
colleges meet in their respective states instead of at some central
location. Conventional wisdom holds that the joint convention of the
Senate and House of Representatives does the counting, and not the
President of the Senate, but this is not at all clear from the text of the
Electoral College Clauses. But does the counting function subsume
the power not to count? What about unconstitutional votes? What
about faithless votes?
As is now somewhat well known, Congress has answered the
question whether the counting function subsumes the power not to
count affirmatively. The relevant statute is the Electoral Count Act
of 1887,11 presently codified at 3 U.S.C. §§ 5-6, 15-18. The heart of
the Electoral Count Act is undisputedly 3 U.S.C. § 15, a complicated
provision that sets forth rules for counting (and not counting)
electoral votes. In a nutshell, this section provides that in a case of
single returns, the joint convention may only reject electoral votes
that are not "regularly given" if both Houses of Congress concur.'2 In
a case of multiple returns from the same state, this section provides
that the joint convention may only accept electoral votes as "regularly
given" if both Houses of Congress concur (with a few important
wrinkles to be discussed later). 3 The meaning of the phrase
"regularly given"' 4 in § 15 is far from clear. The precedents of the
electoral count, however, strongly suggest that the joint convention
will not count unconstitutional votes, and possibly not faithless votes
either.
While 3 U.S.C. § 15 sets forth the rules for counting (and not
counting) electoral votes, 3 U.S.C. § 5, the specific federal statutory
provision at issue in Bush v. Gore, sets forth the so-called "safe
11. Act of Feb. 3, 1887, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 3 U.S.C. §§ 5-
6, 15-18 (2000)).
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harbor" provision for counting electoral votes with respect to a state's
determination of any controversy or contest concerning the
appointment of its electors. 5 Bush v. Gore indicates that there must
be nine votes on the Supreme Court for the proposition that 3 U.S.C.
§ 5 is constitutional. Although neither party briefed or argued the
constitutionality of this provision of the Electoral Count Act, each of
the Justices must have reached an independent, antecedent
determination that 3 U.S.C. § 5 passes constitutional muster.1 6
Curiously, Bush v. Gore, for all that it did address regarding
presidential election, did not address the heart of the Electoral Count
Act-3 U.S.C. § 15. Only Justice Breyer, with Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg concurring, even mentioned this key section, and he did so
approvingly. 7 The prevailing wisdom, in the Supreme Court and
elsewhere, is that the Electoral Count Act is constitutional?
15. Id. § 5.
16. Needless to say, this assumes that each of the Justices was doing his or her job,
and not violating his or her oath to support the Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3,
which is an assumption that may beget controversy, depending on one's jurisprudential
(political?) preferences.
17. See 531 U.S. 98, 153-54 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Twelfth
Amendment commits to Congress the authority and responsibility to count electoral votes.
A federal statute, the Electoral Count Act, enacted after the close 1876 Hayes-Tilden
presidential election, specifies that, after States have tried to resolve disputes (through
'judicial' or other means), Congress is the body primarily authorized to resolve remaining
disputes."); id. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Given this detailed, comprehensive scheme
for counting electoral votes [3 U.S.C. § 15], there is no reason to believe that federal law
either foresees or requires resolution of such a political issue by this Court."). Others
have similarly argued that the "political question doctrine," see, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962), counsels (if not requires) that the Supreme Court should not have
entered the fray in the presidential election of 2000. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v.
Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARv. L. REv.
170,276-87 (2001); id. at 277 n.433 (citing argument made by Professors Charles Fried and
Einer Elhauge in Brief of the Florida Senate and House of Representatives as Amici
Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 7, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531
U.S. 70 (2000) (No. 00-836)); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of
the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 CoLUM. L. REv.
237, 273-300 (2002). Whether Bush v. Gore presented a non-justiciable political question
is beyond the scope of this Article.
18. Only a handful of scholars have addressed the constitutionality of the Electoral
Count Act since its initial adoption more than one hundred and twenty years ago.
Professor Spear, writing in 1877, concluded that the Electoral Count Act of 1877 was
unconstitutional. See Samuel T. Spear, D.D., Counting the Electoral Votes, 15 ALB. L.J.
156, 156-61 (1877). Professor Burgess, writing in 1888, concluded that the Electoral Count
Act of 1887 was constitutional. See John W. Burgess, The Law of the Electoral Count, 3
POL. SC. Q. 633, 653 (1888). More recently, Professor Ross and Mr. Josephson have
apparently concluded that the Electoral Count Act is constitutional. See Ross &
Josephson, supra note 7, at 704-40.
Two other scholars have obliquely addressed the constitutionality of the Electoral
Count Act in recent years. Professor Glennon, in his primer on the Electoral College,
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Yet there has been virtually no scrutiny of this conventional
wisdom in the wake of Bush v. Gore. One of the most unasked
questions regarding the presidential election of 2000 is whether the
federal statutory scheme at issue in that case is constitutional.
This Article argues that the Electoral Count Act, specifically 3
U.S.C. § 15, is unconstitutional. The Electoral Count Act violates the
text and structure of the Constitution in multiple ways. For example,
where is the font of express or implied power to pass the Electoral
Count Act? Where does Congress have the power to regulate the
manner of presidential election? Where do the Electoral College
Clauses provide for bicameralism in counting electoral votes? What
gives the 49th Congress the authority to bind future Congresses and
joint conventions in counting electoral votes?
More generally: What gives the joint convention the power to
judge the validity of electoral votes? The counting function seems to
be arithmetic and ministerial. If the joint convention could judge
electoral votes, it could reject enough votes to thwart the electors' will
or trigger a contingency election for President in the House of
Representatives and for Vice President in the Senate, thereby
arrogating to the two Houses of Congress the power to appoint the
Nation's two highest executive officers.'9 The tight margin of the
somewhat casually concludes that the Electoral Count Act is constitutional. See MICHAEL
J. GLENNON, WHEN No MAJORITY RULES: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 35-43 (1992). Professor Amar, in an article on presidential
succession, assumes that the Electoral Count Act is constitutional in the course of
proposing an improvement to the process of presidential election. He suggests that
"Congress should provide by statute that an electoral vote for any person who is dead at
the time of the congressional counting is a valid vote, and will be counted, so long as the
death occurred on or after Election Day." Amar, supra note 10, at 222.
Most recently, after Bush v. Gore, several commentators have assessed the
constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act, but only in passing. See, e.g., SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECrIONs Go BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, at 98 (2001) ("Questions about the constitutionality of
the Electoral Count Act have been raised but never fully addressed."); Dan T. Coenen &
Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power Over Presidential Elections: Lessons from the
Past and Reforms for the Future, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 851, 860-71, 909-16 (2002)
(concluding that the Electoral Count Act is constitutional and that congressional power to
enact such legislation should support national-ballot and voting equipment legislation);
Jesse H. Choper, Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the Presidential
Election of 2000, at 15 (stating that "the Electoral Count Act is not free of certain
ambiguities and possible constitutional problems") (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the North Carolina Law Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=281869.
19. For an excellent articulation of this point, see 17 CONG. REC. 1059 (1886) where
Sen. Wilson stated:
Can we conclude that the [F]ramers of our Constitution, when they conferred on
the respective Houses of Congress these extraordinary powers, intended to
invest them with the still more extraordinary power of rejecting the votes of
2002] 1661
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presidential election of 2000-in both the popular vote and electoral
vote-demonstrates that these possibilities are not necessarily
remote. In a close presidential election, every electoral vote counts.
As Chancellor Kent put the point in his treatise on the Constitution
first published over 175 years ago, "In the case of questionable votes,
and a closely contested election, this [counting] power may be all-
important. ' 2° As bizarre as it may seem, the joint convention must
count the electoral votes-including unconstitutional or faithless
votes. As unfortunate as it may be, a solution to the problem of
unconstitutional or faithless electoral votes requires constitutional
amendment. The constitutional infirmities of the electoral count are
yet additional reasons to scrap the Electoral College mode of
presidential election altogether.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the history
of the electoral count, addressing the principal congressional efforts
to regulate presidential election and the electoral count, and the
actual problems of the electoral counts from the Founding to today.
Part II contains the constitutional argument against the
constitutionality of Electoral Count Act and sets forth "interpretivist"
arguments from constitutional text and structure.2 Part III considers
electors appointed by the several States, and thereby creating by themselves and
for themselves the contingency which alone gives them the right and power to
elect a President and Vice-President?
See also 18 CONG. REc. 74 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Baker) (similar).
Early commentators on the Constitution, writing in the wake of the electoral crisis
of 1800-01, were quick to point out the evils of presidential election by the House of
Representatives. See, e.g., 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES
WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
app. at 327 (1803) [hereinafter TUCKER'S COMMENTARIES]. St. George Tucker stated:
Then, indeed, intrigue and cabal may have their full scope: then, may the
existence of the union be put in extreme hazard: then might a bold and
desperate party, having the command of an armed force, and of all the resources
of government, attempt to establish themselves permanently in power, without
the future aid of forms, or the control of elections.
Id.; see WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 82 (Lenox Hill Pub. & Dist. Co. 1971) (1843)
[hereinafter DUER'S COMMENTARIES] (noting that "on one memorable occasion...
much riotous and violent conduct was exhibited in the House of Representatives, when,
upon an equality of electoral votes between two of the persons voted for, the choice
devolved upon that body"); 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *279
[hereinafter KENT'S COMMENTARIES] ("All elections by the representative body are
peculiarly liable to produce combinations for sinister purposes.").
20. KENT'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 19, at *276.
21. The methodological approach taken in this Article-one that places almost
exclusive reliance on constitutional text and structure and one that may be described as
"interpretivist" or "originalist"-may be criticized by some as out of touch with the
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what should happen if the Electoral Count Act is unconstitutional,
and electors go bananas and cast unconstitutional or faithless votes.
This Part suggests answers to the paradigm problems of the electoral
count and considers where we should go from here.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE ELECTORAL COUNT
The history of the electoral count is woefully understudied. 22
This is especially problematic because "[d]isputes concerning
presidential electors and their votes are more common than one may
think."23 Although the electoral count's history does not directly (or
necessarily) bear on the constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act,
it is worth studying for at least a few reasons. First, there is much we
can learn about our electoral past. Given the risk that history might
repeat itself, the history of the electoral count furnishes important
precedent for future electoral disputes, in much the same way as cases
furnish precedent for future cases 4 Second, participants in the
Electoral Count Act debates referred to the history of the electoral
subject matter. The arguments run as follows: the electoral college mode of presidential
election has worked in ways never contemplated by the Framers and Ratifiers-with the
advent of political parties, not to mention the perfunctory role of electors themselves in
presidential election. Indeed, one might say that the electoral college mode of presidential
election has (ironically or not) worked in a way positively antithetical to the original
expectations of the Framers and Ratifiers. Moreover, as we shall see, the constitutional
lacunae seem to be especially large when it comes to the thorny issues of the electoral
count-these issues were under-specified from the start. And so the argument concludes
that constitutional meaning should be determined by subsequent practice-what works, or
has been accepted as if valid-more than by constitutional text and structure.
Nevertheless, this Article's methodological approach does yield (I submit) a definitive
result as to the constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act. It is rather difficult to see why
non-constitutional developments in electoral politics relating to presidential election-
however stark when compared to the Founding-create congressional power to regulate
the electoral count when none existed. In any case, this Article's methodological
approach is far from useless even for those who choose to ignore its results. See Akhil
Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article II. Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 207-08 n.7 (1985) (discussing the value of
"interpretivist" methodology whether or not one subscribes to its results).
22. The vade mecum in the study of the history of the electoral count is a House
Special Committee report issued after the Hayes-Tilden presidential election of 1872. See
COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3; see also 3 HIND'S PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 209-67 (Alfred C. Hinds ed.,
1907) (discussing the electoral counts of 1789 to 1905). Two scholars have also nicely
summarized the relevant history. See generally C.C. Tansill, Congressional Control of the
Electoral System, 34 YALE L.J. 511 (1924-25); L. Kinvin Wroth, Election Contests and the
Electoral Vote, 65 DICK. L. REV. 321 (1961).
23. John Harrison, Nobody for President, 16 J.L. & POL. 699,699 (2000).
24. Indeed, Bush v. Gore provides two excellent examples. For references to the
Hayes-Tilden Incident of 1877, see infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text. For
references to the Hawaii Incident of 1961, see infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
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count in debating the constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act. A
familiarity with the history of the electoral count better informs these
legislative debates. Third, participants in the Electoral Count Act
debates referred to the history of the electoral count-and specifically
the actual problems of the electoral count-in debating the necessity
and expediency of the Electoral Count Act. A critical examination of
this history better affords a basis to assess whether the Electoral
Count Act is necessary and expedient to address these historical
problems and whether there may be other non-statutory solutions.
This Part seeks to fill this void in scholarship and proceeds in two
sections. The first section summarizes four principal congressional
efforts-three successful, one not-to regulate presidential election
and the electoral count, including the Act of 1792, the Grand
Committee Bill, the Twenty-second Joint Rule, and finally the
Electoral Count Act. The second section summarizes the actual
problems of the electoral count. In the course of fifty-four electoral
counts in the history of the Republic, there have been only a dozen or
so problems of the electoral count, most of which occurred in the
nineteenth-century.2
A. Congressional Efforts to Regulate Presidential Election and the
Electoral Count
1. Act of March 1, 1792
On March 1, 1792, the Second Congress passed "An Act relative
to the election of a President and Vice-President of the United States
and declaring the officer who shall act as President in case of
vacancies in the offices both of President and Vice-President. '26 The
Act thus regulated presidential election and presidential succession,
the latter pursuant to Article II, Section 1, Clause 6.27
25. As of 1886, Senator Sherman observed that "[s]ince [the Founding] there have
been eleven cases of disputes as to electoral votes, and twenty-one objections have been
made to the electoral votes of different States, presenting a great variety of questions,"
though he did not elaborate. 17 CONG. REc. 815 (1886).
26. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239. For the relevant part of the act relating to
presidential election, see COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 9.
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 provides:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office,
the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President,
and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected.
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The Act did a number of things with respect to presidential
election. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act, pursuant to Article II, Section 1,
Clause 4, established the time of choosing the electors by the States
as thirty-four days before their meeting, and the day on which the
electors were to give their votes as the first Wednesday in December
of each presidential election year.29 Section 1 also clarified Article II,
Section 1, Clause 210 by providing that each state shall appoint a
number of electors equal to the number of Senators and
Representatives to which the state is entitled at the time when the
President and Vice President to be chosen would come into office.31
Section 2 also clarified Article II, Section 2, Clause 332 by
specifying the manner of certifying and transmitting the electoral
certificates to the President of the Senate. It provided that the
electors in each state shall make and sign three electoral certificates-
one to be sent by messenger appointed by a majority of the electors, a
second by post to the President of the Senate, and the third to be
delivered to the judge of the district in which the electors in each state
With respect to presidential succession, the Act provided that, after the Vice President,
the President pro tempore and the Speaker of the House of Representatives would next be
in line to act as President. For a strong and persuasive claim that this mode of presidential
succession is unconstitutional because Members of Congress are not "Officer[s]" within
the meaning of the Presidential Succession Clause, see Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David
Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1995).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 ("The Congress may determine the Time of
chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be
the same throughout the United States.").
29. For the modem codification, see 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("The electors of President
and Vice President shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first
Monday in November, in every fourth year succeeding every election of a President and
Vice President."); id. § 7 ("The electors of President and Vice President of each State shall
meet and give their votes on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December
next following their appointment at such place in each State as the legislature of such State
shall direct.").
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 provides:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no
Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under
the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
31. A proviso to section 1 provided: "That where no apportionment of
Representatives shall have been made after any enumeration, at the time of choosing
electors, then the number of electors shall be according to the existing apportionment of
Senators and Representatives." For the modem codification, see 3 U.S.C. § 3.
32. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 ("And they shall make a List of all the Persons
voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and
transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the
President of the Senate.").
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shall assemble.3 3 Section 3 further specified the manner of certifying
and transmitting the electoral certificates, but well beyond the text of
Article II, Section 2, Clause 3. It provided that
the executive authority of each State shall cause three lists of
the names of the electors of such State to be made and
certified and to be delivered to the electors on or before the
said first Wednesday in December; and the said electors
shall annex one of the said lists to each of the lists of their
votes.
34
These provisions of sections 2 and 3 are noteworthy because the
Electoral College Clauses do not expressly grant Congress the power
to specify the manner of certifying or transmitting the electoral
certificates. Interestingly, a draft of Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 at
the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 provided that "[t]he Legislature
may determine the time of choosing the Electors, and of their giving
their votes; and the manner of certifying and transmitting their votes-
But the election shall be on the same day throughout the
U-States."35  The italicized language was inexplicably dropped by
the time the Framers referred the draft Constitution to the
Committee of Style and Arrangement. 6 It is a slippery exercise to
infer the meaning of this clause from language rejected in predecessor
drafts. Perhaps the Framers intended to deny Congress the power to
legislate on the manner of certification and transmission of electoral
votes. Or perhaps the Framers intended that Congress could enact
33. For the modern codification, see 3 U.S.C. § 11 and 3 U.S.C. § 9, which provides:
The electors shall make and sign six certificates of all the votes given by them,
each of which certificates shall contain two distinct lists, one of the votes for
President and the other of the votes for Vice President, and shall annex to each
of the certificates one of the lists of the electors which shall have been furnished
to them by direction of the executive of the State.
34. For the modem codification, see 3 U.S.C. § 6.
35. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 529 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND] (emphasis added); see also David P. Currie,
The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 1791-1793, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 606,
617-18 (1996) (noting this point). Alexander Hamilton's draft of the Constitution
contained a broader grant of law-making power. See 3 FARRAND, supra, at 624 ("The
Legislature shall by permanent laws provide such further regulations as may be necessary
for the more orderly election of the President, not contravening the provisions herein
contained.").
36. Contrary to Professor Currie's view, see Currie, supra note 35, at 617-18, this
language was not dropped by the Committee of Style, but was dropped by the Framers
themselves. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 573 (draft Constitution referred to
Committee of Style and Arrangement) ("The Legislature may determine the time of
chusing the Electors and of their giving their votes-But the election shall be on the same
day throughout the United States.").
ELECTORAL COUNTACT
these sections either pursuant to Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 itself
or pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause.37
In any case, it is difficult to see how section 3 and its modern
codification at 3 U.S.C. § 6 are constitutional, strictly speaking. When
section 3 of the Act of 1792 was read in the House of Representatives,
Representative Niles, joined by Representative Hillhouse, objected to
it on constitutional grounds, questioning Congress's ability to impose
duties on the executive authority of each state and calling the section
"degrading to the Executives of the several States. '38  Speaker
Sedgwick responded that "if Congress were not authorized to call on
the Executives of the several States, he could not conceive what
description of persons they were empowered to call upon,' 39 and
Representative Niles's motion to strike the clause was negatived.
Democrat-Republican Senator Charles Pinckney, a Framer and
leading delegate to the South Carolina ratifying convention, probably
would have agreed with Representative Niles's constitutional
objection. In a speech before the Senate in March of 1800, Senator
Pinckney observed that the Act of 1792 may "in one or two
particulars of no importance" go "farther than the Constitution
warrants," though he did not identify any particular sections. 0 In
modern constitutional parlance, the duties imposed on State
Executives by section 3 of the Act of 1792 and 3 U.S.C. § 6, do not
seem quite like "purely ministerial reporting requirements,"'" but
those who have a broader view of "executive commandeering" are
unlikely to question seriously the constitutionality of section 3 of the
Act of 1792 and 3 U.S.C. § 6.42
Other provisions of the Act of 1792 are much less questionable.
Section 4 provided that if the electoral certificate of a state shall not
have been received at the Seat of Government by the first Wednesday
in January, then the Secretary of State shall send a special messenger
to the district judge of the State who held one of the three electoral
37. These two possible fonts of power for the Electoral Count Act are discussed in
Part II.A.2 infra.
38. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 279 (1791).
39. Id. at 279.
40. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 134 (1800).
41. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(suggesting that "purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state
and local authorities" may be constitutionally valid).
42. See, e.g., id. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 970-71 (Souter, J., dissenting); id.
at 976-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism,
79 VA. L. REv. 1957, 1990-2007 (1993) (presenting extensive early historical evidence of
"executive commandeering").
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certificates.43 Section 5 provided that Congress shall be in session on
the second Wednesday in February for the purpose of opening the
electoral certificates and counting the electoral votes.44 Section 6
provided that if the President of the Senate were absent when the
electoral certificates arrived, they would be given to the Secretary of
State for safekeeping, to be delivered as soon as practicable to the
President of the Senate. Section 7 provided for the compensation of
messengers who would carry one of the three electoral certificates
from each of the states to the Seat of Government at the rate of
twenty-five cents a mile. Section 8 prescribed a $1,000 penalty (no
small sum in those days) for messengers who failed to perform the
service.45
Whatever we think about the constitutionality of section 3 of the
Act of 1792, the Act did not in any way assert any congressional
control over the electoral count itself. As one early scholar of the
Electoral Count Act noted, "There is no attempt here, legislatively, to
interpret the Constitution, or devise any counting machinery other
than that which appears on its face, or establish any rule for its action.
43. The modem codification provides:
When no certificate of vote and list mentioned in sections 9 and 11 of this title
from any State shall have been received by the President of the Senate or by the
Archivist of the United States by the fourth Wednesday in December, after the
meeting of the electors shall have been held, the President of the Senate or, if he
be absent from the seat of government, the Archivist of the United States shall
request, by the most expeditious method available, the secretary of state of the
State to send up the certificate and list lodged with him by the electors of such
State; and it shall be his duty upon receipt of such request immediately to
transmit same by registered mail to the President of the Senate at the seat of
government.
3 U.S.C. § 12 (2000). Additionally:
When no certificates of votes from any State shall have been received at the seat
of government on the fourth Wednesday in December, after the meeting of the
electors shall have been held, the President of the Senate or, if he be absent from
the seat of government, the Archivist of the United States shall send a special
messenger to the district judge in whose custody one certificate of votes from
that State has been lodged, and such judge shall forthwith transmit that list by
the hand of such messenger to the seat of government.
Id. § 13.
44. For the modem codification, see 3 U.S.C. § 15 ("Congress shall be in session on
the sixth day of January succeeding every meeting of the electors.").
45. For the modem codification (with the same $1,000 penalty), see 3 U.S.C. § 14
("Every person who, having been appointed, pursuant to section 13 of this title, to deliver
the certificates of the votes of the electors to the President of the Senate, and having
accepted such appointment, shall neglect to perform the services required from him, shall
forfeit the sum of $1,000.").
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It was assumed that the Constitution interprets itself, and executes
itself by its own provisions. 'n6
2. The Grand Committee Bill of 1800
In early 1800, the Federalist-controlled Sixth Congress attempted
to regulate the electoral count.4 7 The impetus for the regulation was
plainly corrupt: The upcoming presidential election between
President and Federalist John Adams and Vice President and
Democrat-Republican Thomas Jefferson commanded the nation's
attention, and the Federalist-controlled Congress desired to deal Vice
President Jefferson's electoral chances a "crippling blow."48 Historian
John Bach McMaster explained that
[t]he leaders of the [Federalist] party were determined that,
if the presidential election could not be carried by fair
means, it should by foul. Adams's electors might be
defeated in the Legislatures and at the poles [sic], but the
votes of the Jefferson electors should, if possible, be thrown
out by Congress. With this for its purpose, an electoral-
count bill appeared in the Senate.49
On January 23, 1800, Federalist Senator James Ross moved
"[tihat a committee be appointed to consider whether any, and what,
provisions ought to be made by law for deciding disputed elections of
President and Vice President of the United States, and for
determining the legality or illegality of the votes given for those
officers in the different States" and that the committee be authorized
to report a bill.50 This motion was the subject of significant debate,
much of which we shall uncover in Part II. On February 14, 1800,
Senator Ross reported "A bill prescribing the mode of deciding
disputed elections of President and Vice-President of the United
46. Spear, supra note 18, at 158.
47. For an easily accessible account of this history, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 288-291 (1997).
48. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 263 (1996).
49. 2 JOHN BACH MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 462 (1928); see id. at 463 ("The purpose of
this shameful bill was plain to all."); see also 2 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL 452-53 (1916) (describing Federalist effort to regulate electoral count as "in
reality a high-handed attempt to control the [coming] presidential election, regardless of
the votes of the people"); Wroth, supra note 22, at 326 & n.24 (describing Federalist effort
to regulate electoral count as "a last ditch effort to stem the tide of Jeffersonian
Republicanism").
50. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1800).
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States. '51 This bill is commonly known as the "Grand Committee"
Bill.52
As its shorthand name suggests, this bill featured the
appointment of a "Grand Committee" on the day before the second
Wednesday in February. This Committee would have thirteen
members: six Representatives chosen by ballot in the House, six
Senators chosen by ballot in the Senate, and the Chief Justice of the
United States who was to act as chairman (if the Chief Justice were
absent then the next most senior Justice would attend).5 3 This
committee was to have power to examine, and finally to decide, all
disputes relating to the election of President and Vice President
including the:
power to inquire, examine, decide, and report upon the
constitutional qualifications of the persons voted for as
President and Vice-President of the United States; upon the
constitutional qualifications of the electors appointed by the
different States, and whether their appointment was
authorized by the State Legislature or not; upon all petitions
and exceptions against corrupt, illegal conduct of the
electors, or force, menaces, or improper means used to
influence their votes; or against the truth of their returns, or
the time, place or manner of giving their votes. 4
51. COUNTING ELECrORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 16.
52. Historian Albert Beveridge writes that the bill was "aimed particularly at the
anticipated Republican presidential majority in Pennsylvania which had just elected a
Republican Governor over the Federalist candidate." 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 49, at
463. It should come as no surprise that the losing Federalist candidate was Senator Ross
of Pennsylvania, the principal proponent of the Grand Committee Bill.
53. The idea for a committee of thirteen may have its roots in a proposal by Elbridge
Gerry at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 who proposed that, in case of electoral
deadlock, "the eventual election should be made by six Senators and seven
Representatives chosen by joint ballot of both Houses." 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at
514. This proposal failed by a vote of two to eight. Id. Note that Gerry's proposal
decidedly favors the House of Representatives-the People's branch of the national
legislature-both in committee representation and committee election given the joint
ballot procedure. Under a joint ballot, the Members of the House of Representatives, at
the founding, would be entitled to sixty-five of ninety-one votes. For a mathematical
depiction of Gerry's thinking, see id. at 99 (proposing the selection of President by a
randomly chosen subset of members of Congress taken together).
54. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 18. The one exception to this
grant of power was that
no petition, or exception, shall be granted, allowed, or considered by the sitting
grand committee which has for its object to dispute, draw into question the
number of votes given for an elector in any of the States, or the fact whether an
elector was chosen by a majority of votes in his State or district."
Id. In other words, the Grand Committee was not to judge the elections or returns of the
electors.
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The committee was "to sit with closed doors." It was to have the
"power to send for persons, papers, and records to compel the
attendance of witnesses,"55 and its report was to be made "on the first
day of March next after their appointment." This report was to be "a
final and conclusive determination of the admissibility or
inadmissibility of the votes given by the electors for President and
Vice-President of the United States. '56
Republican Senator Charles Pinckney delivered a "closely
reasoned attack 5 7 on the Grand Committee Bill, which occupies
some twenty-one pages in the Annals of Congress." It is not
surprising that Senator Pinckney led the effort in the Senate against
the Grand Committee Bill. Some historians place him as the
campaign manager in South Carolina for Democrat-Republican and
Vice President Thomas Jefferson, who had everything to lose with the
passage of the Grand Committee Bill.
In his introductory remarks, Senator Pinckney described the
Grand Committee Bill as more dangerous than the Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798 because, unlike the latter, the former was
perpetual.59 Relying on his experience as a Framer and a leading
delegate at the South Carolina ratifying convention, Senator Pinckney
forcefully articulated his principal objection to the bill:
Knowing that it was the intention of the Constitution to
make the President completely independent of the Federal
55. Id. at 17.
56. Id. at 18.
57. Tansill, supra note 22, at 517.
58. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 126-46 (1800). In his remarks opposing the Grand
Committee Bill, Senator Pinckney described it thus:
[W]hat is the mode [of electing President] proposed by this bill? That the Senate
and House of Representatives of the United States shall each of them elect six
members, who with a chairman, to be appointed by the latter from a nomination
of the former, would form a grand committee who should, sitting with closed
doors, have a right to examine all the votes given by the Electors in the several
States for President and Vice President, and all the memorials and petitions
respecting them; and have power finally to decide respecting them, and to
declare what votes of different States shall be rejected, and what admitted; and,
in short, that this committee, thus chosen, and sitting with closed doors, shall
possess complete, uncontrollable, and irrevocable power to decree, without
appeal from their decision, who has been returned, and who shall be proclaimed
President of the United States.
Id. at 129. Professor Ross and Mr. Josephson suggest that, given the length of Senator
Pinckney's speech, it was not extemporaneous. See Ross & Josephson, supra note 7, at
711 n.252.
59. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 126. Recall that the Alien and Sedition Acts were set to
expire on June 25, 1800 and March 3, 1801 respectively. See Alien Act of June 25, 1798
§ 6, 1 Stat. 570, 572; Sedition Act of July 14,1798 § 4,1 Stat. 596, 597.
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Legislatures, I well remember it was the object, as it is at
present not only the spirit but the letter of that instrument,
to give to Congress no interference in, or control over the
election of a President. It is made their duty to count over
the votes in a convention of both Houses, and for the
President of the Senate to declare who has the majority of
the votes of the Electors so transmitted. It never was
intended, nor could it have been safe, in the Constitution, to
have given to Congress thus assembled in convention, the
right to object to any vote, or even to question whether they
were constitutionally or properly given.... To give to
Congress, even when assembled in convention, a right to
reject or admit the votes of States, would have been so gross
and dangerous an absurdity, as the [F]ramers of the
Constitution never could have been guilty of. How could
they expect, that in deciding on the election of a President,
particularly where such election was strongly contested, that
party spirit would not prevail, and govern every decision?60
According to Senator Pinckney, the animating principle of the
Electoral College Clauses was to remove Congress from the business
of electing the President as much as possible. Despite Senator
Pinckney's strong and well reasoned objections, many of which we
shall uncover in Part II, in the course of the argument against the
constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act, the Senate passed the
Grand Committee Bill by a "strict party vote ' 61 of sixteen to twelve
on March 28, 1800.62
Three days later the bill reached the House. In the House,
Federalist Representative John Marshall-soon to be Chief Justice
Marshall-broke with his party, and much to the Federalists' dismay,
lobbied very hard against the Grand Committee Bill.63 He was
60. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 130. Senator Pinckney also observed that the Framers
"well knew, that to give to the members of Congress a right to give votes in this election,
or to decide upon them when given, was to destroy the independence of the Executive and
make him the creature of the Legislature." Id. at 131. The potential for party spirit in
Congress to dominate the choice of President was well recognized. In the Second
Congress, Speaker of the House Sedgwick "descanted on the pernicious consequences
which might result from the collision of parties, and the working of passions in the breasts
of men whose ardor would probably be excited to the greatest degree" if the House of
Representatives were to choose the President. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 278 (1791). During
the Wisconsin Incident of 1857, Senator Collamer made similar remarks. See COUNTING
ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 132-33 (remarks of Sen. Collamer).
61. 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 49, at 454.
62. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 146.
63. See 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 49, at 455. ("In these cloak-room talks, Marshall, to
the intense disgust and anger of the Federalist leaders, was outspoken against this attempt
to seize the Presidency under the forms of a National law."); SMITH, supra note 48, at 264
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appointed chairman of a select committee to redraft the bill.
Marshall reported the Senate bill in the House of Representatives on
April 25, 1800 with significant amendments. 64 Under the amended
bill, the committee's report was not to be the final and conclusive
determination on the electoral votes. Instead, this determination
would devolve upon the two Houses after receiving the committee's
report. The House bill provided that, upon objection to any elector's
vote in a joint meeting of the two Houses, the vote was to be counted
unless the two Houses, meeting separately, concurred in rejecting it.
Indeed, as we shall see, the Electoral Count Act bears significant
resemblance to this amended bill.65
These amendments "gutted" the Grand Committee Bill.66 The
Senate considered this amended bill on May 8, 1800, and rejected the
House amendments by a "strict party vote."'67 The Senate then passed
an amendment striking out the word "rejecting" and inserting the
word "admitting." The effect of this change was to create a "one-
House veto" over electoral votes. When the two Houses could not
agree on the amended bills, the bill died.' According to John
Marshall scholar Albert J. Beveridge, if Marshall had not waged his
campaign against the Grand Committee Bill, the election of Thomas
Jefferson would have been impossible. 69
It is extremely difficult to see how the original Grand Committee
Bill was constitutional70 In addition to the constitutional argument
that will be explored in detail in Part II, there are at least four
additional attacks on this bill. First, what gives Congress the
("Marshall worked the cloakrooms and corridors assiduously, voicing his objections and
lining up the opposition vote.").
64. See COUNTING ELECrORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 23-26.
65. See Part I.A.4 infra.
66. SNriTH, supra note 48, at 264.
67. 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 49, at 456.
68. See Wroth, supra note 22, at 327 ("The House, less aggressively partisan than the
Senate, refused to accept a measure which would permit rejection by vote of the Senate
alone.").
69. 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 49, at 456. Thomas Jefferson, for his part, was less than
fully appreciative of John Marshall's efforts, suggesting that the Marshall amendments did
not make the Grand Committee Bill constitutional. In a private letter, he wrote:
Marshall made a dexterous manoeuver; he declares against the constitutionality
of the Senate's bill, and proposes that the right of decision of their grand
committee should be controllable by the concurrent vote of the two [Houses of
[C]ongress; but to stand good if not rejected by a concurrent vote. You will
readily estimate the amount of this sort of controul.
Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Robert Livingston (Apr. 30,1800)).
70. The amended Grand Committee Bill largely parallels the Electoral Count Act.
See Part I.A.4 infra.
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authority to delegate the counting function to a committee, if
Congress has counting authority at a? 71  Second, what gives
Congress the authority to take the Chief Justice (or other Justices)
away from her judicial duties?72 Third, what gives Congress the
authority to delay the counting of the electoral votes in violation of
the immediacy principle of the Electoral College Clauses?73 Fourth,
what gives Congress the authority to secretly count electoral votes in
violation of the publicity principle of the Electoral College Clauses?74
In sum, one should seriously doubt the constitutionality of the
Grand Committee Bill. It is far from clear that Representative John
Marshall's amendments removed the multiple constitutional
infirmities. Arguably, the failure of the Second Congress to address
congressional regulation of the electoral count after significant
constitutional debate suggests the unconstitutionality of the Grand
Committee Bill; Senator Pinckney certainly thought soy5
71. Apparently, John Marshall also questioned Congress's ability to delegate
authority to the Grand Committee. 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 49, at 457 (citing Letter
from Speaker Sedgwick, to Sen. Rufus King (May 11, 1800)).
72. The Constitution carefully circumscribes the Chief Justice's judicial duties under
Article III, with one exception. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have
the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on
Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice
shall preside .... ).
It might be argued that the Chief Justice's role in the Grand Committee is quasi-
judicial and that the foregoing clause invites the Chief Justice to play a special role with
respect to the Presidency. For an expression of this claim, see Amar, supra note 10, at 223
n.16. Notably, however, the Framers rejected other non-judicial roles for the Chief Justice
and other Justices of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 75, 298
(rejecting participation in "[r]evisionary power" or veto power); id. at 342 (rejecting
participation in "Council of State" or Privy Council).
73. See text accompanying infra notes 267-74.
74. See text accompanying infra notes 276-86.
75. Senator Pinckney remarked:
Were not the then Executive, and a number of the members of both Houses,
members of the Convention which framed the Constitution; and if it intended to
give to Congress, or to authorize them to delegate to a committee of their body,
powers contemplated by this bill, could the Congress or the President of 1792,
have been so extremely uninformed, and indeed ignorant of its meaning and of
their duty, as not to have known it?
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 136 (1800). However, it must be noted that, during the debate over
the Act of 1792, Speaker of the House Sedgwick did mention the possibility of a
"contested election" and "left it to the consideration of the Committee" to address the
solution. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 279 (1791).
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3. The Twenty-second Joint Rule of 1865
The third principal congressional effort to regulate the electoral
count came sixty-five years later in 1865.76 On January 30, 1865, the
House of Representatives passed a resolution now commonly
referred to as the "Twenty-second Joint Rule." A few days later, on
February 6, 1865, after minor amendment, the Senate passed the
House resolution. Sparsely attended Houses of Congress passed the
Twenty-Second Joint Rule with no debate7 As Dean Wroth has
observed, it was "a political measure, passed and used by Republican
majorities of both Houses to assure control over the votes of the
recently rebellious southern states. 78  The purpose of the Twenty-
Second Joint Rule was thus to exclude the electoral votes of putative
states as needed, not to exclude the electoral votes of electors. It
provided in relevant part:
If, upon the reading of any such certificate by the tellers, any
question shall arise in regard to counting the votes therein
certified, the same, having been stated by the Presiding
Officer, shall be submitted, first by the President of the
Senate to that body, and then by the Speaker to the House
of Representatives, and no question shall be decided
affirmatively, and no vote objected to shall be counted,
except by the concurrent votes of the two houses, said votes
of the two houses to be reported to and declared by the
Presiding Officer, and upon any such question there shall be
no debate; and any other question pertinent to the object for
which the two houses are assembled may be submitted and
determined in like manner.79
76. Three other interim and unsuccessful congressional efforts to regulate the
electoral count deserve brief mention. First, on December 12, 1820, Senator Wilson
submitted a resolution entitled Attempt to Remedy the Uncertainty as to Counting the
Electoral Vote by Legislation. See COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 48.
Second, on March 4, 1824, Senator Van Buren--soon to be President Van Buren in
1837-reported a bill similar to Representative John Marshall's Grand Committee Bill.
This bill passed the Senate on April 19, 1824, but died without having been considered by
the House of Representatives. See id. at 57-60; see also Spear, supra note 18, at 158
(describing the historical background); Wroth, supra note 22, at 327 (same). Third, on
May 10, 1828, Representative Wilde moved a resolution entitled "A Proposition to Inquire
into the Legality of the Certificates of the Votes of the Previous Presidential Election."
COUNTING ELECrORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 63-65.
77. See Spear, supra note 18, at 158; Wroth, supra note 22, at 328 n.33.
78. Wroth, supra note 22, at 328; see also Tansill, supra note 22, at 522 ("[T]he
occasion for this assertion of jurisdiction was the breach between the Executive and
Congress relative to the reconstruction of the southern states.").
79. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 148 (House version); see also
Tansill, supra note 22, at 523 (describing the surrounding history); Wroth, supra note 22, at
328 (citing same passage).
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As the text of the Joint Rule indicates, "no vote objected to shall
be counted, except by the concurrent votes of the two houses." Any
Member of Congress could object to an electoral vote for any reason,
and each House was to have a "one-House veto" as to which votes
were to be counted. 0 Thus, each House could, by rejecting enough
votes, trigger a contingency election in the House of Representatives
for the President and in the Senate for the Vice-President.81 As we
shall see shortly, even the Electoral Count Act does not go this far.
A report by the House Committee on Privileges and Elections in
1874 called the Twenty-Second Joint Rule "the most dangerous
contrivance to the peace of the nation that has ever been invented by
Congress."' Indeed, the consensus view during the Electoral Count
Act debates was that the Twenty-Second Joint Rule was
unconstitutional.' Unsurprisingly, scholars who have studied the
80. Sen. Morton offered an analysis:
Under the rule as it now exists, when the votes for President and Vice-President
are counted, any formal objection, no matter how trifling or insufficient or even
contemptible in its character, has the effect to separate the two houses, and they
are to vote upon this objection, and unless both houses concur in voting it down
the electoral vote of that State is lost. In that way, by the dissent of either house,
any State may be disfranchised; the vote of the State of New York or of Indiana
may be rejected by the most foolish and trivial objection unless both houses shall
concur in voting down that objection. The vote of every State may be rejected in
this way.
COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 444.
81, A report by the Committee on Privileges and Elections in 1874 stated: "Here is a
powerful temptation to the House of Representatives by non-concurrence to throw the
election into its own body, and thus, perhaps, secure the election of a candidate who may
have been overwhelmingly beaten at the polls." COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra
note 3, at 417.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., id. at 444 (remarks of Sen. Morton) ("[T]he existence of this rule imperils
the peace of the nation and subjects the Government to great danger.... It requires no
argument, therefore, to prove the absurdity, the unconstitutionality, and the danger of this
rule."); id. (remarks of Sen. Bayard) ("I have for a long time been of opinion that the
constitutionality of this rule altogether may well be doubted."); id at 472 (remarks of Sen.
Bayard) ("That such a rule was without constitutional warrant, I cannot doubt; and I do
not think I am going too far when I say that the unconstitutionality of that rule is generally
admitted."); id at 526 (remarks of Sen. Morton) ("It was absurd, wickedly and
dangerously unconstitutional."); id at 540 (remarks of Sen. Maxey) ("It is a blot upon the
mode and manner of counting the votes of the electoral college. It gives to either [H]ouse
of Congress the right to stab to the death a sovereign State of this Union."). Sen. Bayard
remarked:
Then, under the maleficent working of a rule adopted without regard to the
Constitution, under the assumption of powers utterly unwarranted by the two
[HIouses of Congress, there came the assumption of a veto power by either
branch of Congress, in silence, without debate, without reason, to throw out the
electoral vote and disfranchise one or more communities at will.
Id. at 665.
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Rule have identified it as the apex of congressional control over the
electoral count.' Simply put, the Twenty-second Joint Rule was
unconstitutional.'
4. The Electoral Count Act of 1887
The legislative history of the Electoral Count Act of 1887 is
complex, and much of this history has been well catalogued
elsewhere.8 6  The heart of the Electoral Count Act is currently
codified at 3 U.S.C. § 15, titled "Counting electoral votes in
Congress."' This section sets forth a complicated set of provisions
for counting electoral votes.
Two noticeable differences exist between the Electoral Count
Act and the Twenty-second Joint Rule. First, the Electoral Count
Act is a law and not a joint rule. Second, the Electoral Count Act
does not have the "one-House veto" provision of the Twenty-second
Joint Rule. It is not clear that these two significant changes cure the
constitutional infirmities of the Twenty-second Joint Rule.
Charting the basic workings of the Electoral Count Act is a good
place to begin. The Act provides for the reading of the electoral
votes by state and the objection to an electoral vote. Unlike its
predecessors, the Electoral Count Act requires an objection to an
electoral vote to have the signature of at least one Senator and at
least one Representative.' After all the objections to the electoral
votes from a state have been received and read, the Senate and the
House of Representatives withdraw for separate deliberations.
84. See Tansill, supra note 22, at 522 ("In 1865, the climax of congressional control
[over the electoral vote] was reached ..... "); Wroth, supra note 22, at 328 ("Congress
asserted total power over the electoral vote with the adoption of the Twenty-second Joint
Rule in 1865.").
85. The "one-House veto" of the Twenty-second Joint Rule bears a remarkable
resemblance to the scheme held unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959
(1983) (holding a "one-House veto" provision unconstitutional).
86. In a nutshell, the precursor bill to the Electoral Count Act was introduced in the
Republican Senate in May 1878. "Spurred by two close presidential elections, the Senate
repassed the bill three times in the next decade, but each time could not win the
agreement of the House." Wroth, supra note 22, at 334 (footnotes omitted). The two
Houses of Congress finally agreed in 1887, after "the passions of Reconstruction had
cooled." Id. For a comprehensive summary of the legislative history of the Electoral
Count Act, see Ross & Josephson, supra note 7, at 722-30, and Wroth, supra note 22, at
334-35.
87. 3 U.S.C § 15 (2000).
88. Id- ("Every objection shall be made in writing, and shall state clearly and
concisely, and without argument, the ground thereof, and shall be signed by at least one
Senator and one Member of the House of Representatives before the same shall be
received.").
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Unless there is a case of "double returns," the applicable provision is
as follows:
[N]o electoral vote or votes from any State which shall have
been regularly given by electors whose appointment has
been lawfully certified to according to section 6 of this title
from which but one return has been received shall be
rejected, but the two Houses concurrently may reject the
vote or votes when they agree that such vote or votes have
not been so regularly given by electors whose appointment
has been so certified.89
In the case of "double returns" with "more than one return or
paper purporting to be a return from a State," 9 the applicable
statutory provision is considerably more complex. The joint
convention first looks to see if the state has determined the
controversy, and if it has, that determination is binding.91 If, however,
there should be multiple state authorities which claim to have decided
the controversy, then the two Houses of Congress, acting separately,
must decide concurrently which set to count. If the two Houses
disagree, then the Electoral Count Act provides that "the votes of the
electors whose appointment shall have been certified by the executive
of the state, under the seal thereof, shall be counted." g The Electoral
Count Act does not address what happens if the same executive
authority certifies different electors or if multiple executive
authorities certify different electors.
B. The Problems of the Electoral Count
Fortunately, Senator Ross's doomsday prediction in the Sixth
Congress that the thorny problems of the electoral count "might
happen, and were very likely to happen"" has not been borne out in
89. Id (emphasis added). Note that the referred to section 6, 3 U.S.C. § 6 (2000), is
the modern codification of section 3 of the Act of 1792.
90. 3 U.S.C. § 15.
91. Id. § 5 ("Determination of controversy as to appointment of electors") provides:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the
appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or
contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by
judicial or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been
made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such
determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and made at
least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive,
and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the
Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the
electors appointed by such State is concerned.
92. Id. § 15.
93. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1800); COUNTING ELECrORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at
1678 [Vol. 80
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the course of two hundred and thirteen years of the Republic. There
have been a dozen or so problems of the electoral count and
consequent challenges to electoral votes, almost all of which occurred
in the nineteenth-century. This section summarizes the historical
problems of the electoral count.
1. The Massachusetts Incident of 1809
The first congressional objection to the votes of electors occurred
in the electoral count of 1809.91 On December 26, 1808,
Representative Barker introduced a memorial from some disgruntled
inhabitants of Hanover, Massachusetts that the appointment of
Massachusetts electors was "irregular and unconstitutional" 95 relative
to the Massachusetts Constitution, and praying that Congress look
into the matter during the electoral count. When a resolution was
called to appoint a committee of the House to investigate,
Representative Randolph spoke in very strong terms against it:
He said it appeared to him that, under color of redress of
grievances, the resolution might go in a very alarming and
dangerous manner to enlarge the sphere of action of the
General Government at the expense of the dearest rights of
the States. In what manner, asked he, is the General
Government constituted? We, as one of the branches of the
Legislature, are unquestionably the judges of our own
qualifications and returns. The Senate, the other branch of
the Legislature, is in like manner the judge without appeal of
the qualifications of its own members. But with respect to
the appointment of President on whom is that authority
devolved in the first instance? On the electors, who are to
all intents and purposes, according to my apprehension, as
much the judges of their own qualifications as we are of
ours .... 96
Representative Rowan also spoke strongly against the resolution.
He thought that "Congress did not possess a superintending power
over the acts of the States in general cases" and doubted that
Congress had any power in this case; he recommended that the
petitions of the Massachusetts citizens not be placed on the files of
the House "because they related to a subject on which the House had
no power to legislate." 7 The resolution passed nevertheless, but
16.
94. COUNTING ELECrORALVOTES, supra note 3, at 37-42.
95. I& at 37-38.
96. I at 38.
97. 1& at 39.
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there is no record that anything further was done. No one objected
during the electoral count, and all Massachusetts electoral votes were
counted.
2. The Indiana Incident of 1817
The second congressional objection to the votes of electors
occurred in the electoral count of 1817.98 On February 11, 1817, the
two Houses gathered in the House of Representatives. During the
electoral count, Representative Taylor, "compelled" to speak "by his
sense of duty," 99 objected to the counting of the electoral votes from
Indiana because the Indiana electors were elected before Indiana
joined the Union. The Speaker of the House interrupted him and
stated that, when assembled in joint convention, the two Houses
"could consider no proposition, nor perform any business not
prescribed by the Constitution."'" Accordingly, the Senate withdrew
to its chamber by their unanimous consent. Representative Taylor
then repeated his argument that, because the Indiana electors were
chosen before Indiana was admitted into the Union, "the votes of that
State were no more entitled to be counted than if they had been
received from Missouri or any other Territory of the United
States." '' In his view, the votes of the Indiana electors were
,,illegal.,,102
Although Representative Taylor did not refer to it, the improper
appointment of the Indiana electors was in violation of section 1 of
the Act of 1792. However, the votes of Indiana's electors were cast
after Indiana was admitted into the Union. Indiana was admitted into
the Union as the nineteenth State effective December 11, 1816. This
date was after the date set by Congress for the meeting of the
electoral colleges but before the date set by Congress for the electoral
count.
Representative Cady countered. He
thought that the matter had been settled by the admission of
Senators and Representatives from Indiana to their seats,
and that it was too late on that account to question her right
to participate in the election of President; and that from the
moment the constitution of the State was assented to, she
98. See id. at 44-47.
99. Id. at 46.
100. Id.




was entitled to all the privileges of an independent member
of the Union.1 3
A joint resolution to settle the question was indefinitely
postponed by the House of Representatives."° The Senate re-entered
the House Chamber and the electoral count resumed. According to
the record of congressional debate, "[n]o one appeared to question
the power of Congress to reject the vote of Indiana if that State was
not a State in the Union at the time the electoral votes were cast."'15
In the end, the votes of Indiana's three electors were counted.
3. The Missouri Incident of 1821
The third congressional objection to the votes of electors
occurred in the electoral count of 1821.'° In early February of 1821,
Congress passed a resolution appointing a joint committee "to
ascertain and report a mode of examining the votes for President and
Vice-President of the United States, and of notifying the persons
elected of their election."'" On February 13, 1821, the Senate
resolved that if any objection was made to the electoral votes of
Missouri and if the result of the electoral count did not turn on
counting or omitting the Missouri votes, then the President of the
Senate would announce the winners of the presidential and vice
presidential electoral vote, plus a conditional tally-that is to say, if
Missouri's votes were counted, the tally would be x; if Missouri's
votes were not counted, the tally would be y. In the Senate, a "long
debate" took place on this resolution and four Senators strongly
opposed it "principally for the reason that it was not competent in the
Senate to decide such a question in anticipation."'08
When the resolution was read in the House of Representatives,
Representative Randolph stated he would rather have seen no votes
counted at all than a "special verdict" announced:
103. Id.
104. Id. When Representative Sharp offered the joint resolution, Representative
Bassett objected, stating that the resolution should not be joint because a joint resolution
might establish a precedent which would "deprive [the] House of one of its powers, by
permitting the Senate to participate in this question." I& at 47. There is no record of any
Representative supporting this erroneous view. There is no textual reason to conclude
that the House has judicial power during the electoral count but that the Senate does not,
or vice versa.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 48-56.
107. Id at 48 (Senate Resolution); id. at 51 (House Resolution).
108. Id. at 49.
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He could not recognize in this house or the other house,
singly or conjointly, the power to decide on the votes of any
State.... He maintained that the electoral college was as
independent of Congress as Congress of them; and we have
no right, said he, to judge of their proceedings.... Suppose
a case, in which some gentlemen of one house or the other
should choose to turn up his nose at the vote of some State,
and say that if it be so and so, such a person is elected; and if
so and so, what-you-call-'im is elected--did not everybody
see the absurdity of such a proposition?'09
Representative Floyd also objected to the special verdict. He stated,
If they had any power over the votes of Missouri at all, it
was when her votes were first received; but no such power
existed. He protested against this assumption of authority
on the part of Congress, and wished to show his
disapprobation of the resolution in the strongest manner.10
Representative Rhea agreed, finding that the Constitution was
not designed to be expedient and that "it was not in the power of this
House, or of both Houses, by resolution, to remedy a defect in the
Constitution." ''
Soon afterwards, during the electoral count, Senator Livermore
objected to the electoral votes from Missouri because Missouri was
not a State of the Union. He was right. Missouri was admitted into
the Union as the twenty-fourth State effective August 10, 1821. In
the House, Representative Floyd submitted a resolution "[t]hat
Missouri is one of the States of this Union, and her votes for
President and Vice-President of the United States ought to be
received and counted.' ' 2
After extended comments by Representatives Randolph and
Archer against the resolution on the ground that it was not within the
power of the House, a motion to table the resolution passed, and the
Senate reassembled in the House Chamber for the electoral count.113
The President of the Senate proceeded to announce the result of the
vote conditionally, as provided in the Senate resolution:
The whole number of electors appointed by the several
States was 235. One elector in each of the States of
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Mississippi having died before
the meeting of the electoral college of which he was a
109. Id at 51.
110. IaM at 52.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 53.
113. Id. at 50-53.
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member, made the whole number of votes actually cast 232,
including the vote of Missouri, of which 117 make a
majority; or, excluding the vote of Missouri, 229, of which
115 make a majority; but in either event James Monroe is
elected President, and Daniel D. Tompkins, Vice-
President.114
When Representative Floyd asked the President of the Senate if
Missouri's votes were in fact counted, the joint convention broke into
disorder. Representative Randolph tried to speak but was
pronounced out of order by the Speaker of the House. The President
of the Senate concluded and the Senate withdrew to its Chamber.11 5
Thereafter, Representative Randolph introduced two resolutions
in the House declaring that the electoral count was illegal. The first
resolution provided that the electoral votes of Missouri were counted.
The second resolution provided
[t]hat the whole number of electors appointed, and of votes
given for President and Vice-President, has not been
agreeably announced by the presiding officer of the Senate
and House of Representatives, agreeably to the provision of
the Constitution of the United States, and that therefore the
proceeding has been irregular and illegal."6
As he was putting his resolutions into writing, the House voted to
adjourn and did not act upon either resolution." 7
4. The Postmaster and Michigan Incidents of 1837
The fourth congressional objection to the votes of electors
occurred during the electoral count of 1837.118 The electoral count of
1837 actually involved two separate incidents: the Postmaster
Incident and the Michigan Incident. In late January of 1837, the
Senate and the House of Representatives resolved to appoint a joint
committee "to ascertain and report a mode of examining the votes of
President and Vice President of the United States, and of notifying
114. Id. at 50. As this pronouncement makes clear, the electoral count of 1821 is
unique for another reason: this was the first (and only) time when electors who were
appointed died before the meeting of the electoral colleges. It appears that the President
of the Senate miscalculated the number necessary for a majority of the votes. The
Electoral College Clauses provide that the needed majority be "a majority of the whole
number of Electors appointed." U.S. CONsT. amend. XII (emphasis added); see U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. Thus, the correct majority was either 116 or 118 votes, depending
on the exclusion or inclusion of Missouri.
115. COUNTING ELECrORAL VOTEs, supra note 3, at 56.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 56.
118. See id. at 70-76.
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the persons of their election." '119 Senator Grundy, who was one of
three Senators on the joint committee, reported to the Senate on
February 4, 1837 that some electors may have been constitutionally
ineligible to be electors because "no Senator or Representative, or
Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States,
shall be appointed an elector. '120 He reported that Isaac Waldron, an
elector from New Hampshire, was the "president of a deposit-bank at
Portsmouth, and was appointed and acting as pension-agent, without
compensation, under the authority of the United States" and the two
North Carolina electors held the "offices of deputy postmasters under
the General Government. 121 In addition, the appointment of three
other electors (from New Hampshire, Connecticut, and North
Carolina, respectively) was in question.122 The Committee concluded
that the Electoral Incompatibility Clause "excludes and disqualifies
deputy postmasters from the appointment of electors; and the
disqualification relates to the time of the appointments, and that a
resignation of the office of deputy postmaster after his appointment
as elector would not entitle him to vote as elector under theConstitution.' ' 123
The Senate took no further action on the issue. Debate in the
House of Representatives was minimal. One Representative pointed
out that all of these electors probably resigned from their offices
before the day on which they cast their votes, 24 but was quickly
corrected by another who noted that the ineligibility under the
Electoral Incompatibility Clause extended to the time of the
appointment.Y5 These issues were not raised during the electoral
count, and all of these electoral votes were counted.
The Michigan Incident was similar to the Indiana and Missouri
Incidents. Michigan was admitted into the Union as the twenty-sixth
State effective January 26, 1837. This date was after the date
Congress set for the meeting of the Electoral Colleges, but before the
date Congress set for the counting of electoral votes. On February 4,
1837, the Senate proposed a resolution to count Michigan's electoral
votes in the same manner as Missouri's. Senator Norvell objected to
119. Id. at 70 (Senate Resolution).
120. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
121. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 71 (remarks of Sen. Grundy).
122. See id. (noting that "five or six votes only would in any event be abstracted from
the whole number").
123. I&
124. Id. at 73 (remarks of Rep. Cambreling).
125. Id. (remarks of Rep. Thomas).
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this resolution, arguing that the Michigan question was exactly the
same as that of the Indiana Incident.'26
Senator Calhoun also opposed the resolution, stating that
"Michigan was a State de facto at the time she formed her
constitution; and if her electors were not legally appointed, neither
were her Senators, who were admitted upon this floor."'27 The Senate
adopted this resolution by a vote of thirty-four to nine. 28 The House
adopted the same resolution on February 6, 1837, although
Representative Crary of Michigan also "thought the position of his
State was analogous to that of Indiana, and that her vote should be
received and counted."'129
On February 8, 1837, the President of the Senate announced the
result of the electoral count in the same way as in the Missouri
Incident. Martin Van Buren of New York was declared the
President-elect.3 0 If Michigan's votes were counted, he had 170; if
not, he had 167 votes. In either event, Martin Van Buren had a
majority of the whole number of electors appointed. However, a
different situation presented itself in the case of the Vice President-
elect. Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky had the most electoral votes.
If Michigan's votes were counted, he had 147 votes; if not, he had 144
votes. In either event, he did not have the requisite majority to be the
Vice President-elect, and thus, the choice devolved upon the
Senate.131 The Senate elected Johnson as Vice President.
5. The Wisconsin Incident of 1857
The fifth congressional objection to the votes of electors
occurred during the electoral count of 1857.132 In the election of 1856,
the five electors of the State of Wisconsin did not cast their votes on
the day prescribed by federal law because of a snowstorm. 33 The
President of the Senate counted Wisconsin's electoral votes over the
objections of both Representatives and Senators assembled in
126. Id. at 72 (remarks of Sen. Norvell). Senator Lyon agreed and "contended that
Michigan was as much entitled to count her vote as was the State of Indiana." IdL Senator
Clay disagreed. Id.
127. Id. (second emphasis added).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 73.
130. Id. at75.
131. Id. at 75-76.
132. See i&. at 86-144.
133. See, e.g., id. at 117 (remarks of Sen. Seward) (referring to "accidental delay
produced by the interposition of Providence preventing the vote being cast at the
prescribed time").
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convention.11 When Representative Lechter objected to Wisconsin's
electoral votes and moved to exclude them, the presiding officer (the
President of the Senate) simply stated that no debate was in order
when the votes were being read by the tellers or even after they were
finished.'35 When Senator Crittenden then asked the presiding
officer, "Do I understand the Chair to decide that Congress, in no
form, has power to decide upon the validity or invalidity of a
vote?,"' the presiding officer replied that it was his constitutional
duty to announce the result of the electoral count and that "[w]hat
further action may be taken, if any further action should be taken,
will devolve upon the properly-constituted authorities of the country-
the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be.' ' 37
While the final result did not turn on the decision to count
Wisconsin's electoral votes, several Members of Congress were
concerned that the decision to count Wisconsin's electoral votes
would set a dangerous precedent. 38  According to Senator Pugh,
unlike the Missouri Incident which was "never likely to happen
again," the Wisconsin Incident "may occur one hundred times again,
if the Government should stand that many years.' ' 39  Senator
Crittenden made the point that the electoral votes of Wisconsin were
not really "votes" at all, by stating: "Here is a vote tendered us from
a State given on another day. We call it a vote in common parlance;
but in the constitutional sense is it a vote at all? Is it not merely null?
Unquestionably, it seems to me, it is null and void."'4° This statement
attracted considerable support. Almost every Member of Congress
who spoke on the subject agreed that the votes of Wisconsin should
not have been counted.' 4'
134. Id. at 87-89.
135. Id. at 89.
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also id. ("The Presiding Officer would state that, the votes having been
counted and announced, the functions of the two houses, assembled for the purpose of
counting the votes, are discharged.").
138. See, e.g., id (remarks of Rep. Marshall); id (remarks of Sen. Toombs); id. at 90
(remarks of Sen. Butler); id. at 110 (remarks of Sen. Nourse).
139. Id. at 137 (remarks of Sen. Pugh).
140. Id at 131.
141. Senators Hale and Houston were the sole exceptions in the Senate. Senator Hale
urged that Wisconsin's votes should be counted because the people of Wisconsin ought
not to be disenfranchised because of an "accident" of their agents. His cry was very much
one of substance over form. See id at 119. Senator Houston argued that any resolution
that Wisconsin's votes should not have been counted was unconstitutional. In his view,
the electoral count of 1857 was "good, constitutional, and lawful." Id at 122-23.
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Ultimately, resolutions were introduced in each House of
Congress that Wisconsin's electoral votes were null and void and
ought not to have been included in the electoral count, but these
resolutions failed. 42
6. The Greeley Incident and the Other Incidents of 1873
The sixth congressional objection to the votes of electors
occurred during the electoral count of 1873.1'" In the election of 1872,
three Georgia electors cast votes for Horace Greeley of New York.
Greeley had died after the November popular election but before the
electors met in the electoral colleges. These three electors voted for
Greeley anyway, feeling bound by the wishes of their constituents.
Senator Hoar objected to these three votes and stated that they could
not be counted because Greeley was not a "person" within the
meaning of the Constitution when the electors voted.
144
Representative Banks objected on the basis that "we have no power
to decide on the eligibility of any man voted for for President."'45 The
question of whether to count these votes was a very close one. The
House voted 101 to 99 (with forty not voting) not to count the
Greeley votes. 46 The Senate voted forty-four to nineteen to count
them.147 Because the two Houses did not concur, the Greeley votes
were not counted pursuant to the Twenty-second Joint Rule. 48
The electoral count of 1873 presented at least three other
important challenges to electoral votes. First, two objections were
made to Mississippi's electoral votes. The Mississippi electors did not
certify that they voted by ballot. 49 One of the electors from that
state, A.T. Morgan, was absent and the electors appointed an
alternate, J.J. Spellman. Spellman's appointment was not signed by
the Governor of Mississippi as required by the laws of that state.5°
The House and the Senate voted to count all Mississippi electoral
votes, including Spellman's. 5 '
142. See id at 132 (proposed joint House and Senate resolution); id at 144 (House).
143. See id at 357-408.
144. Id at 366.
145. Id. at368.
146. Id
147. Id. at 377.
148. Id. at 380. The Greeley precedent almost certainly affected the electoral vote of
1912. In that year, the defeated Republican candidate for Vice President died before the
meeting of the electoral colleges, and the pledged electors voted for someone else. See
115 CONG. REC. 148 (1969) (remarks of Rep. McCulloch).
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Second, Senator Morton objected to Georgia's votes for a
different reason. Apparently two votes were cast for Charles J.
Jenkins of Georgia for President, and five votes for Alfred H.
Colquitt of Georgia for Vice President.52 This vote distribution
revealed a mathematical certainty: at least one of the electors from
that State had violated the constitutional requirement that he vote for
at least one person who is not an inhabitant of his State. 3 Because
the objection was made after the electoral votes from Georgia were
read, the Chair decided that it came too late and no decision was
made on this objection.54
Third, two objections were made to Texas's electoral votes. The
executive authority of Texas had failed to certify that its electors were
properly appointed. Moreover, four of the electors (less than a
majority of those elected) themselves appointed four persons to take
the place of four elected, but absent, electors. 155 Nonetheless, both
the House and the Senate voted to count all of Texas's electoral
votes. 56
7. The Hayes-Tilden Incident of 1877
The seventh and most important objection to the votes of
electors occurred during the electoral count of 1877-the "never
again" incident that directly led to the passage of the Electoral Count
Act roughly a decade later. Undoubtedly, the electoral count of 1877
is the most objectionable electoral count in history, having been
described by one of our leading scholars as "the most violent,
fraudridden, and tumultuous in history."'57
In 1876, Democrat Samuel J. Tilden squeaked out a majority of
the total number of popular votes for President, defeating Republican
Rutherford B. Hayes by just 250,000 votes. 58 Hayes, however,
152. Id.
153. Id
154. Id. at 380-81.
155. Id at 382-83.
156. Id. at 389.
157. Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST.
COMMENT. 115, 127 (1994).
158. For an excellent summary of the incident, see McConnell, supra note 157, at
127-33. For the principal historical scholarship on this incident, see CHARLES FAIRMAN,
FIVE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley
N. Katz eds., 1988); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 575-87 (1988); PAUL LELAND HAWORTH, THE HAYES-
TILDEN DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (1906); KEITH POLAKOFF, THE POLITICS
OF INERTIA: THE ELECTION OF 1876 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION (1973). For a
discussion of this incident by those who have written on the Electoral Count Act, see, for
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claimed a one-vote majority of the electoral votes with 185 votes to
Tilden's 184. The problem was that rival Republican and Democratic
state governments in three states-Florida, Louisiana, and South
Carolina-each had sent rival electoral certificates to Congress,
presenting the standard case of "double returns" from these states.5 9
After mediation failed, Congress created an "Electoral
Commission" to resolve the disputed double returns from these
states.16° This Commission was to consist of fifteen persons: five
Senators, five Representatives, and five Justices of the Supreme
Court. As ought to be apparent, the Commission has some very eerie
similarities to the Grand Committee of 1800. The plan was to appoint
seven Republicans and seven Democrats; the fifteenth person would
be a Justice of the Supreme Court picked by the other four "partisan"
Justices. Justice David Davis, an Independent, initially received the
nod to be this fifteenth person, but he declined the offer after the
Illinois Legislature appointed him to fill a vacancy in the Senate.
Justice Joseph P. Bradley, a Republican, then received the thankless
job.
example, GLENNON, supra note 18, at 16-17, and Wroth, supra note 22, at 331-34 & 331
n.46 (collecting other sources).
159. There was a problem with one electoral vote from Oregon as well: one of the
Oregon electors for Hayes was a postmaster, and was therefore ineligible to the office of
elector, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Oregon's Democratic Governor, refusing to
certify the electoral certificate, struck the name of the postmaster-elector for Hayes and
substituted that of an elector for Tilden, who received the next most votes. This account is
briefly recollected in Harrison, supra note 23, at 700 n.2 (citing ARI HOOGENBOOM, THE
PRESIDENCY OF RUTHERFORD B. HAYES 30-31 (1988)).
160. During the Electoral Count Act debates, at least one Senator noted that the
Electoral Commission of 1877 was constitutionally suspect, though he noted that it was "a
wise solution to a great difficulty." See 17 CONG. REc. 817 (1886) (remarks of Sen.
Sherman). In his book on Reconstruction, Professor Bruce Ackerman calls this Electoral
Commission "extraconstitutional." 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 247 (1998). Perhaps this is a clever attempt to avoid calling it
"unconstitutional." Other scholars have firmly taken the position that the Electoral
Commission was unconstitutional. I agree. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 23, at 700 n.3
("Under now-current separation of powers doctrine the commission was almost certainly
unconstitutional. Its members exercised significant government power but were not
appointed consistently with the Appointments Clause, as Buckley v. Valeo says they
should have been.") (citation omitted); Tribe, supra note 17, at 278 & n.438. Professor
Tribe states:
Today, of course, the service on such a body by members of Congress would be
understood to violate the separation of powers as construed by Buckley v. Valeo,
and the reservation of a veto power in Congress acting by anything less than full
legislation presented to the President for signature or veto would be understood
to violate the nonparliamentary structure of our government.
(citation omitted) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)).
2002] 1689
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Interestingly, the Commission was to have "the same powers, if
any, now possessed.., by the two Houses."16' The Commission was
only to have jurisdiction over the cases of double returns; objections
to electoral votes in cases of single returns would be handled as later
provided by the Electoral Count Act (the two Houses, meeting
separately, would need to concur to reject a vote). The decisions of
the Commission, like that of the Grand Committee, were to be final,
but with one exception: the two Houses could overturn the decision
of the Commission if they so concurred. 162
Given the political composition of the Commission, it is not
surprising that the Commission secured a victory for Hayes. In each
case of double returns, the Commission voted eight to seven to count
the votes of the Republican electors by a strict party vote, with Justice
Bradley casting the decisive vote in each case. This perceived
partisanship had huge political costs. The Democrats controlled the
House of Representatives and threatened a filibuster to delay the
counting of electoral votes. A constitutional crisis loomed: if no
President was elected by March 4, 1877, then the Presidential
Succession Clause might kick in.'63
The famous "Compromise of 1877," announced on March 1,
1877, served to avert this crisis. Southern Democrats would proceed
with the formal counting of the electoral votes, allowing Republican
Hayes to be elected President, but would extract several substantial
concessions from him. Among other things, congressional
Republicans, speaking for Hayes, agreed to cease federal military
support for the Reconstruction governments of the South, sealing the
end of Reconstruction. The upshot of the Hayes-Tilden Incident is
that Hayes became President although he was the clear loser in the
popular vote and the likely loser of the electoral vote. 64
161. Act of Jan. 29,1877, ch. 37, § 2, 19 Stat. 227,229; see Wroth, supra note 22, at 331.
162. This "two-House veto" provision is constitutionally problematic. See INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-51 (1983); Tribe, supra note 17, at 278 (noting same point).
163. See text accompanying infra note 476.
164. The modem view is that Samuel Tilden should have garnered the electoral votes
of Florida, thus giving him a several vote majority of the electoral votes. See, e.g., C.
VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE
END OF RECONSTRUCTION 19 (2d. ed. 1966); Jerrell H. Schofner, Florida Courts and the
Disputed Election of 1876, 48 FLA. HIST. Q. 26, 46 (1969); Jerrell H. Schofner, Florida in
the Balance: The Electoral Count of 1876,47 FLA. HIST. Q. 122,148-50 (1968).
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8. The Hawaii Incident of 1961
The eighth congressional objection to the votes of electors
occurred during the electoral count of 1961.165 This incident,
involving the validity of the electoral certificate(s) of Hawaii, was the
most significant problem of the electoral count of the twentieth
century, and the one most relevant given recent history.
The initial election results in Hawaii showed Republicans
Richard M. Nixon and Henry Cabot Lodge as the winners of the
popular vote for President and Vice President. A slate of Nixon-
Lodge electors was appointed on November 16, 1960, certified by the
acting Governor of Hawaii on November 28, 1960. A recount was
ordered to begin on December 13, 1960. On December 19, 1960, a
slate of Nixon-Lodge electors cast their votes for President and Vice
President. 16 6 This electoral certificate was previously certified by the
Acting Governor of Hawaii.167 However, on December 19, 1960, a
slate of Kennedy-Johnson electors also cast their votes for President
and Vice President, without any previous certification from the
executive authority of Hawaii.168 On December 30, 1960, the Circuit
Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the State of Hawaii determined
that the Kennedy-Johnson electors won the popular vote in Hawaii.169
A few days later, on January 4, 1961, the newly-elected Governor of
Hawaii certified the electoral certificate of the Kennedy-Johnson
electors . 7  The Administrator of General Services received this
certification on January 6, 1961-the day of the electoral count.
During the electoral count, President of the Senate Richard
Nixon stated that "[t]he Chair has received three certificates from
persons claiming to be the duly appointed electors from the State of
Hawaii.' 17  These three certificates were (1) the Nixon-Lodge
electoral certificate of December 19, 1960, certified by the executive
authority of Hawaii as of November 28, 1960; (2) the Kennedy-
Johnson electoral certificate of December 19, 1960; and (3) the
Kennedy-Johnson electoral certificate of December 19, 1960, certified
by the newly-elected executive authority of Hawaii as of January 4,
1961.172 After these three electoral certificates were opened and read,
165. See 107 CONG. REC. 288-91 (1961).
166. See id. at 289.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id at 290.
170. See idU at 289-90.
171. Mc at 289.
172. Id. at 289-90.
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Nixon stated that "[t]he Chair has knowledge, and is convinced that
he is supported by the facts" that the third electoral certificate
"properly and legally portrays the facts" with respect to the popular
election in Hawaii. 73 Accordingly, he stated that
[i]n order not to delay the further count of the electoral vote
here, the Chair, without the intent of establishing a precedent,
suggests that the electors named in the certificate of the
Governor of Hawaii dated January 4, 1961, be considered as
the lawful electors from the State of Hawaii. 74
No one objected and all three of Hawaii's electoral votes were
counted.175
9. The Bailey Incident of 1969
The ninth and most recent congressional objection to the votes of
electors occurred during the electoral count of 1969.176 It was well
known before the joint convention convened for the purposes of the
electoral count that Dr. Lloyd W. Bailey, a Republican elector from
North Carolina, had been "faithless" in giving his two electoral
votes-instead of following the popular vote for Richard M. Nixon
for President and Spiro Agnew as Vice President, Dr. Bailey voted
for George C. Wallace for President and Curtis Lemay as Vice
President. The Governor of North Carolina certified the state's
electoral certificate with knowledge of Dr. Bailey's faithlessness.
A few days before the electoral count, some Senators, led by
Senator Muskie (who was then running for Vice President),
introduced a memorandum in the Senate recommending that Dr.
Bailey's vote be rejected, and that it be recast in accordance with the
popular vote in North Carolina. 77 This memorandum announced the
authors' intention to object to the vote of North Carolina on January
6, 1969.178 During the electoral count on January 6, 1969,
Representative O'Hara objected to the electoral votes of North
173. Id. at 290.
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. The result of the electoral count did not even come close to turning on the legal
status of Hawaii's three electoral votes. Democrats Kennedy and Johnson prevailed in the
electoral count by a margin of eighty-four votes. See id. at 291.
176. See 115 CONG. REc. 9-11 (1969); id. at 146-72 (House debate); id. at 209-46
(Senate debate); see also GLENNON, supra note 18, at 37-40 (discussing history); Ross &
Josephson, supra note 7, at 731-37 (same).
177. See 115 CONG. REC. 11.
178. Interestingly, the memorandum cited the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S.




Carolina and presented a written objection signed by him and Senator
Muskie in which thirty-seven Representatives and six Senators
joined.179 The objection proposed simply that Dr. Bailey's vote be
rejected (and not recast in accordance with the popular vote in North
Carolina).5 0
The debate in each House of Congress was extensive, with over
forty Representatives and over twenty-five Senators speaking on the
objection. The House of Representatives debated the objection for a
full two hours-the maximum time allowed by the Electoral Count
Act. The rationale in the House for sustaining the objection and
rejecting Dr. Bailey's vote was mixed. Some Representatives argued
that only Congress could check faithless electors.'" Representative
Edmondson stated that the "power of Congress to count the electoral
vote" is "the only constitutional power specifically granted to
anybody [sic] or agent to protect the electoral system against arbitrary
or unlawful action to thwart the popular will of the people of the
States in electing the President of the United States."' Other
Representatives argued that Dr. Bailey's faithless vote was not
"regularly given" within the meaning of the Electoral Count Act. 3
Yet others rested their justification to sustain the objection on more
lofty constitutional arguments of "one man, one vote"'" and
"justice. ,
The Representatives who spoke against the objection were more
unified. They argued that Congress had no power not to count Dr.
Bailey's faithless vote because that power was not within the meaning
of the Electoral Count Act, 6 or because Congress had no such power
under the Constitution.' 7 Representative Rarick put the latter point
best:
179. See id. at 146.
180. See id.
181. See, e.g., id. at 147 (remarks of Rep. Wright) (stating that Congress has "the legal
and constitutional power, and indeed the duty, to prevent faithless electors from
corrupting the election of a President"); i at 158 (remarks of Rep. Corman) (stating that
"Congress sits as a court of last resort"); id. at 170 (remarks of Rep. O'Hara) ("Only the
Congress can see to it that the elector respects his obligations ...
182. Id. at 148.
183. See, e.g., id. at 169 (remarks of Rep. Schwengel).
184. See, e.g., id at 146-47 (remarks of Rep. Wright); id at 158 (remarks of Rep.
Rodino).
185. See id. at 165 (remarks of Rep. Hosmer).
186. See, e.g., hi at 151 (remarks of Rep. Anderson) (arguing that Electoral Count Act
was "intended to circumscribe to the very narrowest limits the power of the Congress to
do anything other than to certify the results in the States"); id at 168 (remarks of Rep.
Fish).
187. See, e.g., id. at 148-49 (remarks of Rep. McCulloch) (arguing that electors are
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Under the Constitution and our oath of office we, as
Congressmen, are not election supervisors nor given
discretion to recompute the vote received from a sovereign
state. The Constitution clearly proscribes our duty as "to
count the electoral votes," the ministerial function of a
central collecting agency and a tabulating point.""
Ultimately, the House of Representatives voted to reject the
objection, but not by an overwhelming margin. The vote was 170 to
228, with thirty-two not voting and four not yet sworn."9 Among the
Representatives voting for the objection were future Presidents
George H.W. Bush and Gerald R. Ford. 9° The Senate debate was
similar but briefer. Ultimately, the Senate also voted to reject the
objection not by an overwhelming margin. The vote was thirty-three
to fifty-eight, with seven not voting and two live pair. 91 Because both
Houses of Congress did not vote to sustain the objection and reject
Dr. Bailey's vote, the vote was counted.
II. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
ELECTORAL COUNT ACT
In Part I, we examined the principal congressional efforts to
regulate the electoral count. The fact that Congress did not pass the
Electoral Count Act until 1887, and only after several failed attempts
to enact legislation regulating the counting of electoral votes is
(perhaps surprisingly) of minimal consequence in assessing the
constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act.19 The better clue relates
independent under the Electoral College Clauses and concluding that Congress could not
"tamper" with Dr. Bailey's vote). Representative Poff argued that
[i]f the Congress can look behind the solemn certificate of the Chief Executive of
a State, reject that certificate and by a simple majority vote decide what electoral
votes were "regularly given" and which were given irregularly, then the Congress
can expropriate from the people their power to elect their President.
Id. at 157; see also id. at 162 (remarks of Rep. Henderson) (arguing that Congress's role is
like a local board of elections whose "function is solely to receive the votes, count them,
and certify the result.., not to determine whether votes were properly cast"); id at 164
(remarks of Rep. Eckhardt) (stating that it was "beyond question in the Constitution...
that the joint session of the House and the Senate has no power whatsoever other than to
hear the returns of the electors read"); id. at 166-67 (remarks of Rep. Fountain) (calling
Congress "powerless").
188. Id. at 168.
189. Id. at 170.
190. For Representative Gerald Ford's statement in support of the objection, see id at
163-64.
191. Id. at 246.
192. The converse is not true. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991)
(opinion of Scalia, J.) (stating that "[t]he actions of the First Congress ... are of course
persuasive evidence of what the Constitution means") (citations omitted); Powell v.
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not to timing, but to tone. As we saw somewhat in Part I and as we
shall see in more detail in this Part, the constitutionality of legislation
regulating the counting of electoral votes was controversial from the
start. In particular, the constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act
was considered and debated by several Congresses that considered
such legislation in the Reconstruction Era. This level of extended
debate should raise a red flag as to the possible unconstitutionality of
the Electoral Count Act.
An "interpretivist" resolution of the constitutionality of the
Electoral Count Act must, however, be based on arguments from
constitutional text and structure. This Part sets forth these two
arguments. The textual argument carefully parses the words of the
Electoral College Clauses, and shows how the Electoral Count Act
clashes with the Constitution. In addition, the textual argument,
unlike conventional "clause-bound" textual arguments, examines the
text of the Constitution as a coherent whole, invoking a host of other
clauses, in order to squeeze yet additional meaning from the Electoral
College Clauses, and shed additional light on the unconstitutionality
of the Electoral Count Act. The structural argument identifies a
number of structural principles of the Constitution that relate to
presidential election and to legislation, and shows how the Electoral
Count Act violates these principles.
Anyone who wishes to argue that the Electoral Count Act is
constitutional bears a high burden of proof, in light of the arguments
presented, and in light of the asymmetry of constitutional proofs. In
order to prove that a statute is unconstitutional, one need only find
one reason why a statute is unconstitutional, whereas in order to
prove that a statute is constitutional, one must defend a statute
against all possible constitutional attacks and find that there is no
possible reason why a statute is unconstitutional. 93 There is more
than one reason why the Electoral Count Act is unconstitutional.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) ("[T]he precedential value of these cases tends to
increase in proportion to their proximity to the Convention in 1787."); Wisconsin v.
Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888) (stating that an act "passed by the first Congress
assembled under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in framing that
instrument .... is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning"). Even
then, however, a statute is only presumed to be constitutional.
193. This part presents, in my view, many if not most of the arguments against the
constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act. There may be others.
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A. The Textual Argument
1. Some Basics: Who, What, When, and Where?
The relevant clause of the Twelfth Amendment provides that
"[t]he President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall
then be counted." 194  Careful parsing of these twenty-seven words
yields surprisingly rich clues into the mode and manner of the
electoral count. These words and the rest of the Twelfth Amendment
(and their counterparts in the original Constitution) are, not
surprisingly, woefully understudied. 95 As Professors Levinson and
Young recently put it, "[t]he Twelfth Amendment is a Rodney
Dangerfield of the Constitution: it gets no respect.1' 96 At the same
time, these words of the Twelfth Amendment are incredibly
important in assessing the constitutionality of the Electoral Count
Act: the Constitution is supreme to conflicting federal statutory
law.197 In order to determine whether the Electoral Count Act is
constitutionally permissible, we must examine the Constitution itself.
This sub-section addresses the following five basic questions
relating to counting electoral votes: (1) Who is the presiding officer
of the electoral count? (2) Who opens the electoral certificates and
counts the electoral votes? (3) What is counting and what is to be
counted? (4) When is the counting done? (5) Where is the counting
done?
a. Who Is the Presiding Officer of the Electoral Count?
The relevant clause of the Twelfth Amendment provides that
"[t]he President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and
194. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The only differences between the text of the Twelfth
Amendment and the text of the original Constitution are in punctuation and
capitalization. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
195. No full-scale law review article dissects the text of the Twelfth Amendment. Two
recent articles explore the so-called "Habitation Clause" of the Twelfth Amendment
which provides that Electors must not vote for a President and Vice President of the same
state as themselves. U.S. CONST. amend. XII ("The Electors shall meet in their respective
states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not
be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves;...."); see James C. Ho, Much Ado
About Nothing: Dick Cheney and the Twelfth Amendment, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 227
passim (2000); Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who's Afraid of the Tvelfth
Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925,932-54 (2001).
196. Levinson & Young, supra note 195, at 925.
197. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land....") (emphasis added); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
1696 [Vol. 80
ELECTORAL COUNTACT
House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall
then be counted. 198  This clause does not explicitly answer the
question of who is the presiding officer during the electoral count. 9
Because the President of the Senate is the only named individual in
the clause, it may be tempting to conclude that the President of the
Senate is the presiding officer of the electoral count, but this is far
from clear. There are three possibilities with respect to the President
of the Senate: (1) the President of the Senate shall be the presiding
officer of the electoral count; (2) the President of the Senate may be
the presiding officer of the electoral count; and (3) the President of
the Senate shall not be the presiding officer of the electoral count.
As a textual matter, nothing in the clause suggests that the
President of the Senate shall be the presiding officer of the electoral
count.2° As a structural matter, the President of the Senate is the
presiding officer of the Senate, not the presiding officer of the joint
convention of Senators and Representatives (or the joint assemblage
of the Senate and House of Representatives), which needless to say is
not the Senate. It seems only logical that there must be a presiding
officer of the electoral count. Every parliamentary body needs a
presiding officer in order to function smoothly °1 What then is the
answer to the constitutional question?
If historical practice is any guide, the President of the Senate or
the President pro tempore shall be (or at least may be) the presiding
officer of the electoral count. One of these two officers has been the
presiding officer of every electoral count since the beginning of the
Republic-before and after the adoption of the Electoral Count Act.
Not surprisingly, 3 U.S.C. § 15 provides that
Congress shall be in session on the sixth day of January
succeeding every meeting of the electors. The Senate and
House of Representatives shall meet in the Hall of the
House of Representatives at the hour of 1 o'clock in the
198. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
199. This simple point was not lost during the Electoral Count Act debates. See, e.g.,
17 CONG. REC. 865 (1886) (remarks of Sen. Morgan) ("We frequently hear it stated that
the President of the Senate is the president of the joint meeting. If he is, it is only by
reason of some rule or agreement between the two Houses. The Constitution is silent
upon that point. The Constitution speaks of no officer who is to preside over the joint
meeting.").
200. But see COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 541 (remarks of Sen.
Maxey) ("By the Constitution [the President of the Senate] is the presiding officer over
the joint assemblage of the Senate and the House.").
201. Cf. 17 CONG. REC. 865 (remarks of Sen. Morgan) (discussing presiding officer of
the electoral count) ("To be a house in parliamentary law and in constitutional law it must
be organized under the presidency of its rightful officer.").
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afternoon on that day, and the President of the Senate shall
be their presiding officer.2°
This unbroken historical practice is entitled to great weight in
constitutional interpretation.2 °3
This is not to say, however, that historical practice necessarily
settles the meaning of the Electoral College Clauses. The text of the
Constitution is the first-best and hence authoritative source of
constitutional meaning, not extra-textual sources of constitutional
meaning. To the extent that the text of the Constitution is clear, it
may not be trumped by extra-textual history. The Electoral College
Clauses are not quite as ambiguous as they may appear when we read
the Constitution as a coherent whole. Although it may seem bizarre,
it may be downright unconstitutional for the President of the Senate
to be the presiding officer of the electoral count upon a closer reading
of the text of the Constitution.2 °4
No less than the Office of President of the United States is at
stake during the electoral count. Likewise, no less than the Office of
President of the United States is at stake during presidential
impeachment. Yet, with respect to the latter, the Senate
Impeachment Clause carefully provides that "[w]hen the President of
the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside," not the
President of the Senate.2 5 Should the electoral count be any different
when no less may be at stake?
The Senate Impeachment Clause demonstrates that the Framers
were quite sensitive to the obvious conflict of interest problem when
they focused on it.2 6 To be sure, the Framers did not focus on the
202. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (emphasis added).
203. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (stating that "an unbroken
practice.., is not something to be lightly cast aside" in constitutional interpretation); The
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (stating that a "[ljong-settled and established
practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation" of the Constitution);
cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that legislative prayer, which began in
the First Congress, is constitutional).
204. This statement may be surprising, but I ask the reader to suspend his or her
skepticism.
205. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. But this clause is not nearly as careful as it should
be-the Framers forgot to specify that the Vice President cannot preside at her own
impeachment trial, leaving the matter to necessary implication. For thoughtful
commentaries, see Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own
Impeachment Trial?: A Critique of Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LOUiS U. L.J. 849 (2000);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, 14 CONST. COMMENT.
245 (1997).
206. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
Mentor 1999) (1961) ("No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.");
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similar but less obvious conflict of interest problem when drafting the
Electoral College Clauses. But the Framers did seem to understand
and appreciate the general conflict-of-interest problem. When the
Framers discussed direct presidential election by Congress, they
considered and agreed to a joint ballot procedure that would require
a majority of Senators and Representatives who are present
considered together, in lieu of one that would require the concurrence
of the two Houses of Congress voting separately. 07 James Wilson,
supporting the joint ballot procedure, suggested that the Senate might
have a conflict of interest problem, remarking that "as the President
of the Senate was to be the President of the U-S. that Body in cases
of vacancy might have an interest in throwing dilatory obstacles in the
way, if its separate concurrence should be required. ' '208 If this interest
were true of the Senate, it would be particularly true of the Vice
President.
More generally, the founders likely understood that the Vice
President would oftentimes be a candidate for President or Vice
President in the next election. During the Electoral Count Act
debates, Senator Hoar, discussing the mood at the founding, stated:
The President of the Senate would almost always be and
would be expected to be one of the chief candidates for the
presidential office. He would have been one of the two
principal candidates four years before, and it was the fashion
of those days very much more than of these to continue the
same person in public trusts and in political candidacy, and
several times in our history the Vice-President of the United
States has succeeded to the Presidency, Adams to
Washington, Jefferson to Adams, Van Buren to Jackson.209
Even if the Framers and Ratifiers of the original Constitution did
not understand that the Vice President would be a candidate for
President or Vice President in the next election, the Framers and
Ratifiers of the Twelfth Amendment-which overwrote the relevant
WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 206 (1825) ("As the vice president succeeds to the functions and emoluments of
the president of the United States whenever a vacancy happens in the latter office, it
would be inconsistent with the implied purity of a judge that a person under a probable
bias of such a nature, should participate in the trial, and it would follow that he
should-wholly to retire from the court."); 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 493.
207. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 401-03.
208. Id. at 402-03; see also id at 403 (remarks of James Madison) (supporting the joint
ballot procedure and observing in passing that "[t]he President of the Senate also is to be
occasionally President of the U.S.").
209. 17 CONG. REC. 1019 (1886).
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provision of the original Constitution-understood the conflict-of-
interest problem well, especially given the imbroglio of the electoral
count of 1801 where Vice President and presidential candidate
Thomas Jefferson not only presided over the electoral count but also
assumed the counting function. 10 It is thus possible to say that the
conflict-of-interest principle applies to the Twelfth Amendment if not
to the original Constitution.
There is no evidence from the Electoral College Clauses that the
President of the Senate shall be the presiding officer of the electoral
count. In the absence of such evidence, the Senate Impeachment
Clause supplies a strong argument that the President of the Senate
shall not be the presiding officer of the electoral count. The
difference-and perhaps the constitutionally significant difference-
between presidential impeachment and counting electoral votes may
be that the Vice President necessarily has a conflict of interest in the
former because the Vice President is to act as President,2 1' whereas
the Vice President does not necessarily have a conflict of interest in
the latter because the Vice President may or may not be a candidate
in the next presidential or vice presidential election. Nevertheless,
the better reading of the Electoral College Clauses, when read in light
of the Senate Impeachment Clause and of conflict-of-interest
principles generally, is that the Vice President, the President of the
Senate, shall not be the presiding officer of the electoral count. 12 The
Electoral Count Act may be unconstitutional for this reason alone.21 3
210. See supra note 3 and text accompanying infra note 230.
211. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
212. An interesting question arises whether a Senator or Representative-who may
also be a presidential or vice presidential candidate-may be the presiding officer of the
electoral count, even though the Vice President shall not be. The better answer is "Yes."
Before opening the electoral certificates and inspecting the electoral votes, the identities
of the presidential or vice presidential candidates are (at least theoretically) unknown, and
hence it would be impossible to know which Senators or Representatives to exclude from
the presiding officer's chair. The argument is that the Constitution implicitly assumes that
the Vice President-more than any other person present at the electoral count-would be
a presidential or vice presidential candidate, and hence makes the Vice President uniquely
ineligible to be the presiding officer. As a prudential matter, of course, the presiding
officer should be someone who is not known to be a presidential or vice presidential
candidate.
213. There is one more reason why the "Presiding Officer Clause" of 3 U.S.C. § 15 may
be unconstitutional. That clause provides that "the President of the Senate shall be their
presiding officer." 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (emphasis added). What gives Congress the
authority to super-add to the Vice President's duties specified by the Constitution? See,
e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 ("The Vice President of the United States shall be
President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided."); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 ("In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his
Death, Resignation or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the
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If the President of the Senate shall not be the presiding officer of
the electoral count, who then is the presiding officer? The answer to
this question is simpler than it appears: One of the Senators and
Representatives then and there present at the electoral count. Each
parliamentary body has, almost by definition, the right to choose its
presiding officer and other officers from one of its own, at least in the
absence of any explicit declaration to the contrary.214  Whether
Congress may exercise this choice on behalf of the joint convention of
Senators and Representatives is an entirely different question, and
one to be discussed later.1 5
b. Who Opens the Electoral Certificates and Counts the
Electoral Votes?
With respect to who does the opening of electoral certificates
and the counting of electoral votes, the relevant clause of the Twelfth
Amendment provides that "[t]he President of the Senate shall, in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted. 2 16  The critical
question to ask is whether the counting function belongs to the
President of the Senate or to the Senate and House of
Representatives. The interpretive stakes are high: If the counting
function belongs to the President of the Senate, the Electoral Count
Act is unconstitutional because it vests the counting function in the
two Houses of Congress, and under the Constitution, Congress may
not strip the President of the Senate of her constitutional duty.2 17
Same shall devolve on the Vice President .... ); U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1 (similar);
U.S. CONST. amend. XII ("The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate
and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be
counted."). If Congress may add to the Vice President's duties, why not the President's
duties or the Chief Justice's duties? If "shall" means "must," the Presiding Officer Clause
of the Electoral Count Act would seem to be, strictly speaking, unconstitutional.
214. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives shall chuse
their Speaker and other Officers."), and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 ("The Senate shall
chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice
President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States."), with
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 ("The Vice President of the United States shall be President of
the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.").
215. See infra notes 498-525 and accompanying text.
216. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
217. Others have made this obvious point. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 1059 (1886)
(remarks of Sen. Wilson) (arguing that the counting function is vested in the President of
the Senate and that the Necessary and Proper Clause "does not confer on Congress the
power to assume unto itself the duty which the Constitution imposes on that officer"); 18
CONG. REC. 74 (remarks of Rep. Baker) ("If the Constitution... does.., by fair
implication, vest in the President of the Senate the power and duty not only to open, but
also to count, the votes, then Congress can not, by this or any other legislation, take away
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We begin with the first part of the clause: "The President of the
Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the certificates. '218  It is clear that the
opening of the certificates function belongs to the Vice President,
who is the President of the Senate.219 The Constitution provides no
wiggle room: the President of the Senate shall open all the
certificates, not some.?
or transfer to any other person or officer that power and duty."); Paulsen, supra note 205,
at 245 (noting that each House of Congress may not use the Rules of Proceedings Clause
to strip the Vice President of constitutional duties); Spear, supra note 18, at 156 ("The
Constitution says that 'the votes shall then be counted,' and if this mandate be addressed
to the President of the Senate, that ends the question so far as the counting is concerned.
The Constitution has then trusted him with the whole power, and any legislation to direct
him, would be an impertinent intrusion upon his prerogative."); cf. Harrison, supra note
23, at 703 ("Neither House nor Senate is given any authority over the President of the
Senate when it comes to opening the certificates, and Congress by statute may no more
control the exercise of this constitutionally granted authority than it may tell the President
whom to pardon.").
218. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
219. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 ("The Vice President of the United States shall be
President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided."). It does
appear that the President pro tempore acted in place of the Vice President in at least the
electoral counts of 1809, 1825, 1857, 1877, and most recently 1969 when Vice President
Hubert H. Humphrey "recused" himself from the electoral count.
220. There is the rather tricky question whether the President of the Senate must open
all certificates in a case of multiple returns from the same state, as in the Hayes-Tilden
incident of 1887, or in a case of a return from a putative state (say for example, a
certificate from Puerto Rico). The best answer is that the opening-of-the-certificates
function contains no power of discretion because any discretion in the opening of
certificates would interfere with the counting-of-electoral-votes function. Translated into
the recent past: if two certificates had come from Florida during the electoral count of
2001, the Vice President could not, constitutionally speaking, have refused to open both of
them.
In a recent essay, Professor Harrison takes a contrary view on the specific
question of multiple (putative) electoral certificates. In his view, "[t]he certificates that
the President of the Senate is to open, however, are those of the electors, not those of non-
electors. Hence in order to know which certificates to open, the President of the Senate
must know vhich of competing slates of electors were validly appointed." Harrison, supra
note 23, at 702-03. This is a clever (and obvious) textual argument. He continues: "If the
Twelfth Amendment is assumed to be a dispute resolution mechanism, a natural reading
of it thus indicates that in one especially important context the dispute is to be resolved by
a single individual." Id. at 703. The vice of this reading, as Professor Harrison
acknowledges, is that one person has the power to resolve at least one kind of dispute in
presidential election, a conclusion that is generally to be avoided. Indeed, he
acknowledges in his very next paragraph that "[i]t would be much easier to believe that
this important decision was vested in a collective body, were there not serious problems
with the operation of the collective body, the joint session of Congress (if it is to be called
that)." Id. Notwithstanding the latter "problems" (which are overstated in my view),
Professor Harrison ignores the point that in the case of multiple putative electoral
certificates, the opening of the certificates function interferes with the counting-of-
electoral-votes function. The former enables the latter; the former is more of an
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The counting function is, however, noticeably ambiguous: "[t]he
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House
of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be
counted." There are two plausible readings of this oddly phrased text
employing the passive voice. 21 The counting function may be read as
one vested in the President of the Senate, or jointly in the Senate and
House of Representatives. 22 If the President of the Senate is to count
the votes, the clause easily could have been written to provide that
"[t]he President of the Senate shall... open all the certificates and
"exercise" whereas the latter is more of a "function." Moreover, the former is simply less
important than the latter-a President and Vice President elect are determined after the
electoral votes are actually counted, not when the electoral certificates are opened. The
better answer, I submit, is that the President of the Senate has discretion in the opening-
of-electoral-certificates function only if she also has the counting-of-electoral-votes
function, and even then, that discretion would follow as a matter of the latter function, not
the former.
This scenario of multiple putative electoral certificates was the subject of
discussion during the Electoral Count Act debates, given the cases of double returns in the
electoral counts of 1873 and 1877. For statements that the President of the Senate has no
discretion in opening the certificates in the case of multiple returns, see, for example,
COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 446-47 (remarks of Sen. Bayard); id. at
449-50 (remarks of Sen. Thurman). But see id. at 454 (remarks of Sen. Morton) (arguing
that President of the Senate's discretion in opening certificates "shows the necessity for an
amendment of the Constitution").
221. "The famous phrase of the Constitution 'the votes shall then be counted' has been
like an apple of discord almost since the beginning of Government." J. HAMPDEN
DOUGHERTY, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 254 (1906); see also
Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 27 (1968) (noting that the passive voice of this phrase breaks one of the "cardinal
rules of draftsmanship"); Tribe, supra note 17, at 279 ("The Framers should have listened
to the time-honored injunction to avoid the passive voice. 'Shall be counted'-by
whom?").
During the Electoral Count Act debates, Representative Herbert carefully
examined the grammar of this patch of constitutional text:
Here is a duty imposed upon the President of the Senate. He shall, in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open the certificates.
Then the first person is dropped and the third person is taken up; there the
sentence changes its construction; there the duty imposed upon the President of
the Senate ceases, and afterwards a new part of speech is used-the third person
is adopted, and a verb relating to a noun in the third person, "the votes,"
employed, and a new duty imposed by the words, "and the votes shall then be
counted."
18 CONG. REc. 75 (1886).
222. The ambiguity is well-evidenced in the congressional debate over the electoral
count. See, e.g., COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 48 (remarks of Sen.
Wilson) ("It is not said who shall count the votes, nor who shall decide what votes shall be
counted."); id. at 451 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen) ("So when the Constitution says the
vote shall be counted, it says that a decision shall be made by some one, and it must be
made either by the presiding officer of the Senate or by the Senate and House, who are
required to be present."); see also Spear, supra note 18, at 156 (noting a similar point).
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shall then count the votes."'  If the Senate and House of
Representatives are to count the votes, the clause easily could have
been written to provide that "[t]he President of the Senate shall, in
the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted by the Senate and
House of Representatives."224
The text does not equally support these two plausible readings
once we escape a narrow "clause-bound" interpretivism. When read
in light of the conflict-of-interest principle of the Senate
Impeachment Clause, the better answer (again, but by no means an
unassailable one) is that the counting function of the Electoral
College Clauses is vested in the Senate and House of Representatives,
not the President of the Senate. To be sure, the Constitution does not
explicitly address how the Senate and House of Representatives is to
exercise the counting function-by the two Houses acting separately
223. This obvious point was made during the Electoral Count Act debates. See, e.g., 18
CONG. REc. 46 (remarks of Rep. Dibble).
224. These are the two most obvious readings, but there are at least four other
readings. A third reading is that the Clause is simply silent as to who shall count the votes
and that Congress may specify the counting agent.
A fourth reading, suggested by Representative Dibble during the Electoral Count
Act debates, is that the counting function is split between the House of Representatives
and the Senate: the House is to count the presidential votes and the Senate the vice
presidential votes, because, in case of deadlock, the House chooses the President and the
Senate the Vice President. See 18 CONG. REC. 46. There is no textual or historical
support whatsoever for this reading. Moreover, this reading would have been impossible
before the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment which required Electors to cast separately
marked votes for President and Vice President, and it is unlikely that the Twelfth
Amendment added to the evident textual ambiguity.
A fifth reading, suggested by Senator Thompson during the electoral count of
1857, makes even less sense. He suggested that the counting function is vested solely in
the Senate, with the House only present as witnesses. See, e.g., COUNTING ELECTORAL
VOTES, supra note 3, at 126 ("The Constitution, in my judgment, is that these votes are to
be returned to us and counted by us, and the House of Representatives are admitted to be
present at the count to prevent a combination, a clandestine operation, a secret session, a
coup d'etat."); id at 130 ("When we are counting the votes, (for the President of the
Senate only counts them in his official capacity, and in the session of the Senate, because
he cannot count them as a private individual,) it is improper for the House members to be
anything but listeners."); id at 136 ("The members of that House of Representatives are
to sit by, and whether we put them in the gallery, or the reporters' desks, or in niches-
wherever they are placed they are to look on.").
Finally, a sixth reading, suggested by Senator Call in 1876, is equally nonsensical.
He suggested that the counting function is vested solely in the House of Representatives,
because the Constitution vests in that body the duty to choose the President in case there
is no winner in the Electoral College mode of presidential election, see U.S. CONST.
amend. XII, and only that body may determine whether there is such a winner. See 17
CONG. REc. 1061 (1886); see also id. at 1019 (remarks of Sen. Hoar) (acknowledging and
dismissing as incorrect this view of the counting function).
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in their corporate capacities, or by the two Houses acting conjointly
as one "House" of Senators and Representatives. 225  In addition,
when we consider early state constitutions,226 we see that early state
constitutions did not vest the counting of electoral votes in any one
person. 27
225. The Constitution only requires that the Senate and House of Representatives, as
separately organized bodies, be present as witnesses for the opening of electoral
certificates and (probably) the counting of electoral votes (to the extent that the "in
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives" phrase modifies the counting
phrase, "the votes shall then be counted," see infra notes 278-86 and accompanying text),
but does not address whether the counting of electoral votes is to be done by the Senate
and House of Representatives as such or by Senators and Representatives on a per capita
vote basis (equivalent to the Senate and House of Representatives voting by joint ballot).
Other scholars have noted similar points. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 17, at 279 ("Is any
such [counting] authority reposed instead in one or another House, or in the two Houses
acting concurrently, or in the two Houses acting as a single organ even though not
precisely as the Congress of the United States?"); and Harrison, supra note 23, at 703.
Professor Harrison states:
How is the joint session [of the Senate and House of Representatives] to make
decisions? The Constitution provides no explicit rule, and certainly does not
indicate that the House and Senate are to be put together into one body that will
act by majority vote. Rather, the two chambers appear to retain their separate
identities: the certificates are to be opened in the presence, not of the Senators
and Representatives, but of the Senate and the House.
IL For various textual and largely structural reasons, I conclude that the counting of
electoral votes is to be done by joint ballot of Senators and Representatives. See infra
notes 291-313 and accompanying text (discussing unicameralism principle); infra notes
429-45 and accompanying text (discussing anti-Senate principle of presidential election);
infra notes 526-53 and accompanying text (discussing Chadha principle of law-making).
226. For a classic use of early state constitutions to inform the meaning of provisions in
the Constitution, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 271-76 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., Mentor 1999) (1961) (surveying the early state constitutions in discussing the
separation of powers).
227. During the Electoral Count Act debates, Senator Hoar made this point, though he
did not cite specific provisions from early state constitutions. See 17 CONG. REC. 1019.
For specific provisions, see, for example, the constitutions of the following states:
Delaware: "A president or chief magistrate shall be chosen by joint ballot of both
houses, to be taken in the house of assembly, and the box examined by the speakers of
each house in the presence of the other members ... ." DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 7
(emphasis added). Maryland:
That a person of wisdom, experience, and virtue, shall be chosen
Governor,... by the joint ballot of both Houses (to be taken in each House
respectively) deposited in a conference room; the boxes to be examined by a
joint committee of both Houses, and the numbers severally reported, that the
appointment may be entered ....
MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXV (emphasis added). Massachusetts:
The selectmen of the several towns shall preside at such meetings impartially, and
shall receive the votes of all the inhabitants of such towns, present and qualified
to vote for senators, and shall sort and count them in open town meeting, and in
presence of the town clerk, who shall make a fair record, in presence of the
selectmen, and in open town meeting, of the name of every person voted for, and
of the number of votes against his name ....
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The history, however, undercuts these fundamental textual and
structural considerations. The Framers clearly thought that the
counting function was vested in the President of the Senate alone. In
a unanimous resolution attached to the final Constitution, the
Framers described the procedures for electing the first Chief
Executive, recommending in relevant part "that the Senators should
appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving,
opening and counting the Votes for President."'  The records of the
First Congress confirm this construction. On April 6, 1789, Senator
John Langdon was elected as President of the Senate "for the sole
purpose of opening and counting the votes for President of the
United States."' 9  This early practice should be of limited
precedential value, however, because they relate to the creation of
the Government of the United States before a President and Vice
President were ever elected.
The dangers of this initial construction soon appeared when
Presidents of the Senate were also candidates for President or Vice
President. In the electoral count of 1797, President of the Senate
John Adams purportedly counted "improper votes" from Vermont,
MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 2, ch. 1, § H, art. II. Also Massachusetts:
Those persons who shall be qualified to vote for Senators and
Representatives ... shall.., give in their votes for a Governor to the Selectmen,
who shall preside at such meetings; and the Town Clerk; in the presence and with
the assistance of the Selectmen, shall, in open town meeting, sort and count the
votes, and form a list of the persons voted for, with the number of votes for each
person against his name; ....
MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 2, ch. 2, § I, art. III (emphasis added). Vermont:
[A]t the opening of the General Assembly, there shall be a committee appointed
out of the Council and Assembly, who, after being duly sworn to the faithful
discharge of their trust, shall proceed to receive, sort, and count, the votes for the
Governor, and declare the person who has the major part of the votes, to be
Governor, for the year ensuing.
VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. 2 § XVII (emphasis added). Virginia:
A Governor, or chief magistrate, shall be chosen annually by joint ballot of both
Houses (to be taken in each House respectively) deposited in the conference
room; the boxes examined jointly by a committee of each House, and the
numbers severally reported to them, that the appointments may be entered ....
VA. CONST. OF 1776, cl. 29 (emphasis added). Other early state constitutions providing
for the election of the executive authority by the legislature (for example, Georgia, North
Carolina, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina) or by direct popular election
(for example, New York) did not address the counting of such votes. See, e.g., GA.
CONST. OF 1777, art. XXIII; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XV; N.J. CONST. OF 1776, art. VII;
PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 19; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. III.
228. 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 666; see also Burgess, supra note 18, at 647 ("The
[F]ramers of the constitution undoubtedly meant that the president of the Senate should
count the electoral votes .... ).
229. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 16-17 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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and in the electoral count of 1801, President of the Senate Thomas
Jefferson purportedly counted dubious electoral votes from
Georgia. 30 By 1800, some members of the Senate of the Sixth
Congress interpreted the counting language as vesting the counting
function in the "members composing" the Senate and the House of
Representatives, 31 and to the extent there is any difference, Senator
Pinckney interpreted the counting language as vesting the counting
function in "Congress." 23
The Twelfth Amendment, adopted in 1804, did not resolve the
textual ambiguity between the first two readings of the counting
function. In fact, it contains language identical to that found in
Article II, Section 1, Clause 3. However, as Dean Wroth has
suggested, it is arguable that, with the later precedents, the Twelfth
Amendment changed the original understanding of the counting
function, shifting this function from the President of the Senate to the
Senate and House of Representatives. 3  But early commentators on
230. See Tansill, supra note 22, at 516; Wroth, supra note 22, at 326 n.23; see also
COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 116 (remarks of Sen. Reid) ("It has often
happened that the Vice-President is a candidate for re-election; and we can scarcely
suppose that the Constitution intended to confer on him the power of declaring himself
elected by the votes he may count, without an appeal from his decision."). For more on
the history of self-counting, see COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 533
(remarks of Sen. Morton) (presenting history of self-counting in 1797, 1801, 1821, 1837,
1841, and 1861); Harrison, supra note 23, at 703 n.12 (providing more examples).
231. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 120 (1800). The bill stated:
And the constitution of the United States having directed that "the President of
the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,
open all the certificates, and that the votes shall then be counted," from which
the reasonable inference and practice has been, that they are to be counted by the
members composing the said Houses, and brought there for that office, no other
being assigned them; and inferred the more reasonably, as thereby the
Constitutional weight of each State in the election of those high officers is exactly
preserved in the tribunal which is to judge of its validity: the number of Senators
and Representatives from each State, composing the said tribunal, being exactly
that of the Electors of the same State ....
Id. (emphasis added).
232. 3 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 386 (remarks of Sen. Pinckney, Mar. 28, 1800) ("It
is made their [Congress's] duty to count over the votes in a convention of both Houses,
and for the President of the Senate to declare who has the majority of the votes of the
Electors so transmitted.") (emphasis added). Indeed, there is an important difference
between the "Congress" and the "Senate and the House of Representatives." The word
"Congress" necessarily implies the two Houses of Congress acting independently in their
corporate capacities, whereas the text of the Constitution is more ambivalent-allowing
for the two Houses of Congress acting independently in their corporate capacities or for
the two Houses of Congress acting conjointly in one corporate capacity.
233. See Wroth, supra note 22, at 327 & n.28 (examining language of implementing Act
of Twelfth Amendment, Act of March 26, 1804, ch. 50, 2 Stat. 295, and language used in
the electoral count of February 13, 1805).
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the Constitution, such as Chancellor James Kent and Professor
William Duer, writing in the wake of the Twelfth Amendment,
thought that the counting function still belonged to the President of
the SenateY 4
The Wisconsin Incident of 185721 probably stands as a paradigm
case in support of the proposition that the counting function belongs
to the Senate and House of Representatives and not to the President
of the Senate. During the Wisconsin Incident, Senator Pugh noted
the obvious conflict-of-interest problem if the President of the Senate
had sole responsibility for counting, calling it a "power higher than
the veto." 6  During the Electoral Count Act debates, Senator
Bayard keenly observed that the President of the Senate "cannot
even count" the electoral votes; that "[h]e cannot even inspect them,
except in the incidental and casual manner that is implied by the fact
that his hand shall open the sealed envelope which contains the list of
the electoral vote." 37 Representative Caldwell recalled the President
of the Senate's unsuccessful attempts to assume the counting function
in the Wisconsin Incident of 1857 and the Hayes-Tilden Incident of
1877,238 and described the primary purpose of the Electoral Count
Act as "decid[ing], first, that the power to count the vote is not in the
President of the Senate." 9
234. Chancellor Kent stated:
I presume, in the absence of all legislative provision on the subject, that the
President of the Senate counts the votes, and determines the result, and that the
two houses are present only as spectators, to witness the fairness and accuracy of
the transaction, and to act only if no choice be made by the electors.
2 KENT'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 19, at *276-77; see DUER'S COMMENTARIES, supra
note 19, at 88-89 (similar). Note that Chancellor Kent seems to believe that Congress may
by law take the counting function away from the President of the Senate; the source of
Congress's power to do so is unclear. The question of Congress's source of power to enact
legislation regulating the counting function is discussed in Part II.A.2 infra.
235. See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
236. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 135. Representative Humphrey
Marshall stated his belief that "I am sure that the duty of determining whether a vote shall
be counted belongs to the Senate and House, and not to the President of the Senate." Id.
at 96; see also id at 113 (remarks of Sen. Butler) (noting obvious conflicts of interest
problem). However, as late as the Wisconsin Incident of 1857, some Members of
Congress believed that the President of the Senate had the sole power to decide what to
count and what not to count. See, e.g., idL at 134 (remarks of Sen. Stuart).
237. 1& at 445 (remarks of Sen. Bayard).
238. See 18 CONG. REC. 30 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Caldwell); see also 17 CONG. REC.
815 (1886) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (noting the President of the Senate's attempt to
assume the counting function in the electoral count of 1857); 18 CONG. REC. 75 (remarks
of Rep. Herbert) (noting the President of the Senate's attempt to assume the counting
function in the electoral count of 1877).
239. 18 CONG. REC. 30.
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The best interpretation as a matter of text and the better
interpretation as a matter of history is that the counting function is
vested in the Senate and House of Representatives. This does not
answer, however, whether the counting function is delegable. The
relevant text of the Constitution is best read to exclude counting by
unnamed agents, notwithstanding general constitutional limits to the
delegation of powers. The consensus view of the Members of
Congress during the Electoral Count Act debates was that the
counting function is not delegable. 4 Moreover, the related textual
considerations of the "when" and "where" of counting electoral votes
strongly militate against the delegation of the counting function to
unnamed agents-including coordinate branches of government such
as the federal judiciary.241
A final consideration is whether the President of the Senate has a
vote in the counting function when questions arise. Although the
counting of electoral votes takes place in the presence of the
President of the Senate, the President of the Senate participates no
more in the counting function than she participates in trial of
impeachment-in neither case does the Vice President have a vote.242
The Constitution carefully circumscribes the participation of the Vice
President in the business of the Senate: "The Vice President of the
United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote,
240. For the historical view, see, for example, COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra
note 3, at 445 (remarks of Sen. Bayard) ("That you could not delegate that power to
another body I cannot doubt."); id. at 531 (remarks of Sen. Boutwell) ("Congress must
exercise the power and perform the duty, and it is not possible under the Constitution to
transfer it to anybody else."); 18 CONG. REc. 51 (remarks of Rep. Adams) ("I can not
conceive that any statute can take away from either of these two legislative bodies the
power to come to a yes or no on any question relating to the business they then have in
hand under the provisions of the Constitution.").
The scholarly view also supports the non-delegation of the counting function. See,
e.g., Ross & Josephson, supra note 7, at 715 ("We agree with Pinckney that the Grand
Committee procedure proposed in 1800 was unconstitutional because we do not believe
Congress could delegate its joint power to count to a committee of selected members.");
Spear, supra note 18, at 157 (observing that if the counting power is lodged in the two
Houses of Congress, Congress cannot delegate the counting power to a committee "any
more than it can establish a commission to levy taxes, or declare war").
241. See text accompanying infra notes 267-313.
242. But cf. RAWVLE, supra note 206, at 206. Rawle argued that:
It is not stated in the Constitution whether the president of the senate is on the
trial of an impeachment restricted, as in legislative cases, to the casting vote. As
he is constituted one of the judges by being appointed to preside without any
restriction, the fair inference would be, that he is entitled to vote like the other
judges, but on the trial last mentioned of a judge of the Supreme Court, the vote
of the vice president does not appear in the printed journal.
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unless they be equally divided."' 43 The joint convention of the Senate
and House of Representatives-assembled for the purpose of the
electoral count-is most decidedly not the Senate. To be sure, the
Electoral Count Act provides that, upon any objection to an electoral
vote, the Senate shall separately withdraw to consider the objection.2"
Notwithstanding constitutional objections to this bicameralism,245
neither textual nor structural reasons suggest that the President of the
Senate's tie-breaking vote in the Article I business of the Senate
applies to any Article II business of the Senate in counting electoral
votes.246
243. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
244. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
245. See infra notes 287-313, 526-53 and accompanying text.
246. As a related matter, it is not at all clear that the Vice President may cast a tie-
breaking vote in a contingency election for Vice President in the Senate should there be
no winner under the electoral college mode of vice presidential election. U.S. CONST.
amend. XII provides:
The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the
Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors
appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers
on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose
shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the
whole number shall be necessary to a choice.
Some scholars have suggested that the Vice President could cast such a tie-
breaking vote. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 195, at 239 n.47; Levinson & Young, supra note
195, at 934 n.37. At least one scholar has raised the possibility that the Vice President
could not cast such a tie-breaking vote. See Akhil Reed Amar, President Thurmond?
(Nov. 2, 2000), at http://slate.msn.com/?id=1006401 (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
There are some very good reasons to seriously doubt that the Vice President could
cast such a tie-breaking vote. As a textual matter, the Vice President is not a "Senator"
and the Twelfth Amendment ostensibly requires a majority of the whole number of
Senators-today, fifty-one Senators. If there is no majority of Senators in a contingency
election for Vice President in the Senate, the Senate would have to choose again. Note
that the same is true in the House of Representatives where there is no arbiter to cast a
tie-breaking vote. If there is no majority of states in a contingency election for President in
the House of Representatives, the House would have to choose again. We have seen this
done before: In the contingency election for President in 1801, the House of
Representatives completed thirty-five rounds of balloting before choosing a President, see
supra note 3.
More generally: The Framers generally understood and appreciated the conflict
of interest problems of the Vice Presidency, see supra notes 204-13 and accompanying
text. It is worth hesitating before concluding that one person has the power to determine
an election, particularly (but not only) when that one person would be likely to benefit
from the decision. While it is true that other Senators may have conflict of interest
problems because they too could be candidates for Vice President, it is one thing to say
that a Senator may vote for himself or herself along with other Senators, and quite another
to give the decisive vote to one man or woman. The Vice President's tie-breaking vote is
decisive in a way that the votes of Senators are not. Interestingly, when the Framers
contemplated direct presidential election by Congress, they rejected without discussion
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c. What Is Counting and What Is To Be Counted?
Two significant and interrelated questions remain. First, what is
counting? Second, what is to be counted? Again, the relevant
constitutional text provides that "[t]he President of the Senate shall,
in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted."'247 As has been
documented extensively, the word "shall" is a word of obligation.24
giving the Vice President a tie-breaking vote. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 403
("Mr[.] Read moved 'that in case the numbers for the two highest in votes should be
equal, then the President of the Senate shall have an additional casting vote,' which was
disagreed to by a general negative.").
Finally, if the theory is that the Vice President's power to cast tie-breaking votes
only applies to Article I business (legislation and the internal matters of the Senate,
including the election of Senate officers and the appointment of Senate committees) and
not to Article II or Twelfth Amendment business, then it would also follow that the Vice
President would not have a tie-breaking vote under the Treaty Clause or the
Appointments Clause, which both appear in Article II. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
This appears to be the case, reinforcing the arguments above. It is not possible for the
Vice President to cast a tie-breaking vote with respect to treaties which require a two-
thirds majority of Senators, see id., but it is possible for the Vice President to do so with
respect to presidential nominations under the Appointments Clause, which only require a
majority of Senators. Notwithstanding, Alexander Hamilton intimated early on that the
Vice President could not cast a tie-breaking vote on presidential nominations under the
Appointments Clause. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 389 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor 1999) (1961) ("In the national government, if the Senate
should be divided, no appointment could be made; in the government of New York, if the
council should be divided, the governor can turn the scale and confirm his own
nomination."). The lack of mention of the Vice President is surprising given that he
discussed the Vice President (and her tie-breaking vote) in the immediately preceding
essay, see THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
Mentor 1999) (1961), but perhaps he thought that the Vice President would not
necessarily act in accordance with the President's interests (recall that prior to the
development of the party system, the Vice President was merely the runner-up in the
presidential election and oftentimes the chief opponent of the President). Only once in
our nation's history, to my knowledge, has a Vice President cast a tie-breaking vote on a
presidential appointment. In 1832, President Andrew Jackson nominated Senator Martin
Van Buren as ambassador to Great Britain. The Senate split evenly, and Vice President
Calhoun broke the tie by voting against President Jackson's nomination. See Vice
Presidents of the United States, Martin Van Buren (1833-1837), at
http://www.senate.gov/learning/stat.vp8.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). Vice President Calhoun's negative vote was unnecessary of
course, as a tie vote is widely considered to be defeated, though some accounts treat his
vote as the "deciding vote." See, e.g., id.
247. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (emphasis added).
248. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Guided
Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 782 & n.147
(1984) (stating that the Framers used "shall" as a word of obligation and "may" as a word
of discretion and providing numerous examples in the Constitution); see also 2 FARRAND,
supra note 35, at 485-86 (stating that the Framers carefully distinguished between the
words "ought," "shall," and "may" in the drafting of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1). Indeed, the Electoral College Clauses make the point amply: the
1712 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
The Electoral College Clauses do not say "and the Votes may then be
counted."
Ardent textualists will readily notice two points. First, what is
the significance of the difference between "Certificates" and
"Votes"? The Constitution says that only the "Votes" are to be
counted. Second, what is the significance of the word "all" and its
selective use and seeming disuse? The Constitution says that "all" of
the certificates are to be opened but does not say that "all" of the
votes shall then be counted. Are these subtle textual distinctions a
grant of power to the counting agent not to count all votes?
The ultimate question is whether counting is, on balance, a
ministerial or judicial act. If counting is a ministerial act, it is one of
ascertainment and aggregation-Congress is simply a "central
collecting agency" and a "tabulating point."49 This view has some
support in the purpose of the Electoral College Clauses. There would
be no need for Congress to aggregate electoral votes if the electors
met at some central location, but it was precisely to avoid the
potential for cabal and corruption that the Electoral Colleges Clauses
provide that the electors should meet in their respective states. ° We
shall call this the "thin" conception of the counting function.21
word "shall" is used some eighteen times and the word "may" is used once. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cI. 4 ("The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors,
and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout
the United States.") (emphasis added).
249. 115 CONG. REC. 168-69 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Rarick during the Bailey
Incident of 1969).
250. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 246, at 380 ("Nothing was more to
be desired [in the use of the Electoral College mode of presidential election] than that
every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption."); 4 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 122 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]
(remarks of William Davie at North Carolina ratifying convention) ("He is elected on the
same day in every state, so that there can be no possible combination between the
electors."). At the North Carolina ratifying convention, James Iredell remarked:
Had the time of election been different in different states, the electors chosen in
one state might have gone from state to state, and conferred with the other
electors, and the election might have been thus carried on under undue
influence. But by this provision, the electors must meet in the different states on
the same day, and cannot confer together. They may not even know who are the
electors in the other states. There can be, therefore, no kind of combination. It
is probable that the man who is the object of choice of thirteen different states,
the electors in each voting unconnectedly with the rest, must be a person who
possesses, in high degree, the confidence and respect of his country.
4 id. at 105. Sen. Rufus King later remarked:
[M]embers of the General Convention... did indulge the hope, by apportioning,
limiting, and confining the Electors within their respective States, and by the
guarded manner of giving and transmitting the ballots of the Electors to the Seat
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If counting is a judicial act, then Congress sits as a court of
sorts-a "court of last resort"z25-checking the actions of electors in
the electoral colleges. We shall call this the "thick" conception of the
counting function. As Professor Spear nicely summarized, counting,
"in so far as it is a mere enumeration and aggregation of units, is a
purely ministerial act; but, in so far as it involves any judgment as to
what votes shall be counted, it is a judicial, or, at least, quasi judicial
act." 3  Clearly, there is no clean break between the "thin" and
"thick" conceptions of the counting function. Even the "thin"
conception requires some ascertainment of what is to be counted.Y4
The debates over the drafting of the Electoral College Clauses at
the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 suggest that the Framers had the
ascertainment issue in mind. The Framers rejected a proposal by
James Madison and Hugh Williamson to insert the phrase "who shall
have balloted" after the word "Electors." The purpose of this
proposal was "so that the non voting electors not being counted might
not increase the number necessary as a majority of the whole-to
decide the choice without the agency of the Senate." 5  John
Dickinson successfully moved to insert after "Electors" the word
"appointed." Thus, under the Electoral College Clauses, the requisite
number of electoral votes needed for victory is "a Majority of the
whole Number of Electors appointed." 6  This drafting history
suggests that the Framers considered the possibility that there might
not be a "vote"-but only if an elector shall not have balloted. They
did not consider the possibility that an electoral vote might be
unconstitutional. While silence is difficult to interpret, the Framers'
of Government, that intrigue, combination, and corruption, would be effectually
shut out, and a free and pure election of the President of the United States made
perpetual.
3 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 461 (Mar. 18, 1824); see also 1 KENT'S COMMENTARIES,
supra note 19, at *280 ("These electors assemble in separate and distantly detached
bodies, and they are constituted in a manner best calculated to preserve them free from all
inducements to disorder, bias, or corruption.").
251. Professor Amar has suggested, albeit in passing, that the counting function is
ministerial. See Amar, supra note 10, at 229 ("In counting votes, Congress performs in
effect a ministerial function, registering the will of the voters in the electoral college.").
252. 115 CONG. REc. 158 (remarks of Rep. Corman during the Bailey Incident of
1969).
253. Spear, supra note 18, at 156.
254. See iL (noting that the counting function "must, to some extent, be judicial, in
order that it may be ministerial and declarative. It is not possible to count,... without
deciding what shall be counted").
255. 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 515.
256. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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probable conception of the counting function was more "thin" than
"thick."
Members of Congress have debated the nature of the counting
function intensely over the past 210 years. The issue was first debated
during the Missouri Incident. Representative Clay stated his belief
that counting necessarily involved judging:
In a case of votes coming forward which could not be
counted, the Constitution was silent; but, fortunately, the
end in that case carried with it the means. The two Houses
were called on to enumerate the votes for President and
Vice-President; of course they were called on to decide what
are votes. 7
This was a fairly "thick" conception of the counting function.
Representative Randolph disagreed. " 'Your office,' said he, 'in
regard to the electoral vote is merely ministerial. It is to count the
votes, and you undertake to reject votes.' "Is Representative Archer,
responding to Representative Randolph's argument, thought that
counting could not exist without judging:
He was a little surprised... that the House had no power to
pass any judgment on any return. He always thought that,
wherever was lodged the power to receive a return, there
was also a power to pass judgment on the validity of that
return. Suppose any Territory not within the limits of the
United States at the time, Florida, for example, to send votes
here for electors; was there no authority by which these
votes could be rejected? Suppose a State entitled to twenty-
seven votes should send thirty-seven votes, would any
gentlemen contend that there was no power in this House to
judge of the proper number?29
This is not necessarily a "thick" conception of counting at all; as
we shall see, many of Representative Archer's concerns come before
Congress meets for the purpose of the electoral count. For instance,
257. COUNTING ELECrORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 52 (1821). Just two years later,
Senator Benton observed:
Two questions of great delicacy now present themselves:
1. If electors are not appointed according to the Constitution, can their votes be
counted?
2. If objected to, who shall judge them?
It is the duty of the two houses of Congress to count the votes. Can they count
unconstitutional votes? If they cannot, shall they not judge every vote before it
is counted?
Id. at 57 (1823).




prior to the electoral count, each House of Congress would have
resolved whether or not to recognize Florida as a member of the
Union in considering whether to seat any of Florida's Senators or
Representatives.
During the Wisconsin Incident, Representative Marshall also
advocated a "thick" conception of the counting function. He bluntly
asked, "What is to count? What faculty does it involve? I say not
only the faculty of enumerating, but the faculty of judging whether it
is a vote or not.' '260 In a speech directed to the President of the
Senate during the electoral count, Representative Marshall sought to
justify his conception of the counting function upon the textual
distinction between the word "Certificates" and the word "Votes":
Whether that is a vote or not must depend upon the
determination of this convention, and if you will regard the
verbiage of the Constitution, you will find that your function
goes no further than to open the certificates. The language
of the Constitution is that "the President of the Senate, in
the presence of the House of Representatives, shall open all
the certificates," and then the phraseology changes, and
proceeds, "and the votes shall be counted," not by you, but
by us; and whenever a vote is challenged, this is the time,
and this the only place, where a determination can be
formed whether it is a vote.261
This argument does not withstand a close examination of the
Electoral College Clauses. The Constitution employs the word
"Certificates" instead of "Votes" for a simple reason. Each of the
Electoral Colleges sends a "List" (now two lists with the adoption of
the Twelfth Amendment)-which contains the "Votes" of the
electors-to the President of the Senate. The Constitution requires
that each "List" be signed and certified by the electors in each State;
when the "List" is so signed and certified, it becomes a "Certificate."
Thus, the contradistinction between "Certificates" and "Votes" is of
little interpretive value.
Other Members of Congress agreed with Representative
Marshall. For example, Representative Orr asked, "Does not the
requisition to be present at the counting necessarily carry the right to
260. Id. at 142.
261. Id. at 89. Representative Marshall misquoted the constitutional text. He also did
not notice the textual significance in the use and seeming disuse of the word "all." In a
later remark, he came close: "The President of the Senate has to open all the certificates,
and then his function is performed; and after all the certificates have been opened, the
counting of the votes is then to commence and be concluded." Id. at 95 (emphasis in
original).
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determine what votes offered are legal, and what votes may be void,
as an inseparable incident to the power of counting? ' 262  He
concluded that the "Constitution makes us the managers or
canvassers to count the electoral votes, and in doing so gives us the
power to say whether a vote presented is or is not legal. '263 Those
who advocated a "thin" conception of the counting function were in
the minority. Senator Toucey put the point best in his statement that
"[t]he whole proceeding of counting is based on the idea merely of
disclosing to the public in a safe, authentic way, the actual state of the
vote; and when that is ascertained truly, the President who is chosen
by that vote is President, let Congress do what it may."264
Finally, the nature of the counting function occupied a prominent
position in the debates over the Electoral Count Act. The positions
taken are well summarized by the statements of Senator Edmunds,
who supported the Electoral Count Act, and Senator Bayard, who
opposed it. Senator Edmunds was of the view that a vote
must mean a legal vote, a vote which is in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States and
in accordance with the laws which have existed for so many
years respecting the method by which and the time within
which the vote of each State is to be expressed and
returned.265
Senator Bayard pointed out the implications of Senator Edmunds's
view. He asked:
Were the two houses of Congress ever intended to become
the judges of the electoral vote of the people of this country?
Apparently by the Constitution their duties would seem to
be of a ministerial character only. They were to stand by
and witness the counting, and their presence in that way as
witnesses was supposed to be a security. Now you change
this from a merely ministerial power into a judicial power of
the very gravest and most important character. Is there a
warrant for that in the Constitution of the United States? 266
262. Id. at 140; see also id at 112 (remarks of Sen. Toombs) ("When we are called upon
to see these votes counted, it becomes our first duty to know what are the votes to be
counted.").
263. Id. at 140.
264. Id. at 134.
265. Id at 456; see also id. at 531 (remarks of Sen. Boutwell) (stating his belief that
"the counting of the votes, in the language of the Constitution, means something more
than a mere examination of the certificates returned from the electors of the respective
States").
266. Id. at 523 (remarks of Sen. Bayard).
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In sum, there is considerable historical support for both the
"thin" and "thick" conceptions of the counting function. An answer
to the scope of Congress's counting power is informed by the "when"
and "where" of counting, issues which we shall take up next.
d. When Is the Counting Done?
The Electoral College Clauses contain an immediacy principle
and for good reason. The relevant text of the Constitution provides
that once the President of the Senate has opened all of the
Certificates, "the votes shall then be counted."267  This is the
immediacy principle of the Electoral College Clauses. Another part
of this clause reinforces this immediacy principle. In case of electoral
deadlock, the House of Representatives is to "immediately" choose
the next President from those on the list.26
The word "immediately" has special significance in the Electoral
College Clauses.26 9 According to Senator Pinckney, the word
"immediately" in this Clause means "instantly, and on the spot,
without leaving the House in which they are then assembled, and
without adjournment."270 He explained that the word was inserted to
guard against the possibility of domestic intrigue and foreign
influence at the Seat of Government of the United States:
[T]he election by the House of Representatives taking place
immediately after the votes have been opened and counted,
that body would go to the election free and uninfluenced [by
leaders of domestic intrigue and foreign emissaries], as they
ought. And is not this, sir, safer; is it not better than that the
smallest delay should take place in determining it?... [I]t
will be less dangerous to the public interest, that even one
who may not be the most qualified of the five, should be
elected, than that Congress should adjourn to deliberate on
it, and thus expose themselves, and the best interests of their
constituents, to the secret and artful attacks that will be
made on their integrity. 71
267. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (emphasis added).
268. Id.
269. The word "immediately" is rare in the original Constitution, and is used in only
one other clause of the original Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2
("Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they
shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes.").
270. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 137 (1800).
271. See id at 138 (emphasis added). The Twelfth Amendment, adopted in 1804, also
contains a requirement that the House of Representatives shall "immediately" choose a
President. However, the Twelfth Amendment seems to significantly soften-and perhaps
quash-Senator Pinckney's immediacy principle. The Twelfth Amendment, unlike the
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At the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, James Wilson echoed
Senator Pinckney's observation and his underlying rationale. He
noted that "if the election be made as it ought as soon as the votes of
the electors are opened & it is known that no one has a majority of
the whole, there can be little danger of corruption."'17 In a letter to
the Washington Federalist, "Horatius" advised that
[t]he choice is required to be immediately made, in order
that the result may be declared in the presence of the
Senate, and to prevent the possibility of intrigue and
corruption. The choice must be therefore made before the
house adjourns or disperses, and after the convention of the
Senate and House of Representatives terminates, the house
cannot at a future day act upon this subject. 73
original Electoral College Clauses, provides that "if the House of Representatives shall
not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the
fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in
the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President." U.S. CONST.
amend. XII, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3. Federal law, at the time of the
adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, specified that the counting of electoral votes would
take place on the second Wednesday in February. Thus, the Twelfth Amendment seems
to countenance up to two weeks of deliberation by the House of Representatives. William
Alexander Duer made the point that
[a]lthough the Constitution directs that when no person is found to have a
majority of the Electoral votes, the choice shall be immediately made by the
House of Representatives, yet it is not held obligatory upon that House to
proceed to the election directly upon the separation of the two Houses; but that
it may proceed either at that time and place, or omit it until afterwards. This
construction was adopted before the [Twelfth Amendment], and there can now
be no doubt of its correctness, as the amendment expressly declares the choice of
the House to be valid, if made before the fourth of March following the day on
which the Electoral votes are counted.
DUER'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 19, at 89-90.
If we read the immediacy principle as loosely as Professor Duer suggests, the
current Constitution seems to countenance exactly seventeen days of deliberation by the
House of Representatives. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1 ("The terms of the President
and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators
and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January,... and the terms of their
successors shall then begin.").
It should be noted that the Twelfth Amendment does not specify when the Senate
shall choose the Vice President should the choice devolve upon it. Could it be that the
framers of the Twelfth Amendment simply forgot to add comparable language for the
Senate? See also 1 KENT'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 19, at *278 ("The [C]onstitution
does not specifically prescribe when or where the [Slenate is to choose [V]ice-[P]resident,
if no choice be made by the electors; and, I presume, the [S]enate may elect by themselves,
at any time before the fourth day of March following."). It goes without saying that the
current Constitution seems to countenance exactly seventeen days of deliberation by the
Senate. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
272. 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 502.
273. Horatius, The Presidential Knot, WASH. FEDERALIST, Jan. 6, 1801 [hereinafter
Horatius Letter]. I am grateful to Professor Ackerman for providing me with a copy of
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The immediacy principle implies that the counting agent may not
delay in counting the electoral votes. The "then" requirement
militates against the deliberative aspects of counting and the judging
of the electoral votes. After all, judicial determinations take time.
The Electoral Count Act does not violate the immediacy
principle. 3 U.S.C. § 17 puts strict time limits on the electoral count:
when the two Houses separate to debate an objection to an electoral
vote, each Member of each House may only speak once on the
objection for a maximum of five minutes, and total debate in each
House is limited to two hours 4 Although this provision does not
violate the immediacy principle, it is patently unconstitutional-
Congress may not bind by statute either House in the rules of its
proceedings.275 As we shall see next, the "then" requirement also has
Horatius's letter. Professor Ackerman believes that "Horatius" is John Marshall, a
conclusion which he (tentatively) reaches based on a computer analysis of Marshall's
writings (performed with his linguist friend, Roger Shuy), and based on other "old-
fashioned circumstantial evidence," including a snippet from Marshall historian Albert J.
Beveridge. See Email from Bruce Ackerman to Vasan Kesavan (Apr. 17, 2002) (on file
with author).
274. 3 U.S.C. § 17 (2000) provides that
When the two Houses separate to decide upon an objection that may have been
made to the counting of any electoral vote or votes from any State, or other
question arising in the matter, each Senator and Representative may speak to
such objection or question five minutes, and not more than once; but after such
debate shall have lasted two hours it shall be the duty of the presiding officer of
each House to put the main question without further debate.
275. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (Rules of Proceedings Clause) ("Each House may
determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and,
with the Concurrence of two[-]thirds, expel a Member."). Anyone who wishes to argue
that the Electoral Count Act is constitutional faces the most difficult task in justifying the
constitutionality of 3 U.S.C. § 17.
During the Electoral Count Act debates, Senator Christiancy noted the
constitutional problem. "I notice," said Christiancy,
that this bill, which it is proposed to make an act of Congress, provides for the
length of the time that any Senator or Representative may speak when the
Senate is acting separately and the House is acting separately. I wish to know if
that is not trenching upon the constitutional power of each house to make its
own rules to regulate its own proceedings.
COUNTING ELECrORAL VoTEs, supra note 3, at 688 (1876). Senator Thurman responded
to the point with an entirely unconvincing answer:
The joint rule heretofore adopted prohibited all debate, and it seems to have
been held good. No question was ever made in respect of that rule. If we have
the right to legislate upon this subject, as I think we have-and this whole bill
goes upon that foundation-then I think we have a right to regulate the mode of
procedure so that it shall not be defeated, as it otherwise might be, by the
consumption of time in speaking."
Id. Senator Edmunds, for his part, rightly noted that "[t]hen you might pass a law as to all
bills." Id
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an implication for where the counting (and any potential judging) of
electoral votes takes place.
e. Where Is the Counting Done?
The Electoral College Clauses provide that the lists of electoral
votes from the several states are to be "directed to the President of
the Senate"276 and that "[t]he President of the Senate shall, in the
Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted."'277 These clauses
are the font of two mutually reinforcing "where" principles: the
publicity principle and the unicameralism principle.
The publicity principle is easy to identify. The President of the
Senate is not supposed to open all of the certificates behind closed
doors, but is only to do so "in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives."278 Although this phrase does not necessarily
modify the subsequent vote counting phrase as a grammatical matter,
the Constitution almost certainly requires that the counting of the
votes take place in an equally public manner.27 9 Moreover, there is an
276. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. This language is likely a vestige of early drafts of the
Electoral College Clauses which vested the choice of a President and Vice President in
case of electoral deadlock in the Senate. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 497-98.
There is a reasonable functional explanation as to why the Framers kept this requirement.
The Framers believed that the Senate would be in almost constant session anyway, unlike
the House of Representatives. See, e.g., id. at 274 (remarks of George Mason) (observing
that Senators "will probably settle themselves at the seat of Govt." unlike Representatives
"chosen frequently and obliged to return frequently among the people"); id. at 523
(remarks of James Wilson) ("The Senate, will moreover in all probability be in constant
Session."); id at 537 (remarks of George Mason) (supporting privy council of six members
to the President on basis that it would "prevent the constant sitting of the Senate which he
thought dangerous"); id. at 639 (remarks of George Mason) (referring to "long continued
sessions of the Senate"); GEORGE MASON, OBJECrIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
GOVERNMENT FORMED BY THE CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 11 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (referring to Senate as "a constant
existing Body almost continually sitting"); Essay XVI of Brutus (Apr. 10, 1788), reprinted
in id. at 444 (stating that Senators "will for the most part of the time be absent from the
state they represent" and that Senators will be inhabitants of the "federal city").
277. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
278. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (emphasis added). Interestingly, an early draft of the
Electoral College Clauses at the Philadelphia Convention provided that "[t]he President
of the Senate shall in that House open all the certificates; and the votes shall be then &
there counted." 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 497-98 (emphasis added).
279. Indeed, the secret drafting history of the Constitution shows that when the "in
presence" phrase was agreed to, it was inserted after the word "counted" in the draft of
the Electoral College Clauses, thus modifying both the opening of certificates and the
counting of votes. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 518, 526. When the report was
produced, however, the text was re-ordered and read: "The President of the Senate shall
in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives open all the certificates & the
votes shall then be counted." Id. at 528; see also COUNTING ELEcTORAL VOTES, supra
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excellent functional reason why the Senate and the House of
Representatives are required to be present for the electoral count: if
there should be no winner under the electoral college mode of
presidential and vice presidential election, the duty of choosing the
President devolves upon the House of Representatives, and the duty
of choosing the Vice President devolves upon the Senate? 80
Under the publicity principle, the secret proceeding
contemplated by the Grand Committee Bill would have been grossly
unconstitutional.2" During the Wisconsin Incident of 1857, Senator
Thompson thought the idea of the publicity principle "was that we
were not to go into executive session, nor, by some secret cabal or
clandestine arrangement, get together here and have a coup d'etat,
and make a President."'  Thus, the elections of 1801 and 1825, in
which the House of Representatives chose the President in closed-
door proceedings, were also grossly unconstitutional.3
note 3, at 451 (1875) (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen) ("The Constitution says that the
votes shall then in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives be counted.");
1 TUCKER'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 19, app. at 327 ("The certificates... are to be
publicly opened, and counted in the presence of the whole national legislature: .... );
Horatius Letter, supra note 273 ("The constitution has enjoined that the certificates of the
electors shall be opened, and their votes counted in the presence of the Senate, and House
of Representatives.") (emphasis in original); 18 CONG. REc. 45 (1886) (remarks of Rep.
Dibble) (noting that the counting of electoral votes takes place in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives).
280. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. For an eloquent expression of this point, see 18
CONG. REC. 30 (remarks of Rep. Caldwell).
281. For an eloquent expression of the publicity principle, see 10 ANNALS OF CONG.
145 (1800) where Senator Pinckney remarked:
Give, however, the power of deciding on their votes, and of rejecting or receiving
them, as they please, to thirteen men, all of the same political description, all
wishing the same men, sitting with closed doors, and whose deliberations are
removed from the public eye, and you will find it difficult to avoid just suspicion;
your jealous citizens will remember that secrecy always accompanies corruption,
and that even if this committee were to act in the most honorable manner, yet
still that the friends of the candidate whose votes have been refused, if such
refusal cost him his election, will never cease to suspect that all has not been fair,
and that some improper reason had influenced the decision.
282. COUNTING ELECrORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 126 (1857); see also iL at 452
(remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen) ("Why, sir, are the House and the Senate present? It is
because they represent the sovereignty of the Government at that most critical moment
when the executive power is to be transmitted, and they are there that the transmission
may be under their watchful guardianship.").
283. Professor Glennon seems to think that closed proceedings are constitutionally
permissible, but not constitutionally desirable. See GLENNON, supra note 18, at 48
(discussing question of "Open or Closed Proceedings?"). This is a seriously flawed
reading of the Electoral College Clauses, which emphasize publicity, and of the original
Constitution in its entirety, which emphasizes the same. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5,
cl. 3 (Journal of Proceedings Clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (Veto Clause); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (Receipts and Expenditures Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1
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The publicity principle probably extends to the choosing of a
President and a Vice President in case of electoral deadlock as well.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly specify, it probably
requires that the House of Representatives "immediately" choose the
President in the presence of the SenateI and that the Senate
"immediately" choose the Vice President in the presence of the
House. 5 This mode of presidential and vice presidential selection
maximizes legitimacy.
The question is what the publicity principle implies for the
judging of electoral votes. A narrow view of the publicity principle is
that the Members of Congress come together to ensure the proper
aggregation of the electoral votes. During the Wisconsin Incident of
1857, Representative Orr urged a broader view, arguing that the
publicity principle is the font of congressional power to reject
"illegal" electoral votes:
Suppose the result of the election would depend on the vote
of [Wisconsin]: how would it be possible to declare who was
elected until it had been decided whether or not that vote
was to be received? Who is to decide that? The
Constitution and the laws require that the two houses shall
(Opinion Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (Commissions Clause); U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 3, cl. 1 (Treason Clause); see also Harrison, supra note 23, at 705 (noting that "a
public occasion for the [electoral] count will inspire public confidence in the probity of the
process"); cf. PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 13 ("The doors of the house in which the
representatives of the freemen of this state shall sit in the general assembly, shall be and
remain open for the admission of all persons who behave decently, except only when the
welfare of this state may require the doors to be shut.").
284. See, e.g., 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 137 (remarks of Sen. Pinckney) (describing
immediacy principle as "instantly, and on the spot, without leaving the House in which they
are then assembled, and without adjournment") (emphasis added); 2 FARRAND, supra
note 35, at 518-19 (describing motion of James Madison that, in case of electoral
deadlock, two-thirds of Senators be present in presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives to choose the President; motion passed by a vote of six to four and was
subsequently rendered moot by motion to vest choice of President in case of electoral
deadlock in House of Representatives); Horatius Letter, supra note 273 ("The choice is
required to be immediately made, in order that the result may be declared in the presence of
the Senate, and to prevent the possibility of intrigue and corruption.").
Although the Twelfth Amendment relaxed the immediacy principle (giving the
House of Representatives additional time to choose a President in case of electoral
deadlock, see supra note 271), it is much less clear that it also relaxed the publicity
principle. It appears that the House of Representatives chose the President in the
presence of the Senate in 1801 and 1825. See 1 KENT'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 19, at
-277 (noting that the Senate was "admitted to be present as spectators"); DUER'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 19, at 90 (similar).
285. This principle was violated in the electoral count of 1837. The Senate chose the
Vice President because of electoral deadlock but did so in the Senate Chamber and not in
the presence of the House of Representatives in joint convention.
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meet in joint convention, and that the votes of the electors
of the several States shall be opened and counted before
them.
This, in my judgment, confers upon them the power to
determine whether a vote be valid or invalid. Otherwise it is
a mere farce if they are called on only to witness the
counting. The counting might just as well be done by the
Vice-President or the President of the Senate, without the
presence of the two houses. But it is to guard against an
illegal vote being counted that the two houses are required
to be assembled together z6
This brings us to the second "where" principle: unicameralism.
The Constitution requires that the two Houses of Congress come
together for the purpose of opening all the electoral certificates and
counting the electoral votes. This practice has been followed for all of
our electoral count history. In the first and second presidential
elections, the Senate and the House of Representatives assembled in
the Senate Chamber for the opening and counting of the electoral
votes, and in all subsequent elections, the Senate and the House have
assembled in the House Chamber.37
The unicameralism principle suggests that any power to judge
electoral votes is vested in the one body which is present when the
electoral certificates are opened and when the electoral votes are
counted' and is to be resolved on a per capita vote basis.8 9 The
286. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 90 (emphasis added); see also id
at 114 (remarks of Sen. Butler) ("The Senate of the United States is called into the other
house as a corporate body, an imposing corporate body, to be a witness to the election of
the Chief Magistrate of this country, and to see that the votes are counted fairly."); id at
452 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen) (supporting amendment to Twenty-second Joint
Rule) ("Why, sir, are the House and the Senate present? It is because they represent the
sovereignty of the Government at that most critical moment when the executive power is
to be transmitted, and they are there that the transmission may be under their watchful
guardianship.").
287. Under the current Electoral Count Act, the President of the Senate and Members
of Congress are to meet in the Hall of the House of Representatives. See 3 U.S.C. § 15
(2000). During the Wisconsin Incident of 1857, Senator Thompson declared his belief that
the intent of the Framers was to make the House of Representatives present as witnesses
in the Senate Chamber. See COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 126.
288. In congressional debate, this one body has been repeatedly referred to as a
"convention" or a "joint convention" of the two Houses, although the Constitution does
not employ this word. There were, of course, those who disagreed with this term. See,
e.g., COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 111 (remarks of Sen. Stuart).
289. The unicameralism principle, without more, does not require that the counting
function be exercised by the Senators and Representatives in the unicameral body on a
per capita vote basis. The Senate and House of Representatives could, presumably
without undue trouble, organize themselves and vote as separate bodies while convened
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Electoral Count Act violates the unicameralism principle because it
provides that, upon objection to an electoral vote in the joint
assembly, the two Houses of Congress shall separate and
independently decide on the legality of that electoral vote,29 thereby
giving equal weight to the decision of the Senate and House of
Representatives. One implication of the unicameralism ("where")
principle and the immediacy ("when") principle is that the resolution
of any electoral count questions cannot be vested in any judicial
tribunal. Senator Morton put this point nicely in debates over the
Electoral Count Act:
Then and there. You cannot refer to any other tribunal; you
cannot get the case before the Supreme Court of the United
States or before any special court to be created for that
purpose. These votes are then to be opened, and then and
there they are to be counted.291
The secret drafting history of the Constitution suggests the
unicameralism principle. When the Committee of Eleven proposed
the electoral college mode of presidential election, the draft provided
that, "The President of the Senate shall in that House open all the
certificates; and the votes shall be then & there counted" by the
Senate.291 This clause was later amended to include the phrase "in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives" and the "&
there" language was dropped.293 However, there is very little reason
to suppose that the counting was not to occur in that single body of
Senators and Representatives. 29 4
together in one room. For present purposes, I define the unicameralism principle as
counting electoral votes on a per capita vote basis (equivalent to the Senate and House of
Representatives voting by joint ballot), thereby giving Representatives a decisive
advantage over Senators in resolving disputes in the counting of electoral votes. As we
shall see presently, this conception of the counting function makes better sense of
constitutional structure.
290. 3 U.S.C. § 15.
291. COUNTING ELECrORAL VOTEs, supra note 3, at 529. Also, Senator Boutwell
remarked that:
There can be, under the Constitution, no tribunal to decide that or any other
question arising in the course of counting the votes, because it is a duty imposed
upon the two [H]ouses of Congress. They alone can perform it, and they have
not the power to transfer its performance to anybody else.
Id. at 531.
292. 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 497-98 (emphasis added).
293. See id. at 528.
294. As a background principle, it might be said that the Framers shied away from
separate action by the two Houses in electing the President when both Houses were
involved. Before the Framers agreed to the electoral college mode of election, the
President was to be elected by the Legislature-not the two Houses of Congress acting
separately-but by joint ballot. 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 401-03. The rationale was
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There is ample historical support for the unicameralism principle.
In the Sixth Congress, Representative and Framer Albert Gallatin
moved to amend the Grand Committee Bill to provide that any
decision on the legality of an electoral vote would be made by a
majority of the Members of Congress then present at the electoral
count.295 After a long debate, this motion fell just two votes shy of
passing.296 Senator Baldwin, in his remarks on January 23, 1800,
recognized that the Senators and Representatives would "me[e]t
together in one room" to receive the electoral votes and "to judge
only of its authentication. ' '297 Senator Pinckney, in his remarks on
March 28, 1800, also recognized the unicameralism principle, but
nevertheless argued that Congress had no power to reject electoral
votes.29s Other senators also supported the unicameralism principle.
The preamble of their proposed alternative to the Grand Committee
Bill provided that the Senators and Representatives assembled for the
purpose of the electoral count form a single tribunal, with the number
of Senators and Representatives from each state equal to the number
of electors from each state.299
to avoid the "[g]reat delay and confusion [which] would ensue if the two Houses slid [sic]
vote separately, each having a negative on the choice of the other." Id. at 402 (remarks of
Nathaniel Gorham).
The Framers thought that a joint ballot was particularly important in one other
area. Both the draft of the Constitution referred to the Committee of Style and its report
provided for the appointment of the Treasurer of the United States by joint ballot of the
Congress. See id. at 570 (draft referred to Committee of Style) (stating that Congress shall
have power "[t]o appoint a Treasurer by joint ballot"); i. at 594 (report of Committee of
Style) (first provision of precursor to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8) ("The Congress may by joint
ballot appoint a treasurer."). This provision was subsequently deleted on September 14,
1787, just three days before the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 completed its business.
See id. at 614.
295. Specifically,
A motion of Mr. Gallatin was under consideration to insert, instead of the
principle that in cases of doubt the Houses should divide to their respective
Chambers to consider the qualification or disqualification of a vote or votes,
from their joint meeting, if such question should arise at counting the votes, the
following words: "And the question of the exception shall immediately, and
without debate, be taken by yeas and nays, and decided by a majority of the
members of both Houses then present."
COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 26 (emphasis added).
296. Id During the Electoral Count Act debates, Representative Adams made note of
Representative Gallatin's motion in 1800 in support of his argument for unicameral action.
See 17 CONG. REC. 51 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Adams).
297. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 16.
298. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 139 (1800) ("Congress shall not themselves, even in
joint convention, have the smallest power to decide on a single vote."); i. ("[How utterly
unconstitutional it would be for Congress, either acting in their separate chambers or in
convention, to attempt to assume to themselves the power to reject a single vote.").
299. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 120.
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In later years, those who have supported congressional control
over electoral votes have voiced the unicameralism objection to the
Electoral Count Act. For example, during the Missouri Incident,
Representative Archer, emphasizing the "then" immediacy
requirement of the electoral count, stated:
He was opposed to this House undertaking to proceed in
any manner as to the legality of the electoral votes. He
could recognize no power in the House of Representatives
on this subject separate from the Senate.... Does it not
follow that the votes must be counted in the presence of the
two Houses? For what purposes do they assemble together
unless it be to determine on the legality of the votes. If not
for this purpose, the joint meeting is for form and show and
nothing else. We must, in my apprehension, determine the
question in joint meeting, and in no other way.
However, Senator Rufus King disagreed, stating that he was
"opposed to the settlement of any litigated question in joint meeting,
where the Senate, as a body, would be lost; and argued that whenever
any such should arise, it would be always proper that the two Houses
should separate. 30
1
During the Wisconsin Incident, Senator Pugh made a strong
argument in favor of the unicameralism principle. He believed that
the joint convention was the proper forum to settle the Wisconsin
problem because:
The whole number of Senators and Representatives taken
together is equal to the whole number of electors in all the
colleges. It is exactly the same body of men in number,
equal to all of them. All the States, if they had voted there
yesterday through their Senators and Representatives,
would have exercised the precise power which they
exercised in the election of President."
300. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 54; see also id at 52 (remarks of
Rep. Henry Clay) (implying joint action by the two Houses because the two Houses might
disagree if they met separately and "then the votes would be lost altogether").
301. Id. at 49.
302. Id. at 137. Senator Cass presented the argument against the unicameralism
principle:
I wish to submit a single remark to the President and to the Senate, for I do not
consider that this convention can be addressed. We can take no vote. How are
we to vote? Per capita or by States? Are we to vote as representatives of the
people or representatives of States? If we cannot vote here, we cannot discuss.
The only thing which remains for us to do, if there are insuperable difficulties in
the way, is to adjourn immediately to our respective halls. Then let the Senate or
the House of Representatives bring up the matter for action. By the present
proceeding we are overturning the Government-we are making this a national
1726 [Vol. 80
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Even if the joint convention was a single tribunal-a court of last
resort, according to Senator Pugh-the question remained as to how
the voting should take place within the joint convention. Senator
Pugh stated his belief that the voting should be per capita.03
Representative Orr, speaking before the House of Representatives,
concurred: "Who was to decide on the validity of the challenged
vote? The two [H]ouses in joint convention by a per capita vote. '30 4
However, the textual argument against this position is that the
Electoral College Clauses provide that the counting take place "in the
Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives"-not "in the
Presence of Senators and Representatives," suggesting that the
counting function is to be exercised by the Senate and the House of
Representatives acting separately in their corporate capacities, not by
Senators and Representatives acting together in a single corporate
capacity.
Representative Orr, however, offered one additional structural
argument in support of the per capita vote in the joint convention, an
argument that answers Senator King's objection during the Missouri
Incident that the power of the Senate would be "lost" in the joint
convention. He pointed out that the "[s]enatorial electors" in the
electoral colleges "possess[ed] no power or dignity superior to those
representing the congressional districts. 30 5 Given this observation,
the per capita vote made perfect sense: the Senate would have the
same power in the joint convention that the senatorial electors had in
the electoral colleges.
During the Electoral Count Act debates, Senator Thurman
succinctly expressed the unicameralism principle: "The Constitution
is 'and the votes shall then be counted;' that is, shall be counted right
there, in the presence of the two [Houses. That is what the
Constitution requires .... They are not to be counted elsewhere.
convention.
Id. at 91. Senator Toucey remarked that "[i]f there is to be any action, or deliberation
with a view to action, the two houses must separate, deliberate, and act separately." Id. at
121.
303. d at 137.
304. Id at 140. Representative Humphrey Marshall-Justice John Marshall's cousin-
agreed:
We have a constitutional duty to see that the count is properly made, and a
separate resolution passing from this House to the Senate, and from the Senate
back to this House, does not, according to my view, meet the requirements of the
Constitution. The examination must be made, and the proclamation must be
made, in the presence of the two houses.
Id at 141.
305. Id. at 140.
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They are to be counted then and there. 30 6 Several years later,
Senator George made a particularly compelling structural argument
for unicameral action in judging electoral votes. His argument was
that the counting function "is not a legislative function which ought to
be considered separately by the two Houses, but it is rather in the
nature of a judicial function, '3 ° and therefore the two Houses of
Congress "should adopt that form in the performance of that
[judicial] duty which would enable us to discharge it."3 ' Invoking the
image of a court, he stated:
Why, certainly, sir, it would be an anomaly in jurisprudence,
it would be an anomaly surely in Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence, that for the ascertainment of a single fact, the
rendering of an operative judgment upon the ascertainment
of a fact should be committed to two separate tribunals, each
acting independently of the other, and each having a veto
upon the other. By that sort of tribunal no judicial function
has ever been performed. We require unanimity in juries,
that twelve men shall agree to a verdict, but they are one
body; they consult and confer with each other, and they
arrive at a conclusion as the result of that conference; but
nobody ever proposed to have two juries to try a case. We
have a court sometimes composed of an even number of
judges, and the result may be a division between the judges,
and there may be a provision or there may be none, for one
or the other to rule the case; but it has never been that two
courts having equal power can be charged with the
determination of the same case.30 9
Under Senator George's structural analogy, the number of jurors
in the single body is precisely equal to the number of electors. This
argument has some intuitive appeal. Indeed, the Democratic House
of Representatives in 1884 passed a substitute version of the Electoral
Count Act bill, which provided for the unicameral resolution of issues
during the electoral count on a per capita vote basis, but the
Democratic Senate did not agree.310 This is not to say that the
unicameralism principle was uncontroversial. During the Electoral
Count Act debates, there were Members of Congress who strongly
objected to the unicameralism principle,31 and who believed that the
306. Id. at 465.
307. 17 CONG. REc. 2429 (1886) (remarks of Sen. George).
308. Id
309. Id.
310. See 15 CONG. REc. 5460-68,5547-51 (1884); 16 CONG. REc. 1618 (1885).
311. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 1058 (remarks of Sen. Evarts) (stating that the joint
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counting function should be exercised by the two Houses acting
separately in their corporate capacities.312
In sum, the unicameralism principle makes better sense,
especially as a matter of immediacy, publicity, and jury-like structure.
As we shall soon see, the unicameralism principle also avoids the
presentment problem of the Electoral Count Act.313
2. Where Is the Font of Power?
As we have seen, the Electoral College Clauses are best
interpreted as vesting the counting function in the joint convention
and not the President of the Senate. Let us assume for present
purposes that Congress may by law bind the joint convention in
counting electoral votes-this assumption, as we shall see, is no small
assumption.314 Where is the font of power to pass the Electoral Count
Act? In a Constitution of enumerated and hence limited powers,31 5
convention would be "wholly an unconstitutional assemblage" and that "I can find no
ground to support this extra assemblage of the two Houses voting per capita");
Representative Caldwell remarked:
It will be perceived that this bill is not predicated upon the idea of throwing the
two Houses into convention and merging the smaller body, the Senate, into the
larger body, the House of Representatives, and voting per capita. It is submitted
that no constitutional warrant can be found for such an idea.
18 CONG. REc. 31 (1886). Representative Herbert remarked:
The words are not in the presence of the members of the Senate, or in the
presence of the members of the House of Representatives, but in the presence of
the Senate, which can only mean the organized Senate, and the House of
Representatives, which can only mean the organized House of Representatives.
Id. at 75.
312. For example, Representative Caldwell stated that
the action of the two Houses shall be separate and concurrent upon all questions
of contest arising under the count, but joint as to results, thus preserving the
dignity and rights of the two bodies by conceding to each equal and concurrent
powers in counting and judging of the validity of electoral votes without merger
of the lesser body into the numerically greater.
18 CONG. REC. 31. Addtionally,
[t]he separate concurrent action of both Houses provided for in the bill preserves
the constitutional identity, rights, and dignity of each. This concession of each
House to the other of equal and concurrent power to decide on informalities and
illegalities appearing on the face of returns, upon objection of a Senator or
Representative, is necessary to the determination of results.
Id.; see also id. at 50 (remarks of Rep. Adams) ("[M]y theory is that the two Houses
of Congress, acting each in its own individual capacity, each voting by itself, have
absolute control of the entire subject.").
313. See infra notes 526-53 and accompanying text.
314. For the structural argument that Congress may not bind the joint convention in
counting electoral votes, much less future joint conventions, see infra notes 498-525 and
accompanying text.
315. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This
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we must ask ourselves under what clause or clauses Congress has the
express or implied power to pass the Electoral Count Act. A
dedicated constitutionalist cannot escape from asking this most basic
question of the Electoral Count Act.
There is, of course, no express power enabling Congress to pass
the Electoral Count Act.316 There must therefore be some implied
power enabling Congress to pass the Electoral Count Act; otherwise,
it must be unconstitutional. There are only two options: the
Necessary and Proper Clause317 and the Electoral College Clauses
themselves. Will either of these clauses bear the constitutional
load?
government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers."); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("[T]hat those limits may not be mistaken, or
forgotten, the constitution is written.").
316. This easy textual point was, of course, made during the Electoral Count Act
debates. For example, Senator Jones remarked that
[t]he authority proposed to be given to the Senate and House of Representatives
by this bill cannot surely be derived from any of the express powers of the
Constitution. There is not a word said in the article which contains the delegated
powers on this subject of counting the electoral votes. All that the Constitution
says in regard to the electoral vote is to be found embodied in the second article.
COUNTING ELECfrORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 596.
317. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
318. The most recent scholars to address the Electoral Count Act state that "Congress
probably has the power, when explicit constitutional requirements are violated, not to
count elector votes" because Members of Congress take an oath or affirmation to support
the Constitution. Ross & Josephson, supra note 7, at 713. This argument does not support
the constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act unless the Oath or Affirmation Clause is
the font of power for the Electoral Count Act-an interpretation that is devoid of any
textual, historical, or structural support.
It is also not at all clear whether Ross and Josephson believe that the Oath or
Affirmation Clause is the font of congressional power or congressional duty to reject
unconstitutional electoral votes. Their foregoing statement suggests the former, but two
other statements suggest the latter. See id. ("Depending on the type of constitutional
requirement and whether rejection of the vote would change the result of the election,
Congress might have a duty, under the oath of office to which its members swear, to reject
an elector vote that does not conform to the Constitution."); id. at 739 ("Under the oath
each member takes, Congress must uphold constitutional requirements for presidential
elections, particularly those that lie at the heart of the constitutionality of the process.")
(emphasis added). If the Oath or Affirmation Clause is the font of congressional duty to
reject unconstitutional electoral votes, they cannot be correct that that duty possibly turns
"on the type of constitutional requirement and whether the rejection of the vote would
change the result of the election." The duty to support the Constitution is absolute, not
conditional.
Moreover, the argument from the Oath or Affirmation Clause has almost no
historical support: only one Member of Congress, to my knowledge, pointed to the Oath
or Affirmation Clause as a font of congressional power over the electoral count. See
COUNTING ELEcTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 142 (remarks of Rep. Marshall) ("You
are under oath to support the Constitution, and you cannot count a vote which violates
that instrument, and is a breach of the privileges of the electoral colleges."). The
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a. The Necessary and Proper Clause
The first possible font of congressional power to pass the
Electoral Count Act is the Necessary and Proper Clause. The
Necessary and Proper Clause provides that Congress shall have
power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof."'319 Scholars are split as to
whether the Necessary and Proper Clause is a font of power for the
Electoral Count Act.32°
A careful parsing of the Necessary and Proper Clause reveals
that there are three prongs of power. Under the Clause, Congress has
power for carrying into execution (1) "the foregoing Powers," (2) "all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States," and (3) "all other Powers vested by this
Constitution... in any Department or Officer thereof."321 Which of
these three prongs of the Necessary and Proper Clause will support
Congress's power to enact the Electoral Count Act?
We begin with the first prong. The phrase "foregoing Powers"
obviously refers to the seventeen enumerated powers of Article I,
argument has even less textual support: when we consult the text of the Oath or
Affirmation Clause, we see that Members of Congress take an oath or affirmation to
support the Constitution, but so do members of the state legislatures and executive and
judicial Officers of the United States and of the several states. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
Indeed, Senator Pinckney pointed to the oaths or affirmations taken by members of the
state legislatures and state executives to argue against any congressional power to judge
electoral votes. See, e.g., 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 131 (1800) ("Is not the Constitution the
supreme law of the land, and must not the State Legislatures conform their directions in
the appointment of Electors to the directions of the Constitution?"). Senator Pinckney
also remarked:
Another serious objection to this bill, or to the exercise of this power, either by
Congress or committee, is, that the Executives of the States and the State
Legislatures are equally bound with Congress, by oath, "to support the
Constitution;" it is an oath they all take at the commencement of each new
Legislature.
Id. at 144-45. The important point is that there is no textual justification for supposing
that the Oath or Affirmation Clause gives Congress any special constitutional duty in the
counting of the electoral vote. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the
sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath
or Affirmation.").
319. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
320. Compare Burgess, supra note 18, at 646 (concluding that the Necessary and
Proper Clause is the font of power for the Electoral Count Act), with Ross & Josephson,
supra note 7, at 714-15 (reaching opposite conclusion).
321. As a matter of grammar and punctuation, it is arguable that there is no standalone
second prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and that the second prong and third
prong together constitute one prong.
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section 8,1 and the Electoral College Clauses of the original
Constitution are not "foregoing Powers" in any way given their
placement in Article II. The first prong of the Necessary and Proper
Clause will not suffice as a font of power for the Electoral Count Act.
Let us, for the moment, skip over the second prong and consider
the third prong. The question is whether Congress (more precisely,
the assemblage of the Senate and House of Representatives for the
purposes of the electoral count) is a "Department [of the United
States]" whose members are "Officer[s] [of the United States]." 323
The answer to this question is "No." Congress is not a "Department"
and the Members of Congress are not "Officer[s]" within the meaning
of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
It is well settled that the Members of Congress are not "Officers
of the United States."324  The best textual argument for this
proposition is that Members of Congress are not subject to
impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by the
Senate because they are not "civil Officers of the United States."'325
Furthermore, the Ineligibility Clause of Article I, Section 6 provides
that "no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office. '326 Thus,
322. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-17; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 983-84
(1983) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Necessary and Proper Clause vests
Congress with the power 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing powers [the enumerated powers of § 8]' ")
(alteration in original).
323. Technically, the third prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause refers to
"Department" or "Officer" and not to "Department of the United States" or "Officer of
the United States." The phrase "of the United States" is fairly and necessarily attributed
to both given the last word in the clause "thereof." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18
(stating that Congress shall have power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution... all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof"). At least
one scholar agrees that the word "Officer" in the Necessary and Proper Clause is "a
synonym for the term of art 'Officer of the United States.'" Steven G. Calabresi, The
Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155,161 (1995).
324. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAW § 4-17, at 290
(2d ed. 1988); Amar & Amar, supra note 27, at 114-17 (presenting textual proof);
Calabresi, supra note 323, at 158-63 (same); Vasan Kesavan, The Very Faithless Elector?,
104 W. VA. L. REV. 123, 133 n.46 (2001) (same).
325. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."). For early statements
supporting this point, see, for example, 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 250, at 33
(remarks of Gov. Samuel Johnston at North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 34
(remarks of Archibald Maclaine at North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 127
(remarks of James Iredell at North Carolina ratifying convention).
326. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cI. 2 (emphasis added); see also 2 FARRAND, supra note 35,
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the Members of Congress are not "Officer[s]" within the meaning of
the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The question remains whether Congress is a "Department [of the
United States]" within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, even if Members of Congress are not "Officer[s] [of the
United States]" within the meaning of the same. This is a trickier
question, but not one without an answer. The word "Department" in
the Necessary and Proper Clause has a technical, term of art meaning.
It does not refer to the generic legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of the United States-as used in The Federalist27 or in
the early United States Reports 28-but only refers to the specific
executive and judicial departments of the United States. The
Constitution itself suggests as much. The word "Department" does
not appear elsewhere in Article I (which appertains to the legislative
department in the colloquial sense) but in the Necessary and Proper
Clause; the word does appear in two other clauses-the Opinion
Clause32 9 and the second part of the Appointments Clause33 -- which
refer to "executive Departments" and "Heads of Departments"
respectively. Nowhere is the word "Department" used in the
Constitution to refer to the legislative, executive, or judicial
department in the colloquial sense.
There are at least a few other considerations which militate
against finding that Congress is a "Department" within the meaning
of the Necessary and Proper Clause. First, it would be very strange
at 492 ("The last clause rendering a Seat in the Legislature & an office incompatible was
agreed to nem: con:.") (emphasis added).
327. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison) (entitled "Method of
Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by
Appealing to the People Through a Convention"); THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 282
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor 1999) (1961) (describing "perfectly co-
ordinate" legislative, executive, and judicial departments); see also Steven G. Calabresi &
Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105
HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1156 n.6 (1992) (noting similar point).
328. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 329 (1816) (Story, J.)
("The object of the constitution was to establish three great departments of government;
the legislative, the executive, and the judicial departments."); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199,272-73 (1796) (Iredell, J.) (referring to the "Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
Departments" and the "Legislative department"); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398
(1789) (Iredell, J.) (referring to "a government, composed of Legislative, Executive and
Judicial departments").
329. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("[The President] may require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices ... ").
330. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[B]ut the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.").
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(but perhaps not unthinkable) for Members of Congress not to be
"Officer[s]," but for Congress to be a "Department" within the
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. The logical argument is
that "If Department, then Officer" is true, then "If not-Officer, then
not-Department" is also true. The Necessary and Proper Clause
ostensibly relates to "Officers" who are "Officers of Departments"
who are, in turn, "Officers of Departments of the United States," or
simply "Officers... of the United States." Second, if Congress is a
"Department" within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, then Congress would be able to legislate with respect to itself
on matters concerning its own powers.3" Such legislation flies in the
face of constitutional text. The Rules of Proceedings Clause makes
explicit that "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings. '33  Congress may not therefore enact rules of
proceedings for Congress or each House thereof by statute.333 Such
legislation also violates constitutional structure. The separation of
the two Houses of Congress in the exercise of its powers-in a word,
bicameralism-is a critical structural feature of Article I designed to
check legislative tyrannyY 4  Moreover, constitutional structure
suggests that Congress may not bind itself or future Congresses in the
exercise of its own powers .33  Third, the prevailing interpretation of
the third prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause appears to be that
it only refers to the executive and judicial departments of the United
States.36  Thus, Congress (more precisely, the assemblage of the
331. Such legislation is to be sharply distinguished from legislation enacted pursuant to
Congress's enumerated powers operating on, for example, the federal government
(including Congress) as well as the governments of the several States as well as the people
(citizens and aliens) of the United States.
332. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
333. For a contrary view taken in passing, see Calabresi, supra note 323, at 160 n.31
(noting that the "Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to carry into execution
its own powers, including the rule-making powers of both Houses").
334. See, e.g., THm FEDERALIST No. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
Mentor 1999) (1961) ("In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily
predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different
branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of
action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and
their common dependence on society will admit."); 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 254
(similar); 2 STORY'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 9, §§ 547-557, at 27-36 (discussing
importance of bicameralism in constitutional structure); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 947-51 (1983) (same).
335. See infra notes 498-525 and accompanying text.
336. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal
Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DuKE L.J. 267, 274 n.23
(1993) (reading third prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause as giving Congress power
to pass laws "'horizontally' to implement the constitutionally vested powers of federal
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Senate and House of Representatives for the purposes of the
electoral count)337 is not a "Department" whose members are
"Officers" within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The third prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause also will not
suffice as a font of power for the Electoral Count Act.338
Only the second prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause
remains: Congress shall have power "[t]o make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution... all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States. '339 The question is thus whether the counting function is one
executive and judicial officers"); William Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in
Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on
the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 102, 107-120
(1976).
337. Although this body is technically not "Congress," the argument that this body is
not a "Department" whose members are "Officer[s]" within the meaning of the Necessary
and Proper Clause is largely analogous to the argument set forth above concerning
Congress. The members of this body are the Members of Congress, and this body is not
an executive or judicial department of the United States whose officers (with the
exception of the President and Vice President) are appointed pursuant to the
Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
338. Professor Rosenthal believes the Necessary and Proper Clause is the font of
congressional power not to count the electoral votes of faithless electors. See Rosenthal,
supra note 221, at 32. His fatal mistake is that he believes that Members of Congress are
"Officers of the United States." See id. ("The power to count electoral votes is a power
vested in the President of the Senate and the members of both [H]ouses of Congress, all of
whom are officers of the United States.").
Similarly, during the Electoral Count Act debates, Senator Edmunds believed that
Congress was a "Department" within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
His words leave no doubt on this construction:
The Constitution of the United States vests powers and duties in all the three
great departments of the Government. It then provides that Congress shall have
the power to pass all laws necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the
Constitution and the powers invested in any of its several departments.
... [I]f under your general power of regulation which the Constitution gives
you of carrying into effect its powers you may provide how the Supreme Court
shall exercise its functions, how the Executive shall exercise his functions
carrying out the duties that the Constitution has imposed upon him, may you not
also do the same thing when, assuming that to be the true construction of the
Constitution, the two houses are to meet and witness the counting of these votes
and to decide upon them? It seems to me that no man can considerately answer
that question in the negative.
COUNTING ELECrORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 455.
339. Again, this begs the question whether there is a standalone second prong of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. See supra note 321. The only power vested by the
Constitution in the "Government of the United States" as an undifferentiated whole (in
contrast to powers vested in specific parts thereof) is that (arguably) under the Guarantee
Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
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of the "Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States."
The textual evidence strongly militates against such a finding.
Consider again the text of the Electoral College Clauses: "The
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House
of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be
counted."" ° Obviously, the Electoral College Clauses do not employ
the word "Power," unlike two other clauses outside of Article I,
section 8 which do employ the word "Power" with respect to
Congress-the Treason Clause and Territories Clause.341 Moreover,
the text and tenor of the Electoral College Clauses suggest duty and
not discretion implied by the word "Power"-hence the use of the
word "shall," and more interestingly, the use of passive voice.
There are, however, several clauses outside of Article I, section 8
where Congress has "Power" in the Article I, section 8 sense of the
word, but which do not employ the word "Power." But these clauses
make clear that Congress has legislative power by employing the
phrase "may by law" or the phrase "shall by law" or their close
variants. In the original Constitution, we need only to look to the
Times, Places, and Manner Clause,342 Presidential Succession
Clause,343 the second part of the Appointments Clause,3"4 the Jury
cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."). Nonetheless, for present purposes, I
assume that there are other "Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States" that are not "Powers vested by this Constitution... in any Department or
Officer [of the Government of the United States]." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
340. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (emphasis added).
341. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (Treason Clause) ("The Congress shall have
Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.")
(emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (Territories Clause) ("The Congress shall
have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States .... ) (emphasis added).
342. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (Times, Places, and Manner Clause) ("The Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by
Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.")
(emphasis added).
343. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (Presidential Succession Clause) ("Congress may
by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President.. .
(emphasis added).
344. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause) ("[B]ut the Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.") (emphasis
added).
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Trial Clause, 45 and the Full Faith and Credit ClauseM46 as examples of
the former; and to the Census Clause,' 47 the Congress Meeting
Clause a3 and the first part of the Appointments Clause 49 as
examples of the latter. But, unlike these several clauses, there is no
"may by law" or "shall by law" provision modifying the counting
function.350
When the Constitution commits "Power" to Congress outside of
Article I, Section 8, it says so. It is more than doubtful that the seven
word phrase "and the votes shall then be counted" is one of the
"Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States" within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. As
345. See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 3 (Jury Trial Clause) ("[B]ut when not committed
within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law
have directed.") (emphasis added).
346. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause) ("And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.") (emphasis added).
347. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (Census Clause) ("The actual Enumeration shall
be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States,
and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law
direct.") (emphasis added).
348. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (Congress Meeting Clause) ("The Congress shall
assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in
December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.") (emphasis added).
349. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause) ("[The President] by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law.. . .") (emphasis added).
350. Another example that does not neatly fit into the "may by law" or "shall by law"
categories is the Congress Compensation Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("The
Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be
ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States.") (emphasis
added).
351. Nevertheless, a few scholars recently describe the counting phrase of the Electoral
College Clauses as the "congressional counting power," see Coenen & Larson, supra note
18, at 909-16, or the "counting power," see Barkow, supra note 17, at 278-79,284,286,288
(2002). This phraseology is wrong, at least insofar as the word "Power" is used in the
Constitution. The word "power" implies discretion to do or not do something. The
Electoral College Clauses are devoid of "power"; they direct the counting agent to count
what-are-the-electoral-votes and not to count what-are-not-the-electoral-votes-nothing
less and nothing more. (The scope of what-are-the-electoral-votes is discussed in Part III
infra.) The phraseology is also odd considering that Professors Coenen and Larson
acknowledge that "[t]here is not... a congressional power to count votes; there is a
congressional duty," Coenen & Larson, supra note 18, at 910, emphasizing the word
"shall" and the passive voice of the phrase "be counted" in the text of the counting phrase,
see id. at n.298. Notably, Professors Coenen and Larson reject the argument that the
counting phrase of the Electoral College Clauses is one of the "Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, and
hence not within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause:
1738 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
a matter of principled textual interpretation, the second prong of the
Necessary and Proper Clause also will not suffice as a font of power
to enact the Electoral Count Act.
What about the historical interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause? To be sure, the questions of whether the counting
function is one of the "Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States" within the meaning of the
Necessary and Proper Clause and whether the Necessary and Proper
Clause is the font of power for congressional regulation of the
electoral count has been the subject of significant debate by Members
of Congress. These questions were controversial from the first.
The Senate of the Sixth Congress first debated these questions in
considering the Grand Committee Bill.352 After Federalist Senator
Ross moved to appoint a committee authorized to report a bill,
Senator Brown disagreed. He "was of opinion that this was a subject
on which Congress had no right to legislate. When the Constitution
undertook to make provisions on a subject, if they were found
incomplete, or defective, they must be remedied by recommending an
amendment to the Constitution."353  Federalist Senator Dexter
expressed no doubt that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorized
legislation on the subject. "The law now proposed," said Dexter,
We would reject this first argument on the theory that the vesting of a duty,
particularly one as important as determining the identity of our President,
inescapably carries with it the grant of a "power" in the sense that the word is
used in the Necessary and Proper Clause. Indeed, we think that there is a strong
a fortiori argument to be made here. If Congress can do anything appropriate to
carry into effect powers it may (but need not) exercise, does it not logically
follow that it can do anything appropriate to carry out those powers it has no
choice but to wield? The recognition of the existence of less urgently needed
powers logically dictates the recognition of more urgently needed powers as well.
Coenen & Larson, supra note 18, at 910 (footnotes omitted). This argument fails to
persuade for at least a few reasons. First, this argument overlooks the linguistic meaning
of the word "Power" as employed in the Necessary and Proper Clause and the rest of the
original Constitution. Second, this argument does not grapple with the argument that
Congress may not legislate with respect to itself under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
see text accompanying supra notes 331-38. Third, this argument mischaracterizes the
Necessary and Proper Clause as a broad-based grant of power to carry into effect all
duties imposed on Congress, or for that matter, on the executive and judicial departments
of the federal government. If Congress "can do anything appropriate to carry into effect
powers it may (but need not) exercise," Coenen and Larson, supra note 18, at 910
(emphasis added), what about Congress doing anything appropriate to carry into effect
those "powers" (read duties) that the executive and judicial departments possess but have
no choice but to wield?
352. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 29-32 (1800).
353. Id. at 29.
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"appears to be necessary to carry into effect the power of appointing
the President; it is therefore clearly Constitutional. ' 354 His argument
may be that just as certain powers may give rise to implied powers,
certain duties may give rise to implied powers reasonably necessary to
give effect to those duties.
Was Senator Dexter correct? Is there a "power of appointing the
President" in the Electoral College Clauses? So too Federalist
Senator Livermore "never felt less doubt on any subject that the one
now under consideration: the Constitution has given many directions
to the appointment of the President, some of which he read."3 55
Unfortunately, the recorded debate does not indicate what provisions
Senator Livermore read-perhaps for good reason. There is nothing
in the Electoral College Clauses that suggests that Congress has any
power to regulate the electoral count. Senator Baldwin, who was a
Framer at the Philadelphia Convention, disagreed with the
Federalists on virtually every point. In a detailed speech, much of
which we shall uncover in the course of the structural argument,
Senator Baldwin stated that the Federalists' efforts to regulate the
electoral count "must be made by proposing an amendment to the
Constitution to that effect; and that they could not be made by law,
without violating the Constitution." '356 In other words, there was no
express or implied power in the Constitution to regulate the electoral
count by law. Senator Baldwin took particular issue with Senator
Dexter's conception of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Senator
Baldwin explained that the Necessary and Proper Clause
speaks of the use of the powers vested by the Constitution-
this resolution relates to the formation of a competent and
essential part of the Government itself. that speaks of the
movements of the Government after it is organized; this
relates to the organization of the Executive branch, and is
therefore clearly a Constitutional work, and to be done, if at
all, in the manner pointed out by the Constitution, by
proposing an article of amendment to the Constitution on
that subject.357
Senator Baldwin's statement is a particularly fine textual
meditation based on the word "vested" in the Necessary and Proper
Clause. If we look intratextually, we see that the word "vested"
appears alongside the word "Power" in each of the Vesting Clauses of
354. Md at 30.
355. Id.
356. 1d. at 32.
357. Id (emphasis added).
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Articles I, II, and 111.358 If the second prong of the Necessary and
Proper Clause is a placeholder of sorts for the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers of the United States read as a whole, then the
second prong cannot support the Electoral Count Act. The Electoral
College Clauses are not a part of the legislative power or the judicial
power, and as Senator Baldwin keenly observed, they are not a part
of (and are antecedent to) the executive power.
The Necessary and Proper Clause resurfaced some twenty years
later in the regulation of the electoral count. In December of 1820,
approximately two months before the electoral count of 1821, Senator
Wilson introduced a resolution entitled, "Attempt to Remedy the
Uncertainty as to Counting the Electoral Vote by Legislation. " 359 He
discussed the Necessary and Proper Clause as the font of
congressional power to regulate the electoral count and stated that
Congress has unquestionably the power, under the last
clause of the eighth section of the first article of the
Constitution, and he thought they ought to exercise it by
vesting the authority to decide upon doubtful, disputed, or
unlawful votes, either in the President of the Senate, the
Senate itself, the House of Representatives, or the two
houses conjointly or separately. 6°
This statement reflects some serious problems with the scope of
congressional power to regulate the electoral count under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Even if Congress may enact counting
legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause vesting the
"counting power" in both Houses of Congress (conjointly or
separately), how may Congress vest such power in either House
alone? And how may Congress vest such power in the President of
the Senate, possibly expanding the constitutional duties of the Vice
President? The Committee of the Judiciary, which considered
Senator Wilson's resolution, seemed to think that counting legislation
was constitutional but merely inexpedient, and hence Senator
Wilson's resolution was not acted upon 61
358. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.") (emphasis added); U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.") (emphasis added).
359. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTEs, supra note 3, at 48.
360. Id.
361. Id. (remarks of Sen. Smith, member of Committee of the Judiciary) (reporting
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Little was said about the application of the Necessary and Proper
Clause to counting electoral votes in the years immediately following
1820. Senator Van Buren introduced a bill in the Senate in 1824 that
was very similar to the Electoral Count Act3 62 Senator Macon did
not think that this bill was necessary or constitutional and argued that
"Congress had no power to legislate upon the subject" of Senator
Van Buren's bill. 63 This bill passed the Senate but the House never
considered it.
During the Wisconsin Incident of 1857, Senator Hunter invoked
the Necessary and Proper Clause as the font of power "to regulate by
law the details of the mode in which the votes are to be counted.""
But Senator Collamer expressed his serious doubts that Congress
could legislate on the Wisconsin problem: "I very much doubt
whether the [F]ramers of the Constitution ever intended to leave the
subject of the presidential election to the House of Representatives,
or the Senate, or either, or both of them."36" This statement echoes
Senator Wilson's observations on the scope of congressional power to
regulate the electoral count under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
During the Electoral Count Act debates, the Members of
Congress repeatedly pointed to the Necessary and Proper Clause as
the font of power to pass the Electoral Count Act. It does appear
that these Members of Congress relied on this clause as the font of
power to pass the Electoral Count Act. 66 As Professors Issacharoff,
"[t]hat the committee have had the resolution under their consideration, and are of
opinion that it is inexpedient at this time to legislate on this subject").
362. Id. at 57-58.
363. IL at 58.
364. Id. at 129.
365. Id. at 132.
366. See, e.g., 15 CONG. REC. 5461 (1884) (remarks of Rep. Springer) ("If Congress
may make all laws which are necessary to carry into effect the powers granted by the
Constitution, it may make such laws as it may deem necessary to carry out that express
provision of the Constitution, to count the votes for President and Vice-President.").
Senator Sherman argued:
Congress has undoubted power under the residuary clause in the Constitution
giving powers to Congress to pass all laws suitable and necessary to carry into
execution the express grants of power. Here is a provision in the Constitution
for the election of electors, and therefore the mode and manner by which the
votes of electors may be counted may be pointed out, but Congress shall not
provide that the votes shall not be counted, because the Constitution says that
the votes shall be counted then and there.
17 CONG. REc. 817 (1886); see 18 CONG. REC. 30 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Caldwell)
("This bill is to prescribe the mode in which this count shall be made, and supply the
omission that exists[,] under the first article of the Constitution, which gives Congress all
power to make all laws necessary to carry out these provisions."); id. at 74 (remarks of
Rep. Baker) ("It is conceded that [the Necessary and Proper Clause] is a delegation to
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Karlan, and Pildes conclude, "A majority of Congress was persuaded
by the argument that the Act was permitted under the Necessary and
Proper Clause to give substance to the provisions of the Twelfth
Amendment."367
There were, of course, those who disagreed with this
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause. For example,
Representative Browne explicitly denied that the counting function
was a "power" in the Article I, Section 8 sense of the word-a point
that would implicitly apply to the word "power" in the Necessary and
Proper Clause as well:
The [F]ramers of the Constitution withheld from Congress
the power to interfere with this count; they withheld it by
not committing the power to do it. When the Constitution
confers a power it does so in express words, as Congress
shall have power to borrow money, collect taxes, regulate
commerce, coin money, and the like. By no words, by no
implication, has the power been given Congress to settle
questions concerning the electoral count. 6
Congress of power to provide for carrying into effect the power to open and count the
votes of the electors lodged in the President of the Senate."). Representative Eden
remarked:
In providing by law a method to insure a fair count of the electoral vote we need
exercise no doubtful powers. The Constitution requires the vote to be counted.
I assume that Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass all laws
necessary to carry into effect that mandate of the Constitution.
Id. at 50. Representative Herbert made the point that
[T]he Constitution vests in the Federal Government the power to count the
votes; and the exercise of that power is a Federal function, to be controlled by
the Federal Government .... A power has been given, and it is perfectly plain
that the Constitution vests in Congress the power to enact what legislation is
necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the provision granting the
power.
Id. at 75.
367. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 16, at 98.
368. 15 CONG. REc. 5465; see also 18 CONG. REC. 45 (remarks of Rep. Dibble).
Representative Dibble, carefully parsing the Necessary and Proper Clause, stated:
It is true there is a clause which says that Congress has the right to pass all laws
necessary to carry out certain powers; but those powers are defined. It has the
power to carry out its own express grants of power. It has the right to pass laws
concerning any act of the Federal Government; but the election of a President is
not an act of the Federal Government, but is the action of the State Government.
It has the right to pass laws concerning what any Federal officer shall do or what
any Federal department shall do; but there its power is exhausted. So that
Congress has no power in relation to the electoral vote except to count, in the
sense of enumeration.
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And Senator Wilson made known his belief that "defects in the
Constitution of the United States can not be remedied by acts of
Congress. '369 At a minimum, several Members of Congress, including
those who voted for the Electoral Count Act, had significant doubts
with respect to its constitutionality.
The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a font of power for the
Electoral Count Act. The counting function is neither one of the
"foregoing Powers," nor "Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States," nor "Powers vested by this
Constitution... in any Department or Officer [of the United States]"
within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Put
differently, congressional regulation of the electoral count, however
"necessary," is not "proper"-and hence not within Congress's
domain or jurisdiction-within the meaning of the Necessary and
Proper Clause.37 In case there should be any doubt on this point, the
structural argument makes clear that doubt should be resolved
against Congress in the specific context of presidential election?7
The Electoral Count Act treads on terribly thin textual ground vis-a-
vis the Necessary and Proper Clause, and to the only remaining
possible font of implied power, we now turn.
b. The Electoral College Clauses
The second possible font of congressional power to enact the
Electoral Count Act is the Electoral College Clauses themselves.
There are at least two historical precedents for this supposition. First,
the First Congress encountered the very tricky problem of specifying
the oath or affirmation for state legislators and officers under the
369. 17 CONG. REC. 1058; see also id- at 1059 (arguing that "a power vested by the
Constitution [cannot] be divested by legislative action"). Senator Ingalls fervently stated
in words that ring true today:
Careful consideration of this subject will convince any thoughtful student of the
Constitution that the scheme which has been devised and which now remains in
our organic law is fatally defective, and that nothing can be done by way of
legislation to cure the inevitable evils by which it is surrounded, and the more we
proceed by legislation to patch, to bridge over apparent difficulties, to abbreviate
the number of perils which surround it, by so much we retard and delay the
exercise of the power which the people must ultimately be called upon to
perform in adopting some system that shall remove the perils in which it is now
environed.
Id. at 1026.
370. For an illuminating discussion of the "jurisdictional meaning" of the word
"proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause, see Lawson & Granger, supra note 336, at
297-326.
371. See infra notes 428-554 and accompanying text.
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Oath or Affirmation Clause.372 None of the three prongs of the
Necessary and Proper Clause was thought to apply. The Oath or
Affirmation Clause is not a foregoing power or one of the powers
vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States,
and state legislators and officers are by definition not officers of the
United States. The First Congress simply concluded that the Oath or
Affirmation Clause was "self-executing," and prescribed an oath or
affirmation for these persons anyway.373 Second, much later, the
Supreme Court affirmed Congress's ability to enact legislation under
the Fugitive Slave Clause which appears to be self-executing.374 The
rationale for this decision was that the Fugitive Slave Act is a "direct
implementation" of the Fugitive Slave Clause and therefore does not
go beyond the provisions of the clause.3 75
What does this mean for the Electoral Count Act? Two
questions arise: whether some congressional regulation of the
electoral count may be sustained under the Electoral College Clauses
and whether the Electoral Count Act may be sustained under the
Electoral College Clauses.376
372. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3 ("The Senators and Representatives before
mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by
Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution .... ).
373. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the
Structure of Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. CHi. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 169-71 (1995);
see also Kent Greenfield, Original Penumbras: Constitutional Interpretation in the First
Year of Congress, 26 CONN. L. REv. 79, 111-15 (1993) (building on Professor Currie's
then-unpublished manuscript).
374. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 provides:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein,
be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered upon Claim of
the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
IL; see Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 596-97 (1842) (holding that the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was constitutional).
375. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 909 (1997). But oddly, and in what is a
most tortured interpretation of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has held that
legislation which is not a "direct implementation" of the Fugitive Slave Clause-that is,
legislation that goes beyond the substance and procedure of the clause-is a constitutional
exercise of congressional power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause which provides
that "Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records,
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see
Printz, 521 U.S. at 909 n.3 (1997) (citing California v. Superior Court of Cal., San
Bernardino Cty., 482 U.S. 400,407 (1987)).
376. Indeed, Professor Currie has suggested that some congressional regulation of the
electoral count may be supported on this "implicit" view of the Electoral College Clause.
See Currie, supra note 35, at 620 n.73.
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Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 and the Twelfth Amendment seem
to be at least as self-executing as the Oath or Affirmation Clause or
the Fugitive Slave Clause. Indeed, Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 is by
far the longest "clause" in the original Constitution, containing
approximately 290 words, compared to the next longest clause with
approximately 165 .3n These two clauses look more like technical
rules than the open-textured provisions such as the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.37 8 These two clauses could hardly be
more prolix for constitutional provisions. Professor Gardner offers
the following account:
Presumably, these detailed instructions reflect society's
determination that the use of the particular process set forth
will assure a result sufficiently accurate to justify society's
consent to the winner .... This provision of the
Constitution is unusual: it is rare for the people to dictate in
such detail the manner in which they would like things done.
More typical is article I, section 4, governing congressional
elections ... .37
In addition to this point of prolixity, consider also that the
Electoral College Clauses, and especially the Twelfth Amendment,
contain no special provision empowering Congress to enforce it by
appropriate legislation, in contrast to a host of other (and admittedly
later) amendments to the Constitution. °
Apparently, the Second Congress did not think that Article II,
Section 1, Clause 3 was fully self-executing given the regulations on
the manner of certifying and transmitting electoral votes.3 81 However,
it is unclear whether the Second Congress based these regulations on
the implied power of Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 and or of Article
II, Section 1, Clause 3. Recall that the draft of Article II, Section 1,
Clause 4 at the Philadelphia Convention provided that "[t]he
Legislature may determine the time of choosing the electors, and of
their giving their votes; and the manner of certifying and transmitting
their votes-But the election shall be on the same day throughout the
377. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
378. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
379. James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing Popular
Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 189,229 (1990).
380. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII; § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 2; U.S.
CONsT. amend. XXIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 2.
381. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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U-States''3 82 and that the italicized language was inexplicably
dropped.3  To be sure, regulations on the manner of certifying and
transmitting their votes do not support regulations on the electoral
count.
The problem of binding future joint conventions aside,3s4 some
congressional regulation of the electoral count may easily be
supported under the Electoral College Clauses. For example, a
regulation providing that the joint convention count electoral votes in
the alphabetical order of States in the Union probably would be
constitutionally acceptable. The real issue is whether Congress had
the legislative authority to pass the Electoral Count Act in the first
place.
The Electoral Count Act goes well beyond the text of the
Electoral College Clauses. The Electoral Count Act is by no means a
"direct implementation" of the Electoral College Clauses. During the
Electoral Count Act debates, Senator Jones made the argument from
prolixity that Congress did not have the power to legislate:
That [second] article provides the mode and manner of
returning and counting that vote. If it was intended that
Congress should exercise authority over this subject by
general legislation, why is it that the Constitution, instead of
giving as in other cases a general power to Congress, has
anticipated such legislation by a lengthy provision specifying
particularly the manner in which the voice of the electors
shall be ascertained? It was not the intention of the
Constitution to leave to Congress the power to determine
how the President and Vice-President should be elected.
This is clearly indicated by the express words of the first
section of the second article.38 5
It is more than doubtful that the Electoral Count Act could be
sustained as a direct implementation of the Electoral College Clauses.
If the Electoral Count Act passes constitutional muster as a direct
implementation of the Electoral College Clauses, it is most difficult to
see what would constitute an indirect-and constitutionally-
impermissible-implementation of those clauses.
382. 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 529 (emphasis added).
383. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
384. See infra notes 498-525 and accompanying text.
385. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 596-97.
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c. Textual Arguments from Negative Implication
Two textual arguments from negative implication cast additional
doubt upon any font of congressional power for the Electoral Count
Act, and particularly the implied font of congressional power of the
Electoral College Clauses itself. When the Constitution contemplates
a legislative role for Congress with respect to the Presidency, it says
so-twice.
First, consider Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 which provides that
"[t]he Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and
the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the
same throughout the United States. 38 6 This clause contains the sole
grant of power to Congress in the Electoral College Clauses. The
argument from negative implication gains momentum when we
remember that the Electoral College Clauses were drafted as a whole.
Indeed, the original draft of Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 was a part
of Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 which contains the counting
function 3 7 There is little reason to believe that the omission of any
express legislative power in Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 was
accidental.
Senator Eaton made much of the negative implication during the
Electoral Count Act debates:
Turn over to paragraph 3 of the same section and what do
you find there? The only power that Congress has is here:
"The Congress"-may do what? After the state has done its
duty, "The Congress may determine"-what? "The time of
choosing the electors and the day on which they shall give
their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the
United States." That is all the power. The very keeping of
that power excludes every other idea of power. Every other
idea of power belongs to the states, is in the states.38
386. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
387. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 497-98.
388. Burgess, supra note 18, at 636 (emphasis added). Senator Jones made a similar
point:
This clause shows that they weighed this subject with great care, and that they
thought it necessary not to leave to Congress any implied power over the
election of President.
Now, sir, the power to decide whether the votes of two or ten States shall or
shall not be counted is a far more important and delicate power than that given
to Congress in express terms to fix the time of choosing the electors. And am I
not warranted in saying that, if the Constitution intended that Congress should
have any more extended power than is conferred by this clause, it would have
said so in plain language?
COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 597.
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Second, consider the Presidential Succession Clause of Article II
which provides that
[i]n Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of
his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers
and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the
Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for
the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both
of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer
shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.8 9
This clause too was placed alongside the Electoral College
Clauses in the Framers' draft Constitution and was later rearranged
by the Committee of Style.390 There is little reason to believe that the
omission of any express legislative power in Article II, Section 1,
Clause 3 was accidental.
The prolix Electoral College Clauses provide that "the Votes
shall then be counted"-not, "the Votes shall then be counted as
Congress may by Law have directed." The Framers could have so
provided but they did not.
3. The Intratextual Argument
There is more to the textual argument against the Electoral
Count Act than the sparse words of the Electoral College Clauses-
much more. An Article II-centric focus on presidential election is too
narrow. We can squeeze yet more meaning from the Electoral
College Clauses and Congress's role in presidential election when we
consider the text of the Constitution as a coherent whole. When we
do so, we see that Congress has a role in presidential election, but
Congress has a role in congressional elections as well. We may obtain
important clues about Congress's role in presidential election by
comparing and contrasting it with Congress's role in congressional
elections. This intratextual analysis reveals two arguments that
strongly militate against the constitutionality of the Electoral Count
Act. These two arguments relate to two clauses in Article I: the
Times, Places, and Manner Clause and the House Judging Clause.
389. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
390. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 573 (draft referred to the Committee of Style);
2 id. at 598-99 (report of the Committee of Style).
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a. The Times, Places, and Manner Clause
When the Constitution contemplates a "regulating" role for
Congress in elections, it says so. The Times, Places, and Manner
Clause provides that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places
of chusing Senators. '391
The Times, Places, and Manner Clause is the font of significant
congressional power over congressional elections-so significant that
Alexander Hamilton devoted three essays of The Federalist to the
clause in order to defend it from criticism from Anti-Federalists and
Federalists alike.39 Indeed, several State ratifying conventions
proposed amendments to the Constitution to amend the Times,
Places, and Manner Clause so as to eliminate the proviso empowering
Congress to regulate congressional elections.393
Importantly, no such clause empowering Congress to regulate
presidential election appears in Article II. A careful reading of the
Electoral College Clauses reveals an important point. As we have
seen, Article II, section 1, clause 4 provides that "[t]he Congress may
determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which
they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout
the United States. 394 This clause supplies the only grant of power to
391. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
392. For example, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
This provision has not only been declaimed against by those who condemn the
Constitution in the gross; but it has been censured by those who have objected
with less latitude and greater moderation; and, in one instance, it has been
thought exceptionable by a gentleman who had declared himself the advocate of
every other part of the system.
THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 330 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor
1999) (1961). See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 59-61 (Alexander Hamilton)
(discussing the regulation of congressional elections).
393. E.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 250, at 661 (Virginia ratifying convention)
("Congress shall not alter, modify, or interfere in the times, places, or manner of holding
elections for senators and representatives or either of them, except when the legislature of
any state shall neglect, refuse, or be disabled, by invasion or rebellion, to prescribe the
same."); see 2 id at 552 (Maryland ratifying convention) (similar); 2 id at 545
(Pennsylvania ratifying convention) (similar); 3 id at 246 (North Carolina ratifying
convention) (similar).
394. U.S. CONT. art. III, § 1, cl. 4 (emphasis added). This clause may be the font of
congressional power to regulate the manner of presidential election. For example,
Professor Amar has suggested that, pursuant to this clause and general "electioneering"
rules, "Congress could prohibit-either directly, or through conditional funding rules for
any party that seeks federal election funds-any direct effort to lobby electors between
Election Day and Electoral College Meeting Day by anyone other than the candidates
2002] 1749
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Congress in presidential election and the clause empowers Congress
only with respect to "Time." The Constitution itself fixes the
"Places" with the electors "meet[ing] in their respective States." '395
What about "Manner"? In stark contrast to congressional election,
Congress has no power with respect to the "Manner" of presidential
election. Article JI, section 1, clause 2 provides that "[e]ach State
shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress."
Interestingly, Alexander Hamilton's private, unadopted draft of the
Constitution provided that "[t]he Legislature shall by permanent laws
provide such further regulations as may be necessary for the more
orderly election of the President, not contravening the provisions
herein contained,"3 96 but no such provision was the subject of
recorded debate at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.
What does the Times, Places, and Manner Clause mean for the
Electoral Count Act? The implications of the intratextual argument
are incredibly straightforward. There is little reason to suppose that
the word "Manner" in the Times, Places, and Manner Clause has a
substantially different meaning from the word "Manner" in Article II,
Section 1, Clause 2. Whatever the scope of Congress's power to
prescribe the manner of congressional elections, Congress has no such
power in presidential election.
The marked silence of the founding generation on the issue of
presidential election in contrast to congressional election strongly
suggests that they understood presidential election to be free from
congressional regulation. Unsurprisingly, the intratextual argument
featured prominently in the constitutional debate over the Grand
Committee Bill. In March of 1800, Senator Pinckney seized the
intratextual argument from the Times, Places, and Manner Clause in
his lengthy speech against the Grand Committee Bill. Read carefully
his intratextual argument:
Let us for a moment compare [the Times, Places, and
Manner Clause] with the directions of the Constitution
themselves, or their direct agents." Amar, supra note 10, at 231 n.22. Such laws further
the independence of electors and moreover do not operate on electors directly. But the
existence of a constitutional power in one direction does not imply the existence of a
power in the equal-and-opposite direction.
395. U.S. CONST. amend. XII; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
396. 3 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 624 (emphasis added).
397. Cf. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 827 (1995) (holding that neither




respecting the Electors of a President, and then permit me to
call your attention to the remarkable difference there is
between them, and the reasons for this difference.
By the Constitution, Electors of a President are to be chosen
in the manner directed by the State Legislatures-that is all
that is said. In case the State Legislatures refuse to make
these directions there is no power to compel them; there is
not a single word in the Constitution which can, by the most
tortured construction, be extended to give Congress, or any
branch or part of our Federal Government, a right to make
or alter the State Legislatures' directions on this subject.
The right to make these directions is complete and
conclusive, subject to no control or revision, and placed
entirely with them, for the best and most unanswerable
reasons.
3 98
Senator Pinckney argued that the Grand Committee Bill was
unconstitutional because it was an impermissible congressional
regulation of the manner of presidential election. If Senator Pinckney
is correct, it follows that the Electoral Count Act is also
unconstitutional. Senator Pinckney is correct. Congressional
regulation of the electoral count is a regulation on the manner of
presidential election. The two key sections of the Electoral Count
Act-3 U.S.C. § 5 and 3 U.S.C. § 15-regulate the manner in which
the acts of the electors will be given effect.
The intratextual argument also has powerful implications for the
question of whether there is a font of power for Congress to enact the
Electoral Count Act. Imagine for a moment that the amendments
proposed by several state ratifying conventions eliminating the
proviso of the Times, Places, and Manner Clause empowering
Congress to regulate congressional elections399 had been adopted.
There would be no question that Congress would then have zero
power over the manner of congressional election. The power to
implement this amended Times, Places, and Manner Clause is not a
"Power vested in this Constitution in the Government of the United
States" under the Necessary and Proper Clause. In other words,
Congress derives its sole power to regulate congressional elections
from the proviso of the Times, Places, and Manner Clause. Congress
398. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 128-29 (1800).
399. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 250, at 552 (Maryland ratifying
convention); 2 iii at 545 (Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 3 id at 246 (North Carolina
ratifying convention); 3 id. at 661 (Virginia ratifying convention).
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may not claim that the Necessary and Proper Clause is the font of
power for regulating the manner of presidential election.
In sum, the intratextual argument from the Times, Places, and
Manner Clause makes clear that Congress has near zero power over
the manner of presidential election and raises serious doubts as to
Congress's font of power to enact the Electoral Count Act.
b. The House Judging Clause
When the Constitution contemplates a judging role for each
House of Congress in elections, it says so. The House Judging Clause
provides that "[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members."4" The House
Judging Clause is the font of awesome powers and duties. Under this
clause, each House is a judicial tribunal with the judicial power to
investigate the elections of its Members,4°' and has the duty to refuse
to seat members who are constitutionally ineligible to the office of
Representative or Senator.4°
Importantly, no such clause appears in Article II concerning
presidential election. 403 The negative implication is made more stark
by the fact that the House Judging Clause was considered
immediately after the drafting of the Electoral College Clauses at the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787, but no Framer thought to extend
the principle of the House Judging Clause to presidential election.
4°
What does the House Judging Clause mean for the Electoral
Count Act? The negative implication of the House Judging Clause is
that the joint convention does not have the authority to judge the
elections, returns, and qualifications of electors. The joint convention
is not a judicial tribunal with the power to investigate the manner of
appointment and qualifications of electors, and may not refuse to
count electoral votes contained in authentic electoral certificates for
400. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
401. See, e.g., Barry v. United States ex reL Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 613 (1928)
(holding that the Constitution confers upon Congress certain powers that are "judicial in
character," including the "power to judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its
own members," and "[i]n exercising this power, the Senate may, of course, devolve upon a
committee of its members the authority to investigate and report; and this is the general, if
not the uniform, practice").
402. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (House Qualifications Clause); U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 3, cl. 3 (Senate Qualifications Clause); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (Oath or Affirmation
Clause).
403. At least one other scholar has noted this obvious point. See Harrison, supra note
23, at 702.
404. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 502-03.
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reasons relating to the manner of appointment or qualifications of
electors. 405
These conclusions find support in the purpose of the House
Judging Clause. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, explained that the power to judge
the elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of each
House must be lodged somewhere in order to safeguard the liberties
of the people.4°6 The only question was where to place such a power.
Justice Story concluded that the power is best lodged in the body
whose elections, returns and qualifications are to be judged and not in
some other body. "If lodged in any other, than the legislative body
itself," wrote Justice Story,
its independence, its purity, and even its existence and action
may be destroyed, or put into imminent danger. No other
body, but itself, can have the same motives to preserve and
perpetuate these attributes; no other body can be so
perpetually watchful to guard its own rights and privileges
from infringement, to purify and vindicate its own character,
and to preserve the rights, and sustain the free choice of its
constituents.407
The House Judging Clause strongly suggests that the power to
judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of electors is
committed to the individual electoral colleges who compose their own
"Houses," but we need not decide this in order to conclude that the
power most emphatically does not belong to Congress.40 8 On Justice
405. For additional discussion, see infra notes 582-89 and accompanying text.
406. See 2 STORY'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 9, § 831, at 294-95.
407. 2 id. § 831, at 295.
408. Representative Randolph clearly made the point that each of the Electoral
Colleges retained the power to judge the qualifications of electors in the Massachusetts
Incident of 1809. See text accompanying supra note 96. The point was also suggested
during the Postmaster Incident of 1837, which squarely presented the elector ineligibility
problem of the electoral count. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text. Senator
Grundy raised the issue thus:
Should a case occur in which it became necessary to ascertain and determine
upon the qualifications of electors of President and Vice-President of the United
States, the important question would be presented, what tribunal would, under
the Constitution, be competent to decide? Whether the respective colleges of
electors in the different States should decide upon the qualifications of their own
members, or Congress should exercise the power, is a question which the
committee are of opinion ought to be settled by a permanent provision upon the
subject.
COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 71; see also i&. at 73 (remarks of Rep.
Thomas) (reporting to the House of Representatives that the joint committee "had
proposed a remedy, by either giving the power to reject to the college or to Congress, as
might be deemed most expedient"). For the structural argument supporting the power of
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Story's logic, the power, if vested in Congress, would risk the
"independence" and "purity" of the electoral colleges, and "put
[them] into imminent danger." Note too how the House Judging
Clause eschews bicameralism, with each House of Congress acting
independently of the other, only with respect to its own Members.
The intratextual argument from the House Judging Clause
enjoys a rich pedigree in the constitutional debates over Congress's
ability to regulate the electoral count. As early as 1800, Senator
Baldwin, a Framer at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, made
precisely this intratextual argument in his speech against the Grand
Committee Bill. "[W]hat are the questions which can arise on the
subject intrusted to [electors], to which they are incompetent, or to
which Congress is so much more competent?," he asked.40 9 One set
of questions were "[t]hose which relate to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their own members," and on this issue he concluded,
"[S]hall these be taken away from that body [of electors], and
submitted to the superior decision and control of Congress, without a
particle of authority for it from the Constitution? '41°  Senator
Baldwin clearly invoked the language of the House Judging Clause to
make the intratextual argument, for the phrase "elections, returns and
qualifications" appears but once in the Constitution.
During the electoral count of 1857, Senator Collamer expressed
very serious constitutional doubts about whether the two Houses of
Congress could by joint resolution express any opinion that the
electoral votes of the State of Wisconsin were null and void because
these votes had been given on a day different from that prescribed by
law.41 ' He "very much doubt[ed] whether the [F]ramers of the
Constitution ever intended to leave the subject of presidential
election to the House of Representatives, or the Senate, or either, or
both of them. ' 412 Evidently pointing to the House Judging Clause, he
stated, "The Constitution vested in each house the power to decide
upon the election of its members; it provided carefully that it would
not trust to the two houses to elect a President. 4 13
In May of 1874, the House Committee on Privileges and
Elections employed the intratextual argument in a lengthy report
each Electoral College "House" to judge the qualifications of Electors, see infra notes
479-97 and accompanying text.
409. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 31 (1800).
410. Id.
411. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 132.
412. Id.
413. Id. (emphasis added).
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supporting a proposed amendment to the Constitution. The
proposed amendment provided for the abolition of the Electoral
College mode of presidential election in favor of direct, popular
election and empowered Congress "to provide for holding and
conducting elections of President and Vice-President, and to establish
tribunals for the decision of such elections as may be contested." '414 In
a section of the report captioned "Congress is not a Canvassing
Board," the report provided in relevant part:
The proposition that Congress has power to sit as a
canvassing board upon the electoral votes of the States,
admitting or rejecting them for reasons of its own, subverts
the whole theory by which their appointment was conferred
upon the States; makes Congress the judge of the election and
qualifications of President and Vice-President, and, by the
operation of the twenty-second joint rule, gives that power
to each house separately, as in case of its own members.
There is no such express power given to Congress in the
Constitution, nor is it necessary to carry out any express
power therein given, and its exercise would be in direct
conflict with the known purpose of the [F]ramers to make
the executive and legislative departments as nearly
independent of each other as possible.415
The intratextual argument from the House Judging Clause did
not lose any vigor in the Electoral Count Act debates. Senator
Burnside put the intratextual point bluntly, stating that
it was never the intention of the [F]ramers of the
Constitution to make Congress the judge of the
qualifications of the electors. If it had been so, the
Constitution would have distinctly stated it. It makes each
house the judge of the qualifications of its own members in
express terms, but it does not imply even that Congress has
any right to judge of the qualifications of the electors.4 6
So too Senator Edmunds made the intratextual argument, but a
considerably more complex one. He pointed to the Vesting Clause of
Article 111417 and three clauses of Article I-the House Judging
Clause, the House Expulsion Clause,48 and the Senate Impeachment
414. Id. at 409.
415. Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
416. Id. at 658.
417. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.").
418. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, c. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings, Punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of
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Clause 419-as the sole grants of "judicial power" to individual Houses
of Congress, and concluded that "no judicial power is invested in
either or both Houses of Congress that is not especially named and
imputed to them as such and in such terms."42
Importantly, as the foregoing statements suggest, the intratextual
argument is not just a narrow textual point from negative implication.
The intratextual argument gains its strength from the context of its
application. The House Judging Clause merely makes explicit an
implicit idea that a body has judicial power over the privileges of its
own members.421 The important question for present purposes is
whether Congress has judicial power over the privileges of non-
member electors, especially in light of the "known purpose of the
[F]ramers to make the executive and legislative departments as nearly
independent of each other as possible. 422
In sum, the intratextual argument from the House Judging
Clause strongly suggests that Congress has no judicial power over the
elections, returns, and qualifications of electors.
The intratextual arguments from both the Times, Places, and
Manner Clause and the House Judging Clause are textual arguments
from negative implication. These two clauses carefully empower
Congress and each House of Congress, respectively, in congressional
elections, and the Electoral College Clauses contain no analogues
concerning presidential election. As a brute textual matter, the
intratextual argument raises doubt as to Congress's ability to regulate
the manner of presidential election and to judge the elections,
returns, and qualifications of electors.
two[-]thirds, expel a Member.").
419. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 ("The Senate shall have the sole power to try all
Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.
When the President of the United States is tried the Chief Justice shall preside ....").
420. 17 CONG. REc. 1063-64 (1886) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); see also 18 CONG.
REC. 45 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Dibble) ("There [referring to House Judging Clause] you
find judicial power of a certain kind expressly granted to the two Houses of Congress,
making an exception to the general provision which confines judicial power to the
Supreme Court and the subordinated Federal courts."); i. at 46 (remarks of Rep.
Dribble) (noting the absence of language analogous to the House Judging Clause in the
Electoral College Clauses).
421. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 503 (remarks of James Wilson) ("[He] thought
the power involved, and the express insertion of it needless. It might beget doubts as to
the power of other public bodies, as Courts &c. Every Court is the judge of its own
privileges.").
422. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 418.
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Of course, textual arguments from negative implication need to
be applied sensitively and contextually in order to avoid wooden
readings of the Constitution.4  A sensitive and contextual
interpretation of the intratextual argument reveals a strong case
against Congress's ability to regulate the manner of presidential
election and to judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of
electors. As a matter of sensitive interpretation, the intratextual
arguments from negative implication deserve special weight given the
prolixity of the Electoral College Clauses, relative to other clauses of
Article II which mark the grand contours of executive power, and
more importantly, relative to the clauses of Article I which empower
Congress in congressional elections. It hardly seems that the Framers
simply forgot to draft clauses in Article II analogous to the Times,
Places, and Manner Clause or the House Judging Clause, or
understood Article II impliedly to contain such congressional power
over presidential election.
As a matter of contextual interpretation, we should be especially
chary of Congress's role in presidential election. The intratextual
argument deserves special weight in light of the structural features of
presidential election, namely the repudiation of Congress in the
process of presidential election.42 4  As we shall see, the Framers
instituted an electoral college mode of presidential election as a
replacement for the election of the President by the Congress. The
Elector Incompatibility Clause also expresses the anti-Congress
principle in presidential election by prohibiting Members of Congress
from even serving as electors.4' As Senator Wilson put the point,
"When the [F]ramers of the Constitution expressly prohibited
Senators and Representatives from appointment as electors, they
clearly indicated their purpose to exclude them from all power in or
over the matter of the election of a President by the electors
appointed by the States."'426
423. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. RaV. 647,
653 n.30 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and
Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701,702-08 & n.6 (1995).
For a classic exposition of the expressio unius principle of textual interpretation, see THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 32, 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
424. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; infra note 447 and accompanying text.
425. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("[B]ut no Senator or Representative, or Person
holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an
Elector.").
426. 17 CONG. REc. 1059 (1886) (remarks of Sen. Wilson).
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In sum, the intratextual argument, when interpreted sensitively
and contextually, strongly militates against the constitutionality of the
Electoral Count Act.
4. Conclusions
Taken together, the textual arguments-traditional and
intratextual-expose the unconstitutionality of the Electoral Count
Act. What may seem to be expedient is not necessarily what is
constitutional. First and foremost, the textual argument makes clear
that there is no source of power, express or implied, for Congress to
pass the Electoral Count Act. A careful analysis of the Necessary and
Proper Clause and the Electoral College Clauses reveals that neither
clause supports Congress's power to enact the Electoral Count Act.
In the absence of an implied grant of power to Congress to enact such
a statute, the Electoral Count Act is unconstitutional. Anyone who
wishes to argue that the Electoral Count Act is constitutional must
grapple with the threshold question of whether and where Congress
has the power under the Constitution to enact such a statute. Other
textual arguments relate to specific provisions of the Electoral Count
Act. The constitutionality of the "Presiding Officer Clause" of 3
U.S.C. § 15 is in serious doubt given conflict-of-interest principles
relating to the vice presidency. The constitutionality of 3 U.S.C. § 17
is beyond all serious doubt. This provision, which limits (or purports
to limit) the proceedings in each House of Congress in debating
objections to electoral votes, is patently unconstitutional. Other
textual arguments are holistic, even quasi-structural. The nature of
the counting function by the counting agent is more "thin" than
"thick," relating more to the ascertainment and aggregation of
electoral votes, than to the judging of electoral votes. The bicameral
counting procedure of 3 U.S.C. §15 violates the unicameralism
principle of the Electoral College Clauses. And the intratextual
argument from the Times, Places, and Manner Clause and the House
Judging Clause strongly militates against the constitutionality of the
Electoral Count Act, at least to the extent that the counting agent is
to judge electoral votes contained in authentic electoral certificates.
These textual arguments must also be considered in light of great
care that the Framers took to remove Congress as much as possible
from the business of electing the President. The fact that Congress
has thrice failed to pass constitutional amendments giving Congress
''power to provide for holding and conducting the elections of
President and Vice President and to establish tribunals for the
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decision of such elections as may be contested"'427 is another clue that
militates against the constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act.
Moreover, these three attempts at constitutional amendment
occurred in the 1880s, just a few years before Congress passed-with
no enabling constitutional amendment-the Electoral Count Act in
1887.
B. The Structural Argument
In addition to textual argument, the interpretivist resolution of
the Electoral Count Act is based on a structural argument. The
structural argument illuminates a number of important themes that
emerge from the Constitution as a whole.4" In the present context,
the structural argument provides some of the most satisfying
arguments that the Electoral Count Act is unconstitutional. This
section proceeds in three sub-sections. The first sub-section presents
five principles of presidential election. The second sub-section
presents two principles of rule-making and law-making. The final
sub-section assesses the conclusions of the structural argument.
1. Five Principles of Presidential Election
a. The Anti-Senate Principle
First and foremost, the Constitution mistrusts the Senate in the
process of presidential election. This is the anti-Senate principle of
presidential election. The Electoral Count Act is unconstitutional
because the Senate has equal agency with the House of
Representatives in counting electoral votes. As we have seen, in a
single return case, the joint convention may not reject electoral votes
without the concurrence of the Senate, and in a multiple return case,
the joint convention may not accept electoral votes without the
concurrence of the Senate.429 And as Representative Caldwell
explained during the Electoral Count Act debates:
The separate concurrent action of both Houses provided for
in the bill preserves the constitutional identity, rights, and
dignity of each. This concession of each House to the other
of equal and concurrent power to decide on informalities and
427. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 345-57 (Senate); id at 408-44.
428. For an extensive classic discussion of this species of constitutional argument, see
generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). For a pithy modem discussion, see PHILIP BOBBITr,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 74-92 (1982).
429. See Part I.A.4 supra.
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illegalities appearing on the face of returns, upon objection
of a Senator or Representative, is necessary to the
determination of results.43 °
Whatever may be said about the involvement of both Houses of
Congress in the process of counting electoral votes, it is clear that the
Senate as a separate and distinct body is to have no agency in electing
the President. The Electoral College Clauses make clear that the
Senate and the House of Representatives are not created equally in
the process of presidential election. Under the original Constitution
and the Twelfth Amendment, if the electors shall have failed to make
a choice, the House of Representatives chooses the President, not the
Senate. Under the Twelfth Amendment, if the electors shall have
failed to make a choice, the Senate only chooses the Vice President.431
The logic behind the anti-Senate principle of presidential
election is incredibly clear once we consult the entire text of the
Constitution and its legislative history. Under the Constitution, the
Senate assumes, in addition to its equal share of the Article I
legislative power, three distinct powers. First, the Senate has judicial
power as a court of impeachment for the President, Vice President,
and all civil Officers of the United States.432  Second, the Senate
shares executive-legislative power with the President in the business
of treaty-making.433 Third, the Senate shares executive power with
the President in the business of appointing Officers of the United
430. 18 CONG. REc. 31 (1886) (emphasis added).
431. The Senate has exercised this function only once in our history. In the electoral
count of 1837, the Senate elected Richard M. Johnson as Vice President. See supra note
127 and accompanying text. Note that the Senate's role in choosing the Vice President
was even more circumscribed under the original Constitution, further removing the Senate
from the business of electing the nation's two top executive officers. Article II, Section 1,
Clause 3 provided that
[i]n every Case, after the Choice of the President [by the House of
Representatives], the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the
Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who
have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
432. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments."); see also TiE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 370 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor 1999) (1961) (referring to the Senate as a "court of
impeachments").
433. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two[-]thirds of the
Senators present concur."). To be sure, the founding generation seriously debated
whether the treaty-making power was executive, legislative, or neither. For one view, see
THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 419 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor
1999) (1961) ("The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and
to belong, properly, neither to the legislative nor to the executive.").
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States.4' It is important to remember that the Committee of Eleven's
Report of the Electoral College Clauses at the Philadelphia
Convention provided that, if the electors failed to make a choice, the
Senate would elect the President and the Vice President. The House
of Representatives was to have no role whatsoever. The Report
provided in relevant part:
[A]nd they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and
of the number of votes for each, which list they shall sign
and certify and transmit sealed to the Seat of the[] Genl.
Government, directed to the President of the Senate-The
President of the Senate shall in that House open all the
certificates; and the votes shall be then & there counted.
The Person having the greatest number of votes shall be the
President, if such number be a majority of that of the
electors; and if there be more than one who have such a
majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the
Senate shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for
President: but if no person have a majority[,] then from the
five highest on the list, the Senate shall choose by ballot the
President. And in every case after the choice of the
President, the person having the greatest number of votes
shall be vice-president: but if there should remain two or
more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from
them the vice-president.4 35
The Framers feared that the totality of these powers was simply
too much. They feared that the Senate, already powerful, would
become a dangerous aristocracy, and that the President, already
dependent on the Senate in treaty-making and appointments, would
be a mere creature of that body.436 Consequently, on September 6,
434. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
435. 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 497-98 (emphasis added).
436. For a classic statement to this effect, see id- at 522 where James Wilson remarked:
They will have in fact, the appointment of the President, and through his
dependence on them, the virtual appointment to offices; among others the offices
of the Judiciary Department. They are to make Treaties; and they are to try all
impeachments. In allowing them thus to make the Executive & Judiciary
appointments, to be the Court of impeachments, and to make Treaties which are
to be laws of the land, the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers are ali
blended in one branch of the Government.... [T]he President will not be the
man of the people as he ought to be, but the Minion of the Senate. He cannot
even appoint a tide-waiter without the Senate.
See also, e.g., id. at 501 (remarks of Charles Pinckney) (objecting to the Report because "it
threw the whole appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate" and "makes the same
body of men which will in fact elect the President his Judges in case of an impeachment");
id. (remarks of Hugh Williamson) (noting "objection to such a dependence of the
President on the Senate for his reappointment"); id. at 502 (remarks of James Wilson)
2002] 1761
1762 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
1787, on a motion by Roger Sherman, the Framers rejected the
contingent election of the President and Vice President by the Senate,
providing instead for the choice by the House of Representatives.43 7
This change passed by a vote of ten to one.438
In The Federalist No. 66, Alexander Hamilton explained the logic
for this change in the context of the balance of powers between the
House of Representatives and the Senate, carefully struck by the
Constitution:
[T]o secure the equilibrium of the national House of
Representatives, the plan of the convention has provided in
its favor several important counterpoises to the additional
authorities to be conferred upon the Senate. The exclusive
privilege of originating money bills will belong to the House
of Representatives. The same house will possess the sole
right of instituting impeachments; is not this a complete
counterbalance to that of determining them? The same
house will be the umpire in all elections of the President
(suggesting that the contingent election should be made by Congress and not the Senate
because "the House of Reps. will so often be changed as to be free from the influence &
faction to which the permanence of the Senate may subject that branch"); id. at 511
(remarks of Charles Pinckney) (objecting to Report because "the dispersion of the votes
would leave the appointment with the Senate, and as the President's reappointment will
thus depend on the Senate he will be the mere creature of that body"); id. (remarks of
John Rutlidge) (objecting to Report because "[i]t would throw the whole power [of
presidential election] into the Senate"); id at 512 (remarks of George Mason) (objecting
to Report because "[i]t puts the appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate" and that
"[t]he great objection with him would be removed by depriving the Senate of the eventual
election"); id at 512 (remarks of Hugh Williamson) ("Referring the appointment to the
Senate lays a certain foundation for corruption & aristocracy."); id. at 513 (remarks of
Governor Randolph) ("He dwelt on the tendency of such an influence of the Senate over
the election of the President in addition to its other powers, to convert that body into a
real & dangerous Aristocracy"); id (remarks of John Dickinson) ("[He] was in favor of
giving the eventual election to the Legislature, instead of the Senate-It was too much
influence to be superadded to that body "); id at 515 (remarks of George Mason) ("As the
mode of appointment is now regulated, he could not forebear expressing his opinion that
it is utterly inadmissible. He would prefer the Government of Prussia to one which will
put all power into the hands of seven or eight men, and fix an Aristocracy worse than
absolute monarchy."); iad at 522 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry) (proposing eventual election
of President to be made by Congress and not Senate so as to "relieve the President from
his particular dependence on the Senate for his continuance in office"); id. at 522 (remarks
of Gouverneur Morris) (supporting Gerry's proposal because "[i]t would free the
President from being tempted in naming to Offices to Conform to the will of the Senate, &
thereby virtually give the appointments to office, to the Senate"); id at 524 (remarks of
Hugh Williamson) ("The aristocratic complexion [of the Senate] proceeds from.., the
mode of appointing the President which makes him dependent on the Senate.").
437. See id. at 527 ("To strike out the words 'The Senate shall immediately choose &c.'
and insert 'The House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them
for President, the members of each State having one vote.' ").
438. Idt
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which do not unite the suffrages of a majority of the whole
number of electors; a case which it cannot be doubted will
sometimes, if not frequently, happen. The constant
possibility of the thing must be a fruitful source of influence
to that body.439
As this passage demonstrates, it was simply beyond question at
the founding that the Senate as a separate and distinct body would
have any agency in the process of presidential election."4 St. George
Tucker, in his canonical "American Blackstone," first published in the
wake of the constitutional crisis of the presidential election of 1800,
summarized the anti-Senate principle of presidential election thus:
[The Senate's] exclusion from any participation in the
election of a president, is certainly founded upon the wisest
policy: being associated with him in the exercise of his most
important powers, and being chosen for a much longer
period than the representatives, the presumption of undue
influence, where the contest might be between a president in
office, and any other person, would be altogether
unavoidable.441
The anti-Senate principle of presidential election was not lost in
the Electoral Count Act debates. Senator Bayard thought it
dispositive in urging the repeal of the Twenty-second Joint Rule., 2 "I
do not think," said Bayard, "that anywhere in the Constitution can be
found language in any degree constituting the Senate of the United
States a factor or an actor in the election of the President of the
United States." 443 He asked, "But will any Senator show me any
clause of the Constitution, any implication which can be argued from
any clause of the Constitution, which gives the Senate one particle of
lawful power in controlling the choice of a President or a Vice-
President of the United States?"' Senator Whyte thought the anti-
Senate principle so strong an objection to the Electoral Count Act
that he stated, "I would rather vote for a bill leaving it to the House
of Representatives to interfere than a bill which provided that the
439. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, supra note 432, at 371-72 (Alexander Hamilton).
440. See also 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 250, at 122 (remarks of William Davie
at North Carolina ratifying convention) ("[The President] is perfectly independent of [the
Senate] in his election."); Letter from James Madison to George Hay (Aug. 23, 1823),
reprinted in 3 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 458 ("The Agency of the H. of Reps. was
thought safer also than that of the Senate, on account of the greater number of its
members.").
441. 1 TUCKER'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 19, app. at 328.
442. COUNTING ELECrORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 444.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 445.
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Senate should have anything to do with the election of President of
the United States." 45
The Electoral Count Act, like the Twenty-second Joint Rule,
violates the anti-Senate principle of presidential election. The
involvement of the Senate as a separate and distinct body in the
process of counting electoral votes runs seriously afoul of
constitutional structure. The equal agency of the Senate with the
House of Representatives in the Electoral Count Act impermissibly
infringes upon the constitutional prerogatives of the House of
Representatives in "umpir[ing]" presidential election, and
consequently, unduly strengthens the powers of the Senate in
presidential election. Moreover, the equal agency of the Senate
violates the Framers' deliberate choice to exclude the Senate
altogether from the process of presidential election.
This is not to say that the anti-Senate principle of presidential
election requires that Senators must not participate in counting
electoral votes. There is a constitutionally significant difference
between the Senate as a separate and distinct body, and Senators as
members of a joint convention of Senators and Representatives,
where Representatives greatly outnumber Senators. The counting
function is committed to the joint convention and all questions of the
electoral count must be resolved by it on a per capita basis, not by two
separate and distinct legislative bodies.
b. The Anti-Congress Principle
Second, the Constitution mistrusts Congress in the process of
presidential election. This is the anti-Congress principle of
presidential election. The joint convention violates the anti-Congress
principle to the extent that it rejects electoral votes contained in
authentic electoral certificates as not "regularly given."'4 6 Two parts
of the Electoral College Clauses carefully reflect the anti-Congress
principle of presidential election.
First, the electoral college mode of presidential election itself is
an instantiation of the anti-Congress principle. We should remember
that of all the methods to elect the President considered by the
Framers the one most emphatically rejected was election of the
President by the legislature.447  The Framers rejected the
445. Id. at 538.
446. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
447. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 497-502. A few years later, Senator Pinckney
remarked:
He remembered very well that in the Federal Convention great care was used to
1764 [Vol. 80
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parliamentary system for good reason: to create an independent and
firm Executive.448
The Electoral College Clauses further reflect the rejection of the
parliamentary system. In the event the electors fail to make a choice,
Congress does nothing in choosing the President or Vice President.
In such a case, the House of Representatives chooses the President
and the Senate chooses the Vice President.449 There is no possible
instance in which the two Houses of Congress act concurrently in
choosing the President or Vice President.450  Representative
Randolph seized upon this point during the Missouri Incident:
What was the theory of this Constitution? It is that this
House, except upon a certain contingency, has nothing at all
to do with the appointment of President and Vice-President
of the United States. What was to be the practice of the
Constitution, as now proposed? That an informal meeting
of this and the other house is to usurp the initiative, the
nominative power, with regard to the two first officers of the
Government, in despite and contempt of their decision. Is
there to be no limit to the power of Congress? no mound or
barrier to stay their usurpation? Why were the electoral
bodies established? 45
1
provide for the election of the President of the United States, independently of
Congress; to take the business as far as possible out of their hands.... Nothing
was more clear to him than that Congress had no right to meddle with it at all; as
the whole was entrusted to the State Legislatures, they must make provision for
all questions arising on the occasion.").
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1800).
448. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 103 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris) ("Of
all possible modes of [presidential] appointment that by the Legislature is the worst. If the
Legislature is to appoint, and to impeach or to influence the impeachment, the Executive
will be the mere creature of it."); 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 131 (remarks of Sen. Pinckney)
(stating that Framers "well knew, that to give to the members of Congress a right to give
votes in this election, or to decide upon them when given, was to destroy the
independence of the Executive, and make him the creature of the Legislature"); KENT'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 19, at *279 (noting that legislative selection of the President
"would have rendered him too dependent upon the immediate authors of his elevation to
comport with the requisite energy of his own department; and it would have laid him
under temptation to indulge in improper intrigue, or to form a dangerous coalition with
the legislative body. ... "); 3 STORY'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 9, § 1450, at 313-14.
449. See U.S. CONST. amend XII. For an eloquent expression of this point, see 18
CONG. REC. 46 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Dibble).
450. See also Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (Jan. 14, 1825), reprinted in 3
FARRAND, supra note 35, at 464 ("If, in the eventual choice of a President, the same
proportional rule had been preferred [as in the Electoral Colleges], a joint ballot by the
two [H]ouses of Congress would have been substituted for the mode which gives an equal
vote to every State, however unequal in size.").
451. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 54.
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Indeed, if we look at the Constitution as a whole, we see that it is
a clause-by-clause rejection of the parliamentary system.42 The clear
constitutional baseline is that congressional election of the President
is prohibited. The concurrence of the House of Representatives and
the Senate required by the Electoral Count Act runs afoul of
constitutional structure.453 The fact that Congress does not elect the
President or Vice President, however, does not necessarily mean that
Congress shall have no role in judging electoral votes.
Second, the Elector Incompatibility Clause provides that "no
Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or
Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector. '' 454 The
Elector Incompatibility Clause is a substantial structural guarantee of
independence from Members of Congress. The clause "is a provision
which goes... to show how extremely guarded the Constitution is in
preventing the members of Congress from having any agency in the
election, except merely in counting the votes. '455 When Members of
Congress are prohibited from even giving electoral votes, what gives
them the constitutional authority to judge electoral votes? But again,
the fact that Members of Congress are prohibited from even giving
electoral votes does not necessarily mean that Members of Congress
shall have no role in judging electoral votes.
452. The single clause which best expresses this separation-of-powers vision is U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be
a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."). For a rich discussion of
this clause's significance as a repudiation of the parliamentary system, see generally
Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or
Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1045 (1994). See also Amar & Amar,
supra note 27, at 118-25 (providing additional discussion of separation-of-powers structure
of Constitution).
453. One corollary of this argument is that if there is no power for concurrent action
then it follows a fortiori that there is no power for either House of Congress alone. For
example, Senator Wilson remarked:
[I]f no such power rests with the two Houses for concurrent action, how much
more preposterous does it seem to be to claim that it rests with either House
alone, and especially with the House of Representatives, with which body to
elect a President abides in the event of a failure of the electors to elect?
17 CONG. REC. 1059 (1886).
454. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
455. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 131 (1800); see also 17 CONG. REC. 1059 (1886) (remarks of
Sen. Wilson) ("When the [F]ramers of the Constitution expressly prohibited Senators and
Representatives from appointment as electors, they clearly indicated their purpose to
exclude them from all power in or over the matter of the election of a President by the
electors appointed by the States."); 18 CONG. REc. 46 (remarks of Rep. Dibble) ("The
idea was that the President must go into office without being under any obligation of any
sort to the National Legislature, and the [F]ramers of the Constitution went so far as to
provide even that a member of Congress should not be an elector-that to be a member of
either House of Congress should be a disqualification.").
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The anti-Congress principle should bear on the overall
interpretation of the Electoral Count Act. The anti-Congress
principle stands for the thinnest conception of congressional
regulation in counting electoral votes. As Senator Pinckney
explained:
How could [the Framers] expect, that in deciding on the
election of a President, particularly where such election was
strongly contested, that party spirit would not prevail, and
govern every decision? Did they not know how easy it was
to raise objections against the votes of particular elections,
and that in determining upon these, it was more than
probable, the members would recollect their sides, their
favorite candidate, and sometimes their own interests? Or
must they not have supposed, that, in putting the ultimate
and final decision of the Electors in Congress, who were to
decide irrevocably and without appeal, they would render
the President their creature, and prevent his assuming and
exercising that independence in the performance of his
duties upon which the safety and honor of the Government
must forever rest?456
Simply put, the joint convention may not judge the acts of
electors-that is, their electoral votes.
c. The Anti-President Principle
Third, the Constitution does not provide any role for the
President in the process of presidential election. The Electoral Count
Act, however, did involve the President. The Electoral Count Act is
a law, not a rule of proceeding like the Twenty-second Joint Rule.
Laws require bicameralism and presentment to the President,
whereas rules (including joint rules) do not.4 57 The Electoral Count
456. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 130-31. Professor Harrison recently put the point in the
context of old and recent history:
As the experiences of 1876-1877 and 2000 indicate, giving Congress power to
resolve an electoral dispute is very close to giving it power to choose the
President; indeed, electoral disputes could be trumped up for that very purpose.
It is unlikely that the Constitution allows through the back door what it bars the
front door against.
Harrison, supra note 23, at 705.
457. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 provides that:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States;
If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to
that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at
large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such
Reconsideration two[-]thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be
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Act was presented to and approved by President Cleveland. Is it not
absurd to give the President an agency in counting the electoral votes
of her successors? During the Wisconsin Incident of 1857, Senator
Pugh objected to a mere joint resolution stating that Wisconsin's
electoral votes should not have been counted because it would
require presentment to the President. "Now, confessedly," said Pugh,
"the President has nothing to do with counting the votes for his
successor." 458  Whether President Cleveland's approval of the
Electoral Count Act presents an incurable constitutional problem of
the past for the Electoral Count Act is beyond the scope of the
present analysis.
What is important for present purposes, however, is that a law
cannot be repealed without presentment to and approval by the
President, or by a two-thirds super-majority of both Houses of
Congress. This is a constitutional problem for the Electoral Count
Act because the President has a significant agency in the law of the
status quo. During the Electoral Count Act debates, Senator Hager
put this point best:
But, as I said suppose this bill becomes a law signed by the
President, how are you to get rid of it in the future? If it is
binding upon the Senate and House that meet next it
requires, in order to repeal it, not only the vote of the Senate
and the House, but the approval of the President. Thus the
President enters into the consideration, when the
Constitution never contemplated any such thing. It is a duty
imposed entirely upon the Senate and House of
Representatives; and if you pass this bill in order that it may
be a law it requires the approval of the President, and
hereafter to repeal it and get rid of it also requires the
approval of the President, so that a future Senate and a
future House of Representatives may be entirely under the
control of the President of the United States.... Did the
[F]ramers of the Constitution contemplate any such state of
things as that when the twelfth article of amendment was
adopted? It was the intent that the people should control
the election of the President, and not the President of the
United States.... The President has nothing to do with it.459
sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise
be reconsidered, and if approved by two[-]thirds of that House, it shall become a
Law.
See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (similar).
458. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 135.
459. Id; see also id. at 523 (remarks of Sen. Bayard) ("[F]or this is not a law for to-day
only; it is to become a settled law, a fixed rule, requiring for its repeal the assent of a
1768 [Vol. 80
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To be sure, the President has an agency in presidential succession
under the Presidential Succession Clause,460 but the President is
behind a veil of ignorance when it comes to presidential succession-
unlike presidential election.
d. The Pro-States and Pro-State Legislatures Principle
Fourth, the Constitution trusts the states and state legislatures in
the process of presidential election. This is the pro-states and pro-
state legislatures principle of presidential election. This principle
makes clear that Congress has no role over some of the problems of
the electoral count.
Let us once again turn to Senator Pinckney's famous speech
against the Grand Committee Bill. Invoking the Tenth Amendment,
Senator Pinckney argued that the Grand Committee Bill trampled on
the rights of the states: he considered the right of the states to be free
from congressional interference in the election of the President as
sacred as the right of the states to be free from congressional
interference in matters of religion and the press.46' Senator Pinckney
then observed:
This right of determining on the manner in which the
Electors shall vote; the inquiry into the qualifications, and
the guards necessary to prevent disqualified or improper
men voting, and to insure the votes being legally given, rests
and is exclusively vested in the State Legislatures. If it is
necessary to have guards against improper elections of
Electors, and to institute tribunals to inquire into their
qualifications, with the State Legislatures, and with them
alone, rests the power to institute them, and they must
exercise it.462
Nearly three-quarters of a century later, the House Committee
on Privileges and Elections in 1874 similarly reported:
majority of each house and the President of the United States.").
460. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
461. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 127 ("[The States] supposed they had placed the hand of
their own authority on the rights of religion and the press, and the as sacred right of the
States in the election of the President.").
462. 1L at 130 (emphasis added). Senator Pinckney largely dismissed problems with
respect to the validity of an Elector's appointment. In answering an objection that
Electors might be appointed in violation of the Elector Incompatibility Clause, he stated,
"[W]here is the necessity of this bill? Is not the Constitution the supreme law of the land,
and must not the State Legislatures conform their directions in the appointment of
Electors to the directions of the Constitution?" Ida at 131; see also id. at 132 ("Why this
anxiety, why these unnecessary efforts to take from the State Legislatures their exclusive
and most valuable right?").
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It will thus be seen that the mode of choosing the electors is
placed entirely beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
National Government; and whatever disorders,
irregularities, or failures in the appointment of electors may
occur in any of the States, they are entirely without remedy
or redress upon the part of the Government of the United
States.463
How did Senator Pinckney and the House Committee on
Privileges and Elections reach this conclusion? The italicized words
ought to provide a strong clue. Senator Pinckney expressly invoked
the Times, Places, and Manner Clause in his argument against the
Grand Committee Bill,464 and the use of the word "mode" by the
House Committee on Privileges and Elections is merely a synonym
for the word "Manner" in the Times, Places, and Manner Clause.
As we saw earlier, the intratextual implications of the Times,
Places, and Manner Clause are potentially powerful. In sum, with
respect to presidential election, the Constitution fixes the "Place"
(with the electors meeting in their respective states), empowers
Congress to fix the "Time," and empowers the state legislatures to
determine the "Manner." Unlike Article I, the state legislatures have
the final word on that important subject; Congress has no power to
determine on the "Manner" of presidential election.
But what is the breadth of power textually committed to state
legislatures in presidential election? Does the word "Manner" in the
Times, Places, and Manner Clause include the power to investigate
the qualifications of electors? To determine an answer to this
question, let us begin by looking to The Federalist No. 59 in which
Alexander Hamilton brilliantly defends the Times, Places, and
Manner Clause, which was the subject of much criticism by both
Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike. Hamilton correctly notes "that
there were only three ways in which this power could have been
reasonably modified and disposed: that it must either have been
lodged wholly in the national legislature, or wholly in the State
legislatures, or primarily in the latter and ultimately in the former."4 65
Consider Alexander Hamilton's justifications for reposing ultimate
power over congressional elections in Congress:
If the State legislatures were to be invested with an exclusive
power of regulating these [House of Representatives]
elections, every period of making them would be a delicate
463. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 414 (emphasis added).
464. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 128.
465. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, supra note 392, at 330 (Alexander Hamilton).
1770 [Vol. 80
ELECTORAL COUNTACT
crisis in the national situation, which might issue in a
dissolution of the Union, if the leaders of a few of the most
important States should have entered into a previous
conspiracy to prevent an election.466
Two points should become immediately apparent. First, as the
italicized word indicates, Alexander Hamilton read the "Manner" in
the Times, Places, and Manner Clause as a type of regulation by the
state legislatures. This ought to come as no surprise given the text of
that clause which provides that "Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators."467
Second, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
Hamilton's defense of the Times, Places, and Manner Clause is no
less applicable to presidential election. When we consult the
Electoral College Clauses, we see textually that the "Manner" of
appointing electors is vested wholly in the state legislatures; it is not
vested primarily in the state legislatures and ultimately in the
Congress. If Congress had a role in regulating presidential election,
Hamilton likely would have said so in The Federalist No. 68.
What does all of this mean for questions of the electoral count?
As Senator Pinckney and the House Committee on Privileges and
Elections in 1874 noted, state legislatures might have jurisdiction
(perhaps exclusive jurisdiction) to decide on questions with respect to
the validity of an elector's appointment.46 Dean Wroth adopts this
view. He has written that "[t]he plain implication of the original
scheme is that the states in their control of the manner of
appointment were to provide for the settlement of whatever
controversies might arise.... Local authorities would naturally
resolve any contest." '469
The problem with this view is that it reads into the Times, Places,
and Manner Clause some judicial power to look into the
qualifications of an office holder. This would analogously imply that
Congress has the judicial power to look into qualifications of
466. Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
467. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
468. Senator Pinckney had a much broader conception of the judicial power of State
Legislatures, including the power "to insure the votes being legally given." See text
accompanying supra note 462. However, it is especially hard to see how state legislatures
have any jurisdiction over questions with respect to an elector's vote (whether, for
example, that vote is constitutional or not). The "Manner" power of state legislatures is
textually limited to the appointment of electors. Moreover, electors, once selected, are
arguably independent of state legislatures.
469. Wroth, supra note 22, at 324.
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Members of Congress because Congress has the ultimate control over
the "Manner" of congressional election. The problem with this view
is that such a power of Congress stands in seemingly direct violation
of the power vested in each House of Congress to judge the
qualifications of its members under the House Judging Clause.470
It is also difficult to see how state legislatures (and their
tribunals) would have exclusive jurisdiction to settle whatever
controversies might arise in the appointment of electors; the proper
appointment of electors is very clearly a federal question which may
be adjudicated by federal courts.
The most important problem, however, is a temporal one. Given
the immediacy principle of the Electoral College Clauses,471 there is
simply no time to investigate-by the state legislatures and their
tribunals or by federal courts-the validity of an elector's
appointment once the electoral votes are being counted. Indeed, the
better reading of the Electoral College Clauses may be that federal
courts are vested with the judicial power to inquire into the proper
appointment of electors between the "time of chusing the Electors"
and "the Day on which they shall give their Votes." The problem
here is that Members of Congress are not supposed to know who the
electors in each state are in advance of the meeting of the electoral
colleges, so that the electors may be as free and detached as possible.
Moreover, Congress could easily make the time of choosing the
electors the same day on which the electors shall give their votes,4
72
leaving no time for the judicial investigation of electors'
appointments.
Finally, in addition to the argument made by Senator Pinckney
and the House Committee on Privileges and Elections in 1874, there
is a broader argument that Congress should have no role in regulating
presidential election. In reviewing Hamilton's justification for the
Times, Places, and Manner Clause, we see that there could be no
analogous "delicate crisis in the national situation"473 if the state
legislatures had the last word on determining "Manner." This is
because our Constitution ensures that we will never be without a
President.
One view is that the Electoral College Clauses were carefully
crafted to provide for the election of a President should the states fail
470. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
471. See supra notes 269-74 and accompanying text.
472. During the debate on the Act of 1792, Representative White expressed his wish
that this be done "[i]f it had been possible." 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 278 (1791).
473. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, supra note 392, at 333 (Alexander Hamilton).
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in performing their constitutional duties. For example, Dean Wroth
has written:
The method for electing a President may be contrasted with
the provisions for congressional elections. In the latter
instance, as Hamilton pointed out in the Federalist, Congress
must have ultimate control over the manner of election of its
own members, lest the states, by refusing to elect
Congressmen, cause the whole structure to fall. In the case
of the presidency, since the House was ready to carry out the
election if the states failed, congressional control was not
only undesirable but unnecessary.474
Dean Wroth is clearly alluding to the provision of the Electoral
College Clauses which empowers the House of Representatives to
choose the President in case of electoral deadlock. While Dean
Wroth is correct in his intuition that we will not be without a
President, he is incorrect as a matter of text. The choice of President
by the House of Representatives is not unconstrained, but is limited-
to five persons by the original Constitution and now three persons by
the Twelfth Amendment. If no states appoint electors and hence no
electors vote, the House of Representatives could not elect a
President (nor the Senate a Vice President).
In the case posited by Dean Wroth, however, it may be that
under the original Constitution, the Presidential Succession Clause of
Article II would kick in to ensure that we are not without a
President.4 75 This was the view of "Horatius" in a letter to the
Washington Federalist on January 6, 1801-just five weeks before the
troublesome election of then Vice-President Thomas Jefferson by the
House of Representatives. In Horatius's view, the case of no election
of President and Vice President by the electors fit squarely within the
''removal" provision of the Presidential Succession Clause:
The words used here [in the Presidential Succession Clause]
are comprehensive enough to embrace every vacancy, and if
they are construed not to embrace the case of removal by
virtue of the constitutional terms of the offices of President
and Vice-President, they will not embrace the vacancy most
probable to happen, while they are admitted to embrace
vacancies that are very improbable.476
474. Wroth, supra note 22, at 325.
475. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
476. Horatius Letter, supra note 273; see also id. (observing that the word "removal"
"comprehends the case where neither the electors nor the [H]ouse of [R]epresentatives
shall elect a successor to the President whose time expires by virtue of the constitutional
limitation").
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We need not overly concern ourselves with the scope of
''removal" in the Presidential Succession Clause because the
Twentieth Amendment removes any ambiguity.477 A critic would
argue that this reading of the Presidential Succession Clause does not
remove Congress from the business of electing the President when
the states fail to fulfill their constitutional duties. Indeed, the
Presidential Succession Clause explicitly invites Congress to legislate
on the subject of presidential succession. However, under that clause,
Congress specifies who shall act as President until a special,
intervening presidential election, and not who is President as under
the Electoral College Clauses. Moreover, prospective legislation
under the Presidential Succession Clause-enacted behind a veil of
ignorance well before any constitutional crisis-provides a much
more legitimate solution than allowing the House of Representatives
to choose the President based on the circumstances at hand, when
party spirit is likely to govern the choice.
e. The Pro-Electors Principle
Fifth, the Constitution trusts electors in the process of
presidential election. More precisely, the Constitution trusts electors
with the last word on the persons receiving votes-period. This is the
pro-electors principle of presidential election. The Electoral Count
Act is unconstitutional to the extent that the joint convention may
reject electoral votes in authentic electoral certificates as not
"regularly given."4 78 In other words, the joint convention may not
examine the contents of electoral certificates and reject electoral
votes because of the persons receiving votes.
As a structural matter, the electoral colleges constitute a separate
and coordinate branch of the Government of the United States4 79
(although as an "architextural" matter,4 80 the electoral colleges
occupy textual space in Article II along with the executive branch of
the Government of the United States). What gives Congress or the
joint convention the authority to judge electoral votes?
477. For the relevant text of the Twentieth Amendment, see text accompanying infra
note 605.
478. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
479. Elsewhere, I have set forth a proof for the proposition that Electors occupy a
"public Trust under the United States" because they are not Members of Congress,
Members of the several State Legislatures, Officers of the United States, or Officers of the
several States. See Kesavan, supra note 324, at 128-35; cf. 18 CONG. REC. 30 (1886)
(remarks of Rep. Caldwell) (stating that "the elector is a Federal functionary, as much so
as a Senator or Representative").
480. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. LJ. (forthcoming 2002).
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The electoral colleges are inferior neither to Congress nor to the
joint convention. The numbers suggest as much: the number of
electors is equal to the number of Senators and Representatives."
As a separate and coordinate branch of government, the electors
should have interpretive authority of the Constitution with respect to
the powers committed to them.4s2  The founding generation
understood that electors would be among the most virtuous citizens
of the Republic. 483 The electors in the electoral college "houses" do
"meet" and deliberate like Members of Congress.' They probably
481. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
482. For similar statements with respect to constitutional interpretation by the
President, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of
Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 passim (1993);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branck Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J. 217 passim (1994). For a similar statement with respect to
constitutional interpretation by Congress, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative
Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DuKE L.J. 1335 passim (2001).
483. For example, John Jay argued:
As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the State
legislatures who appoint the senators, will in general be composed of the most
enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that their
attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the
most distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the people perceive
just grounds for confidence.... If the observation be well founded that wise
kings will always be served by able ministers it is fair to argue that as an assembly
of select electors possess, in a greater degree than kings, the means of extensive
and accurate information relative to men and characters, so will their
appointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and discernment.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 359 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor 1999) (1961);
see 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 30-31 (1800) (remarks of Sen. Baldwin) ("Experience had
proved that a more venerable selection of characters could not be made in this country
than usually composed that electoral body."). To be sure, this understanding began to
change in the first decade after the founding. See, e.g., STANIvOOD, supra note 7, at 51.
484. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XII ("The Electors shall meet in their respective
states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President .... ") (emphasis added); THE
FEDERALIST No. 68, supra note 246, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It was equally
desirable that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing
the qualities adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable to
deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which
were proper to govern their choice.") (emphasis added). Hamilton further argued:
[A]s the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in
which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them
much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the
people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.
Id. (emphasis added); cf. Vikram David Amar, The People Made Me Do It: Can the
People of the States Instruct and Coerce Their State Legislatures in the Article V
Constitutional Amendment Process?, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037, 1089 n.233 (2000)
("[T]he electoral college, like Congress and an Article V proposing convention, is truly a
national group whose existence owes entirely to the Constitution. On the other hand, the
electoral college does not 'meet' and deliberate like Congress or an Article V proposing
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enjoy the same privileges and immunities as Members of Congress,
including immunity from arrest and freedom of speech and debate.4 85
Importantly, the electors also enjoy considerable structural
independence from Congress. Electors receive no compensation
from Congress for their federal service, nor has any Congress, to my
knowledge, ever compensated electors for such service.4 6 Electors
are also not subject to impeachment by the House of Representative
or conviction by the Senate because they are not "civil Officers of the
United States."'
The structural coordinacy of electors and their structural
independence is destroyed if Members of Congress may second-guess
the electors' judgments. Unlike inferior courts whose decisions may
be judged by the Supreme Court, 8 the electors are not inferior to the
joint convention of Senators and Representatives and may not be
judged by them. As Representative Randolph put the point in 1821,
"[T]he electoral college was as independent of Congress as Congress
of them; and we have no right, said he, to judge of their
proceedings." 9
A simple counterfactual underscores the structural principles of
coordinacy and independence. Imagine that the Framers gave
Members of Congress, instead of electors, the choice of electing the
President and Vice President. Would there be any question that
Members of Congress would have the last word on the persons voted
for in the presidential and vice presidential election? Would the
Chief Justice of the United States refuse to administer the
presidential oath or affirmation if the Members of Congress acted
unconstitutionally? Would that matter?
convention.").
485. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony
and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session
of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
Speech of Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place."). For
a claim that the President enjoys similar privileges although the Constitution does not so
textually specify, see Amar & Katyal, supra note 423, at 702-08.
486. The Framers briefly considered the compensation of electors. See 2 FARRAND,
supra note 35, at 73 ("Mr. Williamson moved that the Electors of the Executive should be
paid out of the National Treasury for the Service to be performed by them. Justice
required this: as it was a national service they were to render. The motion was agreed to
nem.-con."). The provision was inexplicably dropped on subsequent debate.
487. See Kesavan, supra note 324, at 133 & n.46.
488. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all other cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact .... ).
489. COUNTING ELECrORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 51 (emphasis added).
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There is considerable historical support for the pro-electors
principle of presidential election. Senator Baldwin, in his remarks
against the Grand Committee Bill in January of 1800, succinctly
observed
that the Constitution in directing Electors to be appointed
throughout the United States equal to the whole number of
the Senators and Representatives in Congress, for the
express purpose of entrusting this Constitutional branch of
power to them, had provided for the existence of as
respectable a body as Congress, and in whom the
Constitution on this business has more confidence than in
Congress .490
Senator Baldwin's statement highlights two important points: in
absolute terms, the Constitution trusts electors, and in relative terms,
the Constitution trusts electors more than Members of Congress.
Senator Baldwin then posed a powerful counterfactual: What if
the Constitution had provided that the electors meet at some central
location instead of meeting in their respective states?491 The answer
was obvious-the electors, not some other body, would resolve the
problems of the electoral count.49 It therefore followed, according to
Senator Baldwin, that the joint convention of Senators and
Representatives had no additional power to judge electoral votes just
because the electors meet in their respective states and not at some
central location. He stated, "It having been deemed more safe by the
Constitution to form them into different Electoral colleges, to be
assembled in the several States, does not at all alter the nature or
distinctness of their powers, or subject them any more to the control
of the other departments of the Government." '493 In his closing
remarks, he observed that:
490. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1800).
491. The Framers considered and rejected this idea. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at
525; id. at 526 ("Mr. Spaight said if the election by Electors is to be crammed down, he
would prefer their meeting altogether and deciding finally without any reference to the
Senate and moved 'That the Electors meet at the seat of the General Government.' ").
This motion failed with all States in the negative except North Carolina. Id. Senator
Baldwin, a Framer, no doubt remembered this history.
492. Senator Baldwin argued:
If this body of the Electors of all the States had been directed by the Constitution
to assemble in one place, instead of being formed into different Electoral
colleges, he took it for granted none of the questions on which this [Senator
Ross's] resolution has been brought forward, would have occurred; every one
would have acknowledged that they were to be settled in that assembly.
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 31.
493. Id. at 31-32.
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[A]l1 the questions which had been suggested were as safely
left to the decision of the assemblies of Electors as of any
body of men that could be devised; and that the members of
the Senate and House of Representatives, when met
together in one room, should receive the act of the Electors
as they would the act of any other Constitutional branch of
the Government, to judge only of its authentication, and
then to proceed to count the votes, as directed in the second
article of the Constitution.494
This statement underscores the critical distinction in the
problems of the electoral count. The joint convention of Senators
and Representatives should "judge only of [the] authentication" of
the acts of electors (that is, their electoral certificates), but not judge
the acts of electors (that is, their electoral votes).495
Senator Pinckney, in his lengthy speech against the Grand
Committee Bill in March of 1800, elaborated on the pro-electors
principle of presidential election in the specific context of the
presidential ineligibility problem of the electoral count-that is, the
elector who votes for a President who is not constitutionally qualified.
He believed that virtuous electors simply would not vote for a
President of doubtful constitutional qualifications given the "immense
power" of the President.4 96 If they did, however, he had a forcible
answer:
It is true they, as well as any other Constitutional branch of this
Government acting under that instrument, may be guilty of
taking unconstitutional or corrupt steps, but they do it at their
peril. Suppose either of the other branches of the Government,
the Executive, or the Judiciary, or even Congress, should be
guilty of taking steps which are unconstitutional, to whom is it
submitted, or who has control over it, except by impeachment?
The Constitution seems to have equal confidence in all the
branches on their own proper ground, and for either to arrogate
superiority, or a claim to greater confidence, shows them in
494. Id at 32.
495. This critical distinction in the problems of the electoral count is explained in Part
III.A infra.
496. Senator Pinckney argued:
Who, when he reflects on the immense power the President possesses, can
suppose that any man, honorably selected by his fellow-citizens as an Elector,
could for a moment be so lost to a sense of his own and his country's welfare, as
to vote for a man as the Supreme Executive, whose citizenship or residence were
doubtful, and who were not of sufficient age?
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 132.
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particular to be unworthy of it, as it is in itself directly
unconstitutional.4 97
In sum, in the process of presidential election, the Constitution
trusts electors with the last word on the persons receiving votes. The
joint convention does not sit in judgment of the acts of electors-that
is, their electoral votes. At a minimum, the point is a relative one:
the Constitution trusts electors more than Members of Congress. It is
thus unconstitutional for the joint convention to reject electoral votes
contained in authentic electoral certificates-even when those
electoral votes are unconstitutional.
2. Principles of Rule-Making and Law-Making
The Electoral Count Act violates two critical structural principles
of our Constitution: the anti-binding principle of rule-making and the
Chadha principle of law-making. These structural arguments create a
rather compelling case that the Electoral Count Act is
unconstitutional.
a. The Anti-Binding Principle of Rule-Making
The anti-binding principle of rule-making prevents one Congress
from binding another with respect to the rules of proceedings.498
Moreover, one Congress cannot bind each House of Congress in a
current Congress (let alone that of future Congresses) with respect to
the rules of proceedings. Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 expressly
reflects this principle by providing that "[e]ach House may determine
497. J& at 31 (emphasis added).
498. For a brilliant article on this general (and generally neglected) subject, see Paul
NV. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 185 (1986). A starting point is Blackstone's maxim: "Acts of
Parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent Parliaments bind not." 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90. For an extensive collection of British sources on this
point, see Brett W. King, Deconstructing Gordon and Contingent Legislative Authority:
The Constitutionality of Supermajority Rules, 6 U. CI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 133, 188
n.248 (1999).
Professor Kahn's argument is that there are two types of statutes: "first-order
rules" and "second-order rules." The former type addresses behavior directly, and
includes most laws; the latter type addresses other rules, imposing burdens on
constitutionally assigned functions (for example, legislation), and necessarily raises
questions as to what Congress may accomplish by statute versus by constitutional
amendment. According to Kahn, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985, popularly known as Gramm-Rudman, is a second-order rule, and therefore
raises interesting and significant constitutional problems. He further argues that a future
Congress's freedom to repeal a second-order rule does not cure the constitutional
infirmities of such legislation. See Kahn, supra, at 190-204.
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the Rules of its Proceedings."4 99 Indeed, as a formal matter, the rules
of proceedings in the House of Representatives expire at the end of
the term of each House and are re-enacted by the next House.50 (In
contrast, the rules of proceedings in the Senate do not expire because
the Senate is a continuing body.50 1)
The Electoral Count Act clearly violates the anti-binding
principle of rule-making. The Electoral Count Act is a law of
proceeding for the electoral count, not a rule of proceeding like the
Twenty-second Joint Rule °2 As such, the Electoral Count Act
499. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. Professor Kahn usefully relates that "the House [of
Representatives] has taken the position that it is free to abandon statutory provisions that
purport to regulate internal House procedures." Kahn, supra note 498, at 226. He
discusses an early precedent within the first decade after the founding concerning a subject
relevant to the one at hand: determining the outcome of disputed congressional elections.
He observes:
When Congress passed in 1797 a statute designed to regulate disputed elections,
members in the House objected to the statute as an infringement on each house's
rules powers. The statute was defended as legitimate because it did not prescribe
rules for the House but rather procedures binding on the general public, outside
of Congress. The House later adopted the position that no power
constitutionally committed to one House by the Constitution could be abridged
by an earlier statute.
I. at 226 n.149 (citing 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 683-84 (1797) (statement of Rep. Sitgreaves);
1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS CLASS 10, No. 99, 5th Cong., 2d Sess. 159-60 (1797); 36
CONG. REC. 231-35 (1902) (contested election statute); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st
Sess. 725-34 (1858) (same)).
500. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181,
245 n.373 (1997) (citing RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No.
103-342, at 768 (1995)); see also Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 706 n.4 (1966)
("Neither the House of Representatives nor its committees are continuing bodies.").
501. See Julian Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379,408; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 500,
at 245 n.375 (citing SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE
SENATE, S. Doc. No. 102-25, at 4 (1992)).
502. There should be no question that the Electoral Count Act is a law that regulates a
particular proceeding. To be sure, Members of Congress identified it as a "permanent
rule" or "fixed rule" during the Electoral Count Act debates. See, e.g., COUNTING
ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 520 (1876) (remarks of Sen. Bayard) (referring to
"framing of such a permanent rule in the shape of law upon this subject as would be
satisfactory to the American people"); id. at 523 (remarks of Sen. Bayard) ("[F]or this is
not a law for to-day only; it is to become a settled law, a fixed rule, requiring for its repeal
the assent of a majority of each house and the President of the United States."); 18 CONG.
REC. 30 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Caldwell) ("This bill is to prescribe the mode in which
this count shall be made .... ); id. at 49 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Eden) ("The object of
the bill of the Senate is to fix certain rules by which the two Houses shall be governed in
counting the electoral vote."); id. at 50 (similar). Not surprisingly, some Members of
Congress put the terms "law" or "joint rule" on the same constitutional plane in discussing
the counting of electoral votes. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 815 (1886) (remarks of Sen.
Sherman) (noting that "this most important duty of counting the electoral vote... is now
without law or rule to govern the mode and manner of its procedure"); 18 CONG. REC. 30
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impermissibly binds the actions of future joint conventions. During
the Electoral Count Act debates, Members of Congress naturally
recognized that the Electoral Count Act would be used to bind the
actions of future joint conventions by settling questions of counting
electoral votes in advance.5 3  Indeed, in describing Congress's
motivation in passing the Electoral Count Act, Professors Issacharoff,
Karlan, and Pildes state that "Congress needed a binding rule,
because the previous approach of counting electoral votes under a
joint procedural rule that could be revoked by either house had led to
the rule being revoked whenever one house disapproved of the
results it would produce."" °a
Two sections of the Electoral Count Act-3 U.S.C. §§ 5 and 15-
impermissibly bind (or purport to bind) the joint convention in
counting electoral votes. The former section, the one at issue in Bush
v. Gore, provides:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the
day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final
determination of any controversy or contest concerning the
appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by
judicial or other methods or procedures, and such
determination shall have been made at least six days before
the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such
determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said
day, and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting
of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the
counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution,
and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of
the electors appointed by such State is concerned.0 5
The latter section, as we have seen, binds the joint conventions
with an intricate set of rules for counting electoral votes5 6 This
(1886) (remarks of Rep. Caldwell) ("Congress may provide by law or joint rule the
manner of counting the [electoral] vote."); id. at 46 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Dibble) ("[I]t
is competent for Congress, by statute or by joint agreement, joint resolution, or joint rule,
to name individuals to exercise the duty of making the [electoral] count.").
503. See, e.g., 18 CONG. REC. 30 (remarks of Rep. Caldwell) ("[T]his bill if passed will
be an authoritative expression of the Constitution erected into law in advance of any
complication which may again arise, as it has in the past, as to the counting the electoral
votes of the States and the declaration of the result."); id. ("The passage of this bill will
settle all the questions which have arisen from time to time as to the electoral count.").
504. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 18, at 97 (emphasis added). For expressions of
this concern during the Electoral Count Act debates, see 17 CONG. REc. 815 (remarks of
Sen. Sherman), id. at 2427 (remarks of Sen. Hoar), and 18 CONG. RnC. 50 (remarks of
Rep. Eden).
505. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000) (emphasis added).
506. See Part I.A.4 supra.
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section binds the joint conventions with even the most minor of rules,
including a rule that "certificates and papers shall be opened,
presented, and acted upon in the alphabetical order of the States,
beginning with the letter A.""5 7 Thus, unless the Electoral Count Act
is repealed or amended, future joint conventions could not proceed
with counting electoral votes in reverse alphabetical order of states in
the Union without acting illegally.
Two constitutional problems should be apparent. First, Congress
might not have the authority to determine the rules of proceedings for
its joint convention. The joint convention is decidedly not Congress,
but a distinct parliamentary body with constitutionally-assigned
functions. ° Indeed, under our Constitution, Congress may not even
determine the rules of proceedings of the House of Representatives
or the Senate.509 It would seem to follow that the joint convention has
the constitutional prerogative to determine the rules of its
proceedings when it meets once every four years. Second, even if
Congress may bind its joint convention, Congress may not bind the
joint convention of future Congresses in the exercise of
constitutionally-assigned functions.
The anti-binding principle of rule-making should be a conclusive
structural argument that the Electoral Count Act is unconstitutional.
It is a formalist argument, however, and undoubtedly will be criticized
as such.
Consider the writings of one of our leading constitutional
scholars on the very question of the anti-binding principle, and in the
very context of counting electoral votes. Professor Amar, in an essay
on presidential succession originally prepared and submitted as
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the
Constitution on February 2, 1994, recommended that "Congress
should provide by statute that an electoral vote for any person who is
dead at the time of the congressional counting is a valid vote, and will
be counted, so long as the death occurred on or after Election Day."510
Recall the Greeley incident of 1872511-the specific case that
507. 3 U.S.C. § 15.
508. Even if one believes that the counting function is committed to Congress and not
to the joint convention, it is not at all clear that one Congress may bind itself in advance
with respect to rules of proceedings of the electoral count. For a thoughtful discussion of
one Congress binding itself with respect to rules of proceedings of legislation, see John 0.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority
Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483,506 n.109 (1995).
509. See supra notes 498-501 and accompanying text.
510. Amar, supra note 10, at 222.
511. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
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Professor Amar sought to remedy by statute. 12 To be sure, Professor
Amar defended his proposal against the formalist argument of the
anti-binding principle of rule-making:
Spoilsports might argue that, strictly speaking, any
legislation passed today could not conclusively bind a future
result-oriented Congress, which would be free to replace the
earlier law after [President-elect] Smith's death but before
the official vote counting in Congress. (One Congress cannot
generally bind a successor Congress.) And worrywarts might
fret over whether our proposed legislation should be enacted
as a law rather than a joint or concurrent resolution, since it
seeks to regulate how votes will be counted in Congress itself.
(Sections 15 through 18 of Title 3, however, do provide a
clear precedent for regulating congressional vote-counting
by law.)
The spoilsports and worrywarts largely miss the point.
The key function of our proposed legislation is to serve as a
precommitment and focal point. With our proposed
legislation on the books, it will be much more difficult,
politically, for a future result-oriented Congress to change
the rules and discount the votes for Smith. The principled
precedent will be our legislation, not the Greeley affair.
Citizens, pundits, reporters, and politicians will be able to
point to the plain language, in black and white, in the United
States Code, answering the question of the hour. Any
deviation from this clear focal point will obviously smack of
changing the rules in the middle of the game-indeed, after
the game has ended. 13
Call me a worrywart, but not a spoilsport. Indeed, if we are to
"take text and structure seriously" and not follow "free-form"
methods of constitutional interpretation,-14 call me a worrywart again.
Professor Amar's statement leaves little doubt that the Electoral
Count Act is formally unconstitutional. But does worrywart
formalism make the Electoral Count Act any less unconstitutional?
512. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 10, at 218-19,226-27,228-29.
513. Id. at 227 (emphasis added); cf. Harrison, supra note 23, at 714 (discussing ad hoe
solutions to problems of the electoral count and describing the strength of having a rule,
even if not the right one, as "enabl[ing] the country to avoid total political gridlock or even
violence").
514. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections
on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221 (1995)
(criticizing the "free-form" method of constitutional interpretation as an assault on the
coherent and constrained character of the legal enterprise and calling for a method that is
attentive to the "stubborn truths" of text, history, and structure).
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Is the Electoral Count Act a "law" that only has political but not legal
force?
More recently, the anti-binding problem of rule-making is
coming to the fore in the burgeoning literature on Bush v. Gore.
Scholars from both sides of the political aisle have taken notice of the
point (at least in passing) in their discussions of 3 U.S.C. § 5, the so-
called "safe harbor" provision. In an article published after the case,
Professor Tribe, a member of Vice President Gore's legal team,
states, "There is no constitutionally prescribed method by which one
Congress may require a future Congress to interpret or discharge a
constitutional responsibility in any particular way. '515 And in a very
brief discussion of 3 U.S.C. § 15, he states, "It is true that even that
procedure, untested in the 114 years during which it has been in place,
was shadowed by constitutional doubt over the power of one
Congress to bind its successors in such matters.
516
Likewise, in a forthcoming article, Professor Lund, a defender of
Bush v. Gore and a proponent of Bush-pere states:
This statute, 3 U.S.C. § 5, purports to bind Congress in
exercising its constitutional duty to count electoral votes. I
doubt that this can constitutionally be accomplished by a
statute. Each house of Congress has the authority to
determine its own rules of proceeding, and it is far from
clear that a statute can override that authority. But even if 3
U.S.C. § 5 is unconstitutional in this sense, that has no
bearing on the legal issues that arose in Bush v. Gore."'
Not surprisingly, the anti-binding principle of rule-making
featured prominently in the Electoral Count Act debates. Several
Senators made the point that Congress cannot bind the joint
convention," 8 and that even if Congress could bind its joint
515. Tribe, supra note 17, at 267 n.388 (citing 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-3, at 125-26 n.1 (3d ed. 2000)). The Gore legal team did not
make this argument in any of the briefs filed in Bush v. Gore.
516. Id. at 277.
517. Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 61 n.140, on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(citation omitted). For an extended discussion of the point with respect to 3 U.S.C. § 5,
see Michael J. Glennon, Nine Ways to Avoid a Train Wreck; How Title 3 Should Be
Changed, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 9-15, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
518. On the former point that Congress cannot bind the joint convention by law or
joint rule, Senator Stockton remarked:
If a constitutional amendment is not necessary, then those two bodies there
assembled have the power to regulate the way they shall count the vote, and if
they have not the power it certainly does not exist in these two bodies sitting
before the Congress meets, before the body to whom the Constitution of the
[Vol. 801784
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convention, Congress cannot bind future joint conventions. Senator
Hager put the latter point best. The counting of electoral votes was a
self-executing constitutional duty, and according to Senator Hager,
"[We cannot here establish a rule by which we dictate to another
Congress how they shall perform a constitutional duty. 5 19  He
believed that neither the Twenty-second Joint Rule nor the Electoral
Count Act would have "any binding force upon the Congress that
must act in this matter under the Constitution. ' 20  He colorfully
continued:
Can you say, sir, that you may limit your powers or add to
them by any legislation here? Can you bind your successors
in any matter of constitutional legislation? Turn to the
powers that Congress has. Congress may "lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." You might just as well
undertake to pass a law here pointing out how Congress
shall levy taxes and imposts, as to undertake to regulate
them in the performance of a constitutional duty in regard to
this matter. As well might one supreme court undertake to
bind their successors as for one Congress to undertake to
bind their successors. It cannot be done either by legislation
or by any rule that you may see fit to adopt.
I admit that there is an imperfection in this part of the
Constitution as to how the joint body when assembled
together shall proceed to act and determine the result of the
election. But as the duty is imposed upon the Senate and the
House of Representatives it is for them and each body that is
called upon to act in that capacity to regulate rules for
themselves.52'
Thus, the joint convention was to determine the rules of its own
proceedings. But Senator Hager advanced a fallback position. He
reluctantly admitted that Congress could regulate the proceedings of
its own joint convention by law, but strenuously maintained that
Congress could not regulate the proceedings of future joint
conventions. He stated:
United States has committed the power to count the next vote of presidential
electors has convened. At a session before they are elected, you are here making
laws to prevent them from doing that which was committed to them alone, and
not to you, by the Constitution of the United States.
COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 500; see also id. at 515 (remarks of Sen.
Stockton) ("The truth is and the honest truth is that the twenty-second joint rule ought
never to have been passed. The whole power rested in the joint assembly when it met.").
519. IM at 510 (remarks of Sen. Hager).
520. Id
521. Id. (emphasis added).
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I admit we could pass a law here to regulate the election if
we were to act in the matter. If we were to meet next week
to count the electoral vote we could by the concurrence of
both houses pass a law to regulate our action in the matter;
but we cannot, I say, pass a law to regulate the action of a
future House or future Senate when they meet to perform a
constitutional duty.5"
Senator Hager thus concluded that the Electoral Count Act bill
"will be clearly unconstitutional."5z3  Other Members of Congress
made similar statements. 4
522. Id. (emphasis added). Senator Hager also remarked:
I am satisfied that we cannot bind our successors by any legislation in regard to a
constitutional duty that they have to perform. They themselves must judge how
they shall perform it; and you might as well undertake to dictate that they should
do it in a particular way to accomplish a particular result as to undertake to say
that they shall do it according to the provisions of this bill.
Id
523. Id. at 511.
524. Senator Sherman argued:
Sir, if we put our joint rule, the whole of it, in the form of law, the Constitution
gives to each house the power to make rules for its own government and the
power to make joint rules for the government of the two houses. That is a
constitutional power, and this Forty-third Congress cannot deprive the next
Congress of the power of making rules for the government of the two houses or
for the government of either house. There the constitutional privilege overrides
all your laws.
Id at 516 (remarks of Sen. Sherman). Senator Boutwell stated:
Here is a duty imposed upon Congress by the Constitution; it is a duty to be
exercised at stated periods. The provision of the Constitution does not operate
upon every Congress, but it operates upon particular Congresses. Now, can a
Congress to which or upon which the provision of the Constitution does not
attach at all legislate and bind the conscience and the judgment of a Congress
that is to perform a duty imposed by the Constitution especially upon itself?. I
have great doubt upon that point, whether, if the exigency should arise when it
would be thought desirable, so desirable as to be expedient, for one branch or
the other of Congress to disregard the law, (and that would be just the exigency
when probably the law should be observed,) we should not find one body or the
other willing to take the responsibility and, upon the argument that could be
presented, to go to the country for justification.
Id. at 531. Senator Ingalls remarked:
I shall be instructed far beyond my expectations if some great constitutional
lawyer... can assure me how any legislative enactment that we may adopt now
or at any time can in any manner whatever bind that great political tribunal
which is to meet to declare the result of the presidential election in 1888 ....
[W]hether the President of the Senate is to count the vote, whether the vote is to
be counted by the Senate and House of Representatives separately or jointly,
whether it is to be counted by the tribunal proposed by the Senator from Ohio,
the fact still remains that the vote is to be counted, and that no act can be passed
by any antecedent Congress that can deprive either of the persons or any of
those great constituent bodies of the powers that they possess and which they are
directed to exercise under and by virtue of the twelfth article of the amendments
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In sum, the Electoral Count Act violates the anti-binding rule of
rule-making because it is a law and not a rule. Ironically, the
Electoral Count Act would be closer to constitutionality if it were a
rule like the Twenty-second Joint Rule. If, however, the Electoral
Count Act were repealed and readopted as a joint rule, the
constitutional problem would remain whether Congress may bind the
joint convention. Constitutional structure strongly suggests that the
joint convention has the constitutional prerogative of determining the
rules of its own proceedings.'
b. The Chadha Principle of Law-Making
The Electoral Count Act's requirement that the two Houses of
Congress concur in rejecting electoral votes in the single return case
and to accept electoral votes in the multiple returns case is strange
and complicated.126 This requirement is by design-recall that one
purpose of the Electoral Count Act was to eliminate the "one House
veto" of the Twenty-Second Joint Rule. Senator Morton, the original
sponsor of what was to become the Electoral Count Act, stated,
If we are to have a rule at all, if Congress is to interfere, let it
be upon the ground on which a law is passed or a resolution
is passed. It requires the vote of the two houses to pass a
law, no matter how small or unimportant that law may be 27
to the Constitution.
17 CONG. REC. 1025 (1886). Representative Adams remarked:
[T]he real question will arise when the two Houses meet here to pass upon the
electoral votes in the next Presidential election; and those Houses, in my
judgment, when they meet here to discharge a duty which is expressly imposed
upon them by the Constitution, will not be bound by the action of the Senate and
House of the Forty-ninth Congress and the President, when he signs this bill, if it
shall pass. It is their duty, conferred on them by the Constitution, to count the
votes. If for any reason whatever a single return shall appear to both Houses of
Congress to be an invalid return they have the right so to determine; and if they
do so determine, that vote will not be counted, however many statutes we may
pass like this.
18 CONG. REc. 51 (1886); see also id. at 51-52 (remarks of Rep. Adams) (similar).
525. The critic would argue (persuasively) that the joint convention should not waste
time determining the "shape of the table" on the important day of the electoral count.
The two Houses of Congress are free to create a joint rule purporting to bind the joint
convention. But the requirement of formalism remains. As the first matter of business,
the joint convention should (and will in all likelihood) formally adopt the joint rule as its
rule of proceeding.
526. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
527. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 453.
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Ironically, the concurrence of the two Houses raises significant
constitutional problems. Consider one of the most important
structural features of Article I:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote, to Which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives
may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment)
shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him,
or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two[-
]thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the
Case of a Bill.528
When the two Houses of Congress concur in rejecting or
accepting electoral votes, the vote is not presented to the President-
and, as we have seen, for good reason. 29 The question is whether this
lack of presentment is constitutional.
Scholars who have addressed this presentment problem in the
wake of INS v. Chadha530 have doubted the existence of a
presentment problem in the Electoral Count Act because the
concurrent action of the two Houses in counting electoral votes is not
legislative in nature.531 Clearly, the counting of the electoral votes is
not legislative in nature. 32 However, this conclusion does not dispose
528. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
529. See supra notes 457-60 and accompanying text (presenting structural argument of
anti-President principle in presidential election).
530. 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983) (holding that section of Immigration and Nationality Act
authorizing one House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate decision of Executive
Branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States is
unconstitutional, because such action is legislative and is therefore subject to the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I of the Constitution).
531. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 18, at 43 ("While such an action is technically
within the scope of the Chadha test, it is doubtful that the Constitution requires that a
congressional objection be presented to the president" because the counting of electoral
votes is not a "lawmaking function."); Ross & Josephson, supra note 7, at 727 n.317 ("The
suggestion that Congress cannot exercise its counting function bicamerally without
presidential action is probably not well taken. The [Presentment Clause] has been
interpreted to refer only to legislative action. Whatever the houses are doing when they
are counting electors' votes, they are not enacting laws.") (citations omitted).
532. During the Electoral Count Act debates, some Members of Congress made this
point. Senator George made this point with ample frequency. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC.
1063 (1886) (stating that "whoever does determine what votes shall be counted performs a
judicial act"); id at 2429 (1886) ("What kind of business is [counting electoral votes]? It
certainly is not legislative business. It is the ascertainment of a fact and a very important
fact to this country."); id (stating that counting electoral votes "is not a legislative function
which ought to be considered separately by the two Houses, but it is rather in the nature of
a judicial function"). Senator Hoar also made the point that counting electoral votes was
not a legislative act. See, e.g., id. at 1020 (remarks of Sen. Hoar) (judicial act). Senator
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of the Chadha problem. Contrary to what Professor Ross and Mr.
Josephson have suggested, the Presentment Clause is not solely about
legislative action. 33
The text of the Presentment Clause itself suggests as much. The
single exception identified in the clause-"except on a question of
Adjournment ' 534 -is not legislative but procedural in nature. If the
Presentment Clause is only about legislative action, why does the
clause specify this non-legislative exception? 535 There are at least two
other exceptions to presentment in the non-legislative context, each
with a strong justification. Presentment is not required when
Congress proposes amendments to the Constitution under Article
V,536 or when Congress removes an office-holding disability under
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment because, in each case, the
two-thirds vote requirement is precisely that needed to override a
Edmunds stated that "this act of receiving and counting these votes is not a legislative act,
and I say with equal emphasis that, in my opinion, it is not a judicial act, because the
Constitution of the United States has not imputed any such judicial power to either or
both of the Houses." IL at 1064. In his view, the counting of electoral votes "is an
administrative act, the same sort of administrative act that every State which existed at the
time of the formation of the Constitution imputed to its executive and election officers in
the canvassing and return of votes and in the final ascertainment of them by some body,
for the institution of every officer of a State from a justice of the peace or an overseer of
the poor up at least to its governor." ML
533. See Ross & Josephson, supra note 7, at 727 n.317 ("The [Presentment] Clause has
been interpreted to refer only to legislative action.").
534. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
535. It is arguable that the exception was inserted to simply clarify the meaning of the
clause or out of an abundance of caution. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional
Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1998) (asserting that "[a]
considerable number of constitutional clauses are redundant in a certain sense; they
illuminate and clarify what was otherwise merely implicit"). The secret drafting history of
the Presentment Clause suggests otherwise. For example, the Committee of Style
inexplicably dropped the italicized language in the proposed clause:
Every order, resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment
and in the cases hereinafter mentioned) shall be presented to the President for his
revision; and before the same shall have force, shall be approved by him, or,
being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by the Senate and House of
Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a
bill.
2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 569 (emphasis added); see 2 id. at 594. During the Electoral
Count Act debates, Senator Hoar asserted that "[t]here are all through the Constitution,
among the powers of these two Houses, powers which require the concurrence of the two
Houses for their exercise, but which, not relating to legislation, are never held to require
the assent of the President or to be presented to the President," but failed to present any
examples other than Article V. 17 CONG. REC. 2429.
536. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,955 n.20 (1983); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 378,381 (1798).
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presidential veto under the second part of the Presentment Clause.37
Clearly, the Electoral Count Act lacks this justification: a simple
majority vote of each House is sufficient to reject an electoral vote.
Moreover, the Impeachment Clauses furnish an important
background lesson. Impeachment is a paradigmatic non-legislative
activity and presentment in case of impeachment would be
silly-much like the case of counting electoral votes. The
impeachment powers are finely wrought and intended to avoid
concurrent action of the two Houses: only the House may institute an
impeachment;538 only the Senate may try one; 39 and a two-thirds
super-majority of Senators is required for a conviction of
impeachment.5 40
This presentment problem was raised at least once during the
Electoral Count Act debates as an argument against its
constitutionality. Senator George called the presentment problem a
"conclusive objection" to separate action of the two Houses.5 41 "[1]t is
impossible," said Senator George, "to escape from the express
language of the Constitution that 'every order,' not every bill, not
every act, not every statute, but every 'order,' every 'resolution,'
every 'vote,' in the language of the Constitution, to which the
concurrence of the two Houses is necessary, shall be presented to the
President for his signature."'54  Senator Hoar responded that the
Presentment Clause only related to legislative matters.5 43
537. Senator George made precisely this response to Senator Hoar during the
Electoral Count Act debates with respect to the Article V presentment question. See 17
CONG. REc. 2429. Senator Hoar then asked if "the joint rules of the two Houses must be
presented to the President because to their validity they require the concurrence of the
two Houses?" Id. Senator George, relying upon the Rules of Proceedings Clause,
responded that each House, in addition to making its own rules, "may also make rules
besides its own separate rules for its joint action with the House, and in the same way the
House may perform that function, and in that way reach joint rules." Id
538. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives shall chuse their
Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.").
539. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments.").
540. See id. ("And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two[-
]thirds of the Members present.").
541. See 17 CONG. REC. 2428-29. Professor Ross and Mr. Josephson note that
Representative Adams also addressed the presentment problem in Electoral Count Act
debate in the House of Representatives in late 1886, but I fail to find any such evidence.
See Ross & Josephson, supra note 7, at 727 n.317 (citing 18 CONG. REC. 51-52 (1886)
(remarks of Rep. Adams)).
542. 17 CONG. REc. 2428-29.
543. See id. at 2429 ("[The Presentment Clause] never has been held anywhere, so far
as I know, to apply to anything but legislative matters which are to take effect upon the
people by the authority of the Congress. There are all through the Constitution, among
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A close reading of Chadha, unavailable of course to the
participants in the Electoral Count Act debates, fortifies the basic
argument made by Senator George and casts further doubt upon the
constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act. The Chadha Court
carefully explained why the "one-House veto" provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act was subject to the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment in Article I. 44 The Court began by
noting that "[w]hether actions taken by either House are, in law and
fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not on their form but
upon 'whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded
as legislative in its character and effect."545 The Court then described
the one-House veto provision in that case as one that "had the
purpose and effect of altering the legal fights, duties and relations of
persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials
and Chadha, all outside the legislative branch, ' 546 which was the first
of a series of four arguments in the Court's conclusion that the
provision was subject to the bicameralism and presentment
requirements of Article I. 4
The counting (and not counting) of electoral votes by a simple
majority of the two Houses of Congress, acting separately and
concurrently, sounds like an action that has "the purpose and effect of
altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons ... outside the
legislative branch, ' '54 if there ever was one. This bicameral procedure
in counting electoral votes would therefore require presentment.
Even if the counting of electoral votes is more properly described in
the first instance as a "judicial act," this conclusion would not be
changed under the Chadha Court's conception of legislative power 49
If the Electoral Colleges Clauses require (or permit) bicameralism
but not presentment in counting electoral votes, the Court simply did
not mention it 50
the powers of these two Houses for their exercise, but which, not relating to legislation,
are never held to require the assent of the President or to be presented to the President.").
544. See 462 U.S. at 952-58.
545. Id. at 952 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
546. Id.
547. See id. at 956-57.
548. Id. at 952.
549. See id. at 957 n.21 (discussing Justice Powell's position that the one-House veto
provision is a "judicial act" and concluding that "[w]e are satisfied that the one-House
veto is legislative in purpose and effect and subject to the procedures set out in Art. I").
550. In a footnote, the Court identified one exception to the Presentment Clause, and
suggested another. See iL at 955 n.20. The exception was for the proposal of
constitutional amendments by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress under Article V. Id
(citing Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798)). The Court then suggested
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Furthermore, if the two-House veto provision of the Electoral
Commission of the Hayes-Tilden Incident of 1877-which enabled
the two Houses of Congress to overturn the findings of that
commission without presentment-is constitutionally problematic
under Chadha 51 as Professor Tribe has recently suggested,552 it would
surely seem to follow that the two-House veto provision of the
Electoral Count Act-which enables the two Houses of Congress to
overturn the "findings" of electors without presentment-is equally if
not more constitutionally problematic under Chadha.553
We must interpret exceptions to the Presentment Clause
faithfully. The word "every" in the Presentment Clause means every
and not some. Under our Constitution, there is no other instance
where a simple majority of both Houses of Congress may affect the
legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside of the legislative
branch without presentment to the President. There is no textual or
structural reason why the counting function of the Electoral College
Clauses should constitute an exception to this important
constitutional rule, especially when the stakes are an entire branch of
government. The bicameral procedure for counting electoral votes in
the Electoral Count Act is unconstitutional under the Chadha
principle of law-making.
There is, however, a solution to the presentment problem in
counting electoral votes: the unicameralism principle avoids the
that "[o]ne might also include another 'exception' to the rule that Congressional action
having the force of law be subject to the bicameral requirement and the Presentment
Clauses" by pointing to the Rules of Proceedings Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, as
giving to each House "the power to act alone in determining specified internal matters."
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 n.2. The Court was careful to note that "this 'exception' only
empowers Congress to bind itself and is noteworthy only insofar as it further indicates the
Framers' intent that Congress not act in any legally binding manner outside a close
circumscribed legislative arena, except in specific and enumerated instances." Id
(emphasis added). Actually, the Court incorrectly framed the point: the Rules of
Proceedings Clause does not apply to "Congress" but each House of Congress. The
important point is that the Court nowhere suggested that any rule-making authority of
Congress could be used to affect the legal rights, duties, and relations of non-Members of
Congress without presentment to the President. See also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra
note 508, at 495 n.60 (stating that "when the [Chadha] Court stated that the Rules of
Proceedings Clause gave Congress the power to 'bind itself,' it meant simply that the rules
were binding on members of Congress as opposed to individuals or institutions outside
Congress").
551. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
552. See Tribe, supra note 27, at 278 & n.438.
553. Indeed, the argument is an even stronger one to the extent that electors in the
electoral colleges constitute a separate and co-ordinate branch of the federal government,
see Kesavan, supra note 324, at 131-35, unlike the Electoral Commission of 1877 which
was a quasi-legislative body largely drawn from Members of Congress.
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presentment problem entirely. The Presentment Clause cannot be
said to apply to the joint convention of Senators and Representatives
assembled for the purpose of the electoral count, where neither the
Senate nor the House of Representatives acts in their corporate
capacity.
3. Conclusions
The structural argument reveals that the Electoral Count Act is
unconstitutional, at least it if it is anything more than merely
precatory. As a prima facie matter, the Electoral Count Act, to the
extent that it is a law that has legal force, clearly violates the anti-
binding principle of rule-making. This is perhaps the strongest
structural argument against the constitutionality of the Electoral
Count Act. In addition, the Electoral Count Act is also
unconstitutional in its potential operation in counting electoral votes.
The bicameral procedure of 3 U.S.C. § 15 violates the anti-Senate
principle of presidential election, the Chadha principle of law-making,
and the anti-President principle of presidential election. Finally, to
the extent that the joint convention rejects electoral votes contained
in authentic electoral certificates as not "regularly given,'" the
Electoral Count Act violates the anti-Congress principle of
presidential election, the pro-states and pro-state legislatures
principle of presidential election, and the pro-electors principle of
presidential election.
III. WHAT SHOULD WE Do iF ELECrORS Go BANANAS?
Assume that the Electoral Count Act is unconstitutional as
argued in Part II. What happens if electors go bananas and vote for
Professor Paulsen's dog, Gus, as President?55  What happens if
electors go bananas and also vote for Dean Ely's dog, Portland, as
Vice President?556 To make things even worse, suppose there is a case
of double (or more) such returns from the same state?
554. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
555. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Bill Clinton Unconstitutional? The Case for
President Strom Thurmond, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 217,222 (1996).
556. For Portland's claim to fame in the legal academy, see, for example, JOHN HART
ELY, ON CONsTrriUIONAL GROUND 399 n.251 (1996); John Hart Ely, Standing to
Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARV. L. REv. 576,581-84 (1997); John Hart
Ely, Another Spin on Allegheny Pittsburgh, 38 UCLA L. REv. 107, 108 n.6 (1990). Dean
Ely's other dog, Buffo, featured prominently in some of his earlier work, see, e.g., JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 182 (1980), where she almost became Secretary
of Agriculture, but Dean Ely informs me that Buffo has since "passed on to the other
side." See Email from Dean John Hart Ely, to Vasan Kesavan (Mar. 2,2001) (on file with
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The Electoral Count Act sounds like a good statutory scheme to
deal with these and less preposterous problems, but needless to say,
not every good statutory scheme is a constitutional one. 57 An
argument that the Electoral Count Act is unconstitutional may
(sadly) not be enough. The critic would argue that we deserve to
know what should happen when inauthentic electoral certificates are
transmitted to the seat of government, or when authentic electoral
certificates containing unconstitutional or faithless electoral votes are
transmitted to the same. Of course, with or without the Electoral
Count Act, the potential problems of the electoral count remain.
This Part seeks to placate the critic and provide answers to these
questions. This Part proceeds in three sections. The first section
addresses the paradigm problems of the electoral count and provides
(or at least suggests) answers in the absence of the Electoral Count
Act. As we shall see, the Electoral Count Act is not necessary to
address any of the potential problems of the electoral count that may
arise because the Constitution itself (implicitly) provides answers
(however undesirable they may be). The second section argues that
the Twentieth Amendment, adopted in 1933, provides a
constitutional solution to the thorniest problem of the electoral
count-the problem of presidential or vice presidential ineligibility.
Given the Twentieth Amendment, the Electoral Count Act is not
needed to address this potential problem of the electoral count.
Finally, the third section considers where we should go from here in
revising the current statutory scheme, assuming that some statutory
scheme relating to counting electoral votes would be constitutional.
author).
557. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (holding
cancellation procedures in the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional under the
Presentment Clause); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding interim
provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act unconstitutional as violating
the "constitutional system of dual sovereignty"); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
149 (1992) (holding the "take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 957-58 (1983) (holding a "one-House veto" provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act unconstitutional under the Presentment and Bicameralism Clauses). By
citing these cases, I do not mean to signify my agreement or disagreement with their
holdings. Cf. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944 ("[Tlhe fact that a given law or procedure is
efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone,
will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government .. ").
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A. Answers to the Paradigm Problems of the Electoral Count
In Part I, we examined the paradigm problems of the electoral
count as experienced in the electoral counts in the history of our
Republic. It is now time to provide (or at least suggest) some
answers. The paradigm problems fall easily into two categories: (1)
problems relating to the electoral certificate, and (2) problems
relating to the electoral vote. The paradigm problems within each
category are not of equal difficulty. Let us consider the paradigm
problems in some rough order of increasing difficulty within each
category.
1. The Problems of the Electoral Certificate
The problems of the electoral certificate share two distinguishing
characteristics. First, they are antecedent to the problems of the
electoral vote. Second, they, as a prima facie matter, do not require
any knowledge of the persons receiving votes, and may therefore be
resolved without ever looking at the names of the persons receiving
votes. In sum, the problems of the electoral certificate relate to
judging the authenticity or validity of the acts of electors, whereas the
problems of the electoral vote relate to judging the acts of electors-
that is, their electoral votes.
a. The Unsigned, Uncertified, or Unsealed Electoral
Certificate Problem
A first problem of the electoral certificate relates to the three
simple elements of the electoral certificate that attest to its
authenticity. Suppose a state should transmit an electoral certificate
to the seat of government that is not (i) signed, (ii) certified, and (iii)
sealed. The result would be that the joint convention must not count
the electoral votes in this electoral certificate.
The relevant clause of the Twelfth Amendment provides that
"[the Electors] shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of
government of the United States, directed to the President of the
Senate"5 8 the electoral certificate. Under even the "thinnest"
conception of the counting function, the joint convention must judge
the authenticity of the electoral certificate, distinguishing between
what is merely the legal equivalent of a Publishers Clearinghouse
sweepstakes entry and what is a bona fide electoral certificate.
Indeed, the word "certify" in the Twelfth Amendment is a signal of
558. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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legal significance . 59 The rejection of inauthentic electoral certificates
preserves authenticity in the process of presidential election. The
Electoral College Clauses contain an authenticity principle for good
reason: authenticity is the principal safeguard to the risk of cabal and
corruption in the election of the President.5 6
b. The Puerto Rico, or Unrepublican State, Electoral
Certificate Problem
A second problem of the electoral certificate relates to the
authenticity of its sender. Suppose Puerto Rico should transmit an
electoral certificate to the seat of government. Or suppose that an
unrepublican State should transmit an electoral certificate to the seat
of government. 61 Obviously, the result would be that the joint
convention must not count the electoral votes contained in this
electoral certificate.
The Constitution makes clear that only states and the District of
Columbia are entitled to appoint electors,5 62 and are thereby entitled
to transmit electoral certificates. The political branches of the federal
government have the right to recognize states in the Union.5 63
559. See, e.g., 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1054 (2d. ed. 1989) (defining "certify"
as "[tjo declare or attest by a formal or legal certificate").
560. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 68, supra note 246, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton)
("Nothing was more to be desired [in Electoral College mode of presidential election]
than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and
corruption."). Senator King remarked:
[M]embers of the General Convention ... did indulge the hope, by apportioning,
limiting, and confining the Electors within their respective States, and by the
guarded manner of giving and transmitting the ballots of the Electors to the Seat
of Government, that intrigue, combination, and corruption, would be effectually
shut out, and a free and pure election of the President of the United States made
perpetual.
3 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 461 (remarks of Sen. Rufus King).
561. See, e.g., 18 CONG. REC. 31 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Caldwell) ("Suppose some
State should enthrone a king, constitute a house of lords, and they should appoint electors,
and send up but one return properly certified and finally determined as required under the
second section of the bill proposed by the minority. Shall an American Congress count
such a vote?").
562. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (States); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1 (District
of Columbia).
563. See generally Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (holding that the
recognition of a state government lies with Congress, not the courts); see also U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 3 ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union .... "); U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic Violence.").
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We have seen this problem before as well as its resolution. The
Thirty-eighth Congress resolved not to count the electoral votes from
eleven Southern States.5 4 When Congress sent the resolution to
President Lincoln for his signature, he replied in the third person:
The joint resolution entitled "Joint resolution declaring
certain States not entitled to representation in the electoral
college" has been signed by the Executive in deference to
the view of Congress implied in its passage and presentation
to him. In his own view, however, the two Houses of
Congress, convened under the twelfth article of the
Constitution, have complete power to exclude from counting
all electoral votes deemed by them to be illegal; and it is not
competent for the Executive to defeat or obstruct that
power by a veto, as would be the case if his action were at all
essential in the matter. He disclaims all right of the
Executive to interfere in any way in the matter of canvassing
or counting electoral votes, and he also disclaims that, by
signing said resolution, he has expressed any opinion on the
recitals of the preamble or any judgment of his own upon
the subject of the resolution 6
President Lincoln's reply suggests that Congress's power not to
count electoral votes is quite broad, but we should be careful not to
take it out of context of the Northerners' (Republicans') exclusion of
Southern senators, representatives, and electors pursuant to the
Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4.
c. The Number of Electoral Votes Problem
A third problem of the electoral certificate relates to the
aggregate number of electoral votes in the electoral certificate.
Suppose a state should transmit an electoral certificate to the seat of
government that contains more electoral votes than the number of
electors to which that state is then entitled.566 During the Electoral
Count Act debates, Senator Frelinghuysen distinctly noted this
possibility that "[a] State may claim a larger representation than has
been assigned her and may appoint more electors than she is entitled
564. See COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 147-49 (House); id. at
149-223 (Senate and House); see also Wroth, supra note 22, at 328-29 n.34.
565. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 229-30; see also Wroth, supra
note 22, at 328-29 n.34.
566. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; 3 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). For ease of exposition, I will
simply refer to electoral votes instead of two distinct lists of electoral votes for President
and Vice President, respectively.
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to, and all their votes may be returned. '567 His answer was clear: "[I]f
a State should send as votes a larger number than it was entitled to...
it would be a direct violation of the Constitution and an act of
revolution for any one to count them."56  The result would be that
the joint convention must not count the electoral votes in this
electoral certificate.5 69
Translated into a counterfactual: Suppose Florida's electoral
certificate on January 6, 2001 contained twenty-six votes instead of
the twenty-five votes to which Florida was then entitled. The State of
Florida would be disenfranchised in the presidential election.
It may be tempting to conclude that the joint convention must
exclude one of the twenty-six votes, but which one? Must they
exclude a randomly selected vote? It hardly seems more
constitutional to exclude a randomly selected vote than to exclude all
votes. What about a particular vote? In order to exclude a particular
vote, the resolution of this problem would require knowledge of the
persons voted for, thereby transforming a problem of the electoral
certificate (a problem of judging the authenticity of the acts of
electors) into a problem of the electoral vote (a problem of judging
the acts of electors). And which vote would be excluded? There is no
constitutional requirement that all electoral votes in an electoral
certificate must be given for the same person.570 The joint convention
may not exclude a particular electoral vote without affirmatively
voting against a person voted for-an action that goes well beyond
judging the authenticity of the acts of electors.
567. COUNTING ELECrORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 451.
568. Id.
569. This counting principle does not hold in the equal-and-opposite direction: a state
may transmit an electoral certificate containing less electoral votes than the number of
electors to which that state is then entitled, and these votes must be counted by the joint
convention. Indeed, the Framers contemplated that electors would be appointed but
would not give votes. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 515 (rejecting the motion of
James Madison and Hugh Williamson "to insert after 'Electors' the words 'who shall have
balloted' so that the non voting electors not being counted might not increase the number
necessary as a majority of the whole.").
570. The choice is reserved to the states. For example, only Maine and Nebraska have
proportional voting instead of "winner-take-all" voting in their electoral colleges. See ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 805.2 (West 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714 (1998). But
even in "winner-take-all" states, the possibility looms that faithless electors will give votes
in contravention of the popular vote. See supra notes 7, 176-91 and accompanying text;
infra notes 590-92 and accompanying text.
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d. The Multiple Electoral Certificates Problem
A fourth problem of the electoral certificate relates to the
aggregate number of electoral certificates (returns) from a putative
state. Suppose two or more sets of electors from the same state
should transmit an electoral certificate to the seat of government.
Recall the Hayes-Tilden Incident of 1877.57' One and only one of the
following two propositions must be true as a matter of logic: (1) one
of the electoral certificates is authentic and all others are not; or (2)
none of the electoral certificates are authentic. Needless to say, the
result would be that all of the electoral votes contained in the
authentic electoral certificate must be counted and all of the electoral
votes contained in the inauthentic electoral certificates must not be
counted.
The multiple returns problem may seem complicated, but it is not
analytically different from the Puerto Rico problem of the electoral
certificate. The authentic electoral certificate (if any) is one from the
state; the others, insofar as the Constitution is concerned, are merely
legally equivalent to Publishers Clearinghouse sweepstakes entries
transmitted to the seat of government by non-states. If multiple state
authorities should claim to be the lawful authority of a state, the joint
convention must choose which state government is the lawful one,
but, importantly, this choice is no more difficult than the choice
(previously) made by each House in deciding to seat Members of
Congress from a putative state, or the choice made by the President
when she sends in the troops under the Guarantee Clause to protect
one of multiple authorities that request the interposition of military
force.572 Most importantly, the multiple returns problem is one of the
electoral certificate and not of the electoral vote and should be
treated as such. The joint convention should be able to determine
which electoral certificate contains the legitimate set of electors
without examining the names of the persons receiving votes.
e. The Misdated Electoral Certificate Problem
A fifth problem of the electoral certificate relates to its date.
Suppose a state should transmit an electoral certificate to the seat of
government that contains electoral votes given on a day different
571. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
572. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.") (emphasis added).
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from that specified by federal law for the giving of electoral votes.573
Recall the Wisconsin Incident of 1857574 and the Hawaii Incident of
1961.575  The result would be that the votes contained in this
certificate must not be counted by the joint convention, except
perhaps in one narrow circumstance to be discussed shortly.
Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 provides that "[t]he Congress may
determine the Time of chusing the electors, and the Day on which
they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout
the United States.'576 This is a rule, inasmuch as the Constitution's
requirement that the President be thirty-five years of age upon
entering office is a rule;577 this is not a standard. It may be tempting
to conclude that the joint convention could exercise discretion as to
whether to count electoral votes given on a day different from that
specified by federal law, especially in cases of force majeure such as
the Wisconsin Incident of 1857. Indeed, the Constitution, to the
extent that it is to be interpreted against the background of the
common law, might recognize an exception for force majeure.5 78 This
one narrow circumstance aside, however, the language of the
Constitution is unmistakably clear-adherence to the date chosen is
mandatory. More importantly, the requirement that electoral votes
be given on the same day throughout the Union is a particularly
important part of the authenticity principle of the Electoral College
Clauses.579  The joint convention has the duty to support the
573. See 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) ("The electors of President and Vice President of each
State shall meet and give their votes on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in
December next following their appointment at such place in each State as the legislature
of such State shall direct.").
574. See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
575. See supra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
576. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (emphasis added). Admittedly, there is nothing in
the Electoral College Clauses that expressly provides that the electors shall date the
electoral certificate, but the requirement is fairly subsumed by that of certification. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XII ("[The Electors] shall sign, and certify, and transmit sealed to the
seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate.")
(emphasis added). Who ever heard of a legal certificate without a date?
577. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
578. During the Electoral Count Act debates, Representative Dibble thought
otherwise:
[A]s in the election of any of us, if a man who is a voter does not go to the polls
on election day and within the hours fixed by law and cast his vote, the vote is
lost, and it makes no difference whether he was sick, or whether he was
prevented from casting his vote by some necessity, or mischance, or design, or
whether his vote might have changed the complexion of the election; his vote is
lost if his right to vote is not exercised on the day designated.
18 CONG. REc. 46 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Dibble).
579. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 500 (remarks of Governor Morris) ("As
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authenticity principle of the Electoral College Clauses, not the power
to exercise its discretion in the matter.
Translated into the past: Wisconsin's electoral votes in 1857
(perhaps) should not have been counted and Hawaii's electoral votes
in 1961 should not have been counted. Translated into a
counterfactual: Florida's electoral votes in 2001-if given on a day
other than December 18, 2000-should not have been counted,580
though Justice Ginsburg in Bush v. Gore implied otherwise.
5 1
the Electors would vote at the same time throughout the U.S. and at so great a distance
from each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be impossible to corrupt
them."); 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 250, at 122 (remarks of William Davie at North
Carolina ratifying convention) ("He is elected on the same day in every state, so that there
can be no possible combination between the electors."). At the North Carolina ratifying
convention James Iredell remarked:
Had the time of election been different in different states, the electors chosen in
one state might have gone from state to state, and conferred with the other
electors, and the election might have been thus carried on under undue
influence. But by this provision, the electors must meet in the different states on
the same day, and cannot confer together. They may not even know who are the
electors in the other states. There can be, therefore, no kind of combination. It
is probable that the man who is the object of choice of thirteen different states,
the electors in each voting unconnectedly with the rest, must be a person who
possesses, in high degree, the confidence and respect of his country.
Id at 105.
580. One leading scholar agrees. See Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers
for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CI. L. REV. 657, 676 n.93 (2001). After quoting the
Constitution's provision that the "Day [for giving electoral votes] shall be the same
throughout the United States," see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4., Professor McConnell
concludes, "December 18 was so designated by statute. It would be unconstitutional for
Congress to allow the electors from a single state to give their votes on a later date." Id.
(emphasis added). He then discusses the Hawaii Incident of 1961, see supra notes 165-75
and accompanying text, and concludes, "That should not be treated as a precedent. In
that election, the votes of Hawaii were not necessary to the result, and on the suggestion
of the losing candidate, Vice President Richard Nixon, in his capacity as President of the
Senate, were recognized as a courtesy." McConnell, supra, at 676 n.93.
This is not to say that December 18, 2000 was a magic point in time for the
electoral count of January 6, 2001. Political difficulties aside, there is no reason why
Congress could not have amended 3 U.S.C. § 7 to provide that electors shall give their
votes on a date later than December 18, 2000 and, if needed, amended 3 U.S.C. § 15 to
provide that the joint convention shall count their votes on a date later than January 6,
2001. Both dates, of course, could be no later than January 20, 2001 at the time of noon,
when the terms of the President and Vice-President expired. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX,
§ 1. The important point is that the Constitution demands that electoral votes be given on
the same day throughout the Union-not forty-nine states on December 18, 2000 and one
state on some other date. When Congress could have amended 3 U.S.C. § 7 is a more
difficult question. The spirit of the Constitution suggests that, in order to minimize undue
congressional interference and manipulation in presidential election, Congress could not
amend 3 U.S.C. § 7 after the electors shall have given their votes on December 18, 2001
pursuant to then-existing federal law.
581. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 144 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("But none of these
dates [including December 18, 2000, the date set by 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)] has ultimate
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f. The Elector Ineligibility Problem
A sixth problem of the electoral certificate relates to the
qualifications of the electors. Suppose that an electoral vote is given
by an elector who is constitutionally ineligible to the office of
elector.58 2 Recall the Postmaster Incident of 1837.1s The result would
be that the votes of an elector who is constitutionally ineligible to
hold the office of elector must be counted.
The joint convention may not judge the manner of appointment
or qualifications of electors.584 Once the vote of a constitutionally
ineligible elector is transmitted in the electoral certificate, that vote is
final and must be counted. A congressional analogy is illuminating.
Imagine that a Representative-elect does not meet the constitutional
qualifications prescribed by the House Qualifications Clause.5 5 The
Representative is seated, performs legislative business, and is only
subsequently expelled from the House. Are the votes of this
Representative any less valid?586
Most importantly, the elector ineligibility problem is impossible
to resolve without knowing the persons voted for and the joint
convention may not judge the acts of electors. In particular, the votes
of a constitutionally-ineligible elector must be counted because of the
anonymity principle of the Electoral College Clauses.
The Electoral College Clauses protect the anonymity of electors
in two important ways: (i) voting in the Electoral Colleges shall be by
ballot, and (ii) the electoral certificate shall contain lists of the
significance in light of Congress' detailed provisions for determining, on 'the sixth day of
January,' the validity of electoral votes.").
582. There are only two clauses that specify the qualifications of electors. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("[B]ut no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office
of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector."). U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 3 provides:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress
may by a vote of two-thirds in each House, remove such disability.
583. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
584. See supra notes 400-22 and accompanying text (presenting intratextual argument
from House Judging Clause).
585. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
586. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
Mentor 1999) (1961) (suggesting that the votes of an "illegitimate member" of Congress
would be valid before that member is "dispossessed" of his or her seat).
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persons voted for, signed and certified by the electors as a whole.5 7
The votes of individual electors are not to be known in order to
preserve the independence of the electors and the President. Senator
Pinckney put these points brilliantly in the specific context of the
elector ineligibility problem:
[H]ow are [sic] Congress... to proceed to find how these
unduly or disqualified Electors voted, particularly if they
should belong to a State having a number of Electors? As
the Constitution directs they are to vote by ballot, the votes
of the election ought to be secret. You have no right to
require from an Elector how he voted, nor will you be able
to know for whom he did vote, particularly if in the return
from that State different candidates have been voted for. In
this dilemma, I ask, what is to be done? You cannot
discover for whom this disqualified or improperly returned
Elector voted; and you would not certainly, in a State having
sixteen or twenty-one votes, reject the whole, because one or
two illegal votes have been supposed to be given.588
Of course, it is possible to determine the persons voted for by a
constitutionally-ineligible elector in a case of mathematical
certainty-when all of the electoral votes for President or Vice
President are given for the same person. But, as we have seen, there
is no constitutional requirement that all electoral votes must be given
for the same person.589  A non-constitutional common practice of
"winner-take-all" voting in the electoral colleges that makes
mathematical certainty the norm and not the exception does not
change the answer to this constitutional question.
587. U.S. CONST. amend. XII states that:
The Electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for President
and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same
state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as
President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they
shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons
voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they
shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the
United States, directed to the President of the Senate.
Id. (emphasis added).
588. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 144 (1800). During the Electoral Count Act debates,
Senator Sherman also discussed the elector ineligibility problem and the consequent
difficulty of rejecting a "part" of the electoral votes contained in an authentic electoral
certificate. See 17 CONG. REc. 815-16 (1886).
589. See supra note 570.
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2. The Problems of the Electoral Vote
The problems of the electoral vote share two distinguishing
characteristics: they are problems subsequent to the problems of the
electoral certificate and they require knowledge of the persons for
whom the votes are cast. These problems relate to judging the acts of
electors.
a. The Faithless Elector Problem
Suppose that an electoral vote is faithless-that is, in
contravention of the known popular vote. Recall the Bailey Incident
of 1969.590 The result would be that the votes of faithless electors
must be counted.
Again, the joint convention may not judge the acts of electors.
Moreover, there is no constitutional requirement of faithfulness.5 91
Frankly, it is shameful that 174 Representatives (including future
Presidents George H.W. Bush and Gerald R. Ford) and thirty-three
Senators who took an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution
voted not to count Dr. Bailey's faithless vote. The answer to the
faithless elector problem does not depend on whether state laws
purporting to bind electors to vote in accordance with the popular
vote are constitutionalV92 Once the faithless vote is transmitted in the
electoral certificate, that vote is final and must be counted.
590. See supra notes 176-91 and accompanying text.
591. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214,232 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (explaining that
the original understanding is that electors "would be free agents, to exercise an
independent and nonpartisan judgment as to the men best qualified for the Nation's
highest offices"); THE FEDERALIST No. 68, supra note 246, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton);
Amar, supra note 10, at 230 ("The Constitution plainly contemplates that, at least
formally, the electors must themselves decide upon their votes."). It is an open question
whether the original understanding of 1787-1788 is the right original understanding on the
requirement of faithfulness. The Twelfth Amendment significantly rewrote the Electoral
College Clauses and that amendment was adopted in part with the intention of vindicating
majoritarian popular will. See Lolabel House, Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States 20-40 (1901) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Pennsylvania). More importantly, it does not follow that if there is no constitutional
requirement of faithfulness that there is a constitutional requirement of faithlessness (that
is, absolute discretion). It is an open question whether state laws that purport to bind
electors to vote in accordance with the popular vote are constitutional. Compare, e.g.,
Amar, supra note 10, at 219 ("[T]he constitutionality of [elector-binding] laws seems
highly dubious if we consult constitutional text, history, and structure."), with Vikram
David Amar, The People Made Me Do It: Can the People of the States Instruct and Coerce
Their State Legislatures in the Article V Constitutional Amendment Process?, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1037,1089 n.233 (2000) (describing the question as an "open one").
592. See Ross & Josephson, supra note 7, at 690-91 (providing examples of elector-
binding laws).
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b. The Presidential or Vice Presidential Ineligibility Problem
Suppose that an electoral vote is for a dead person-that is, in
violation of the Presidential or Vice Presidential Eligibility Clauses. 93
Recall the Greeley incident of 1873.594 The result would be that the
votes for a dead presidential or vice presidential candidate must be
counted.595
The joint convention may not judge the acts of electors. This
answer applies with equal force to the other qualifications of the
Presidential and Vice Presidential Eligibility Clauses-natural born
citizen, thirty-five years of age, and fourteen years a resident within
the United States.596 The presidential or vice presidential ineligibility
problem is perhaps the thorniest problem of the electoral count.
c. The Inhabitants of the Same State Problem
Suppose that an elector votes for inhabitants of her state for both
President and Vice President-that is, in violation of the Twelfth
Amendment: 7  This is the hypothetical Bush-Bentsen problem-
recall that Republican Vice President George H.W. Bush and
Democrat Senator Lloyd Bentsen were both inhabitants of the State
of Texas in the presidential election of 1988.598 The Bush-Bentsen
593. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 ("No Person except a natural born Citizen...
shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that
Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen
Years a Resident within the United States."); U.S. CONST. amend. XII ("But no person
constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-
President of the United States.").
594. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
595. As a prudential matter, Professor Amar has stated that "[Congress] should simply
count the votes of a dead man as if he were alive." Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents Without
Mandates (With Special Emphasis on Ohio), 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 375,388 (1999).
596. U.S. CONST. art. II., § 1, cl. 6; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also Ross &
Josephson, supra note 7, at 706-07 (suggesting that Greeley precedent applies to entirety
of Presidential Eligibility Clause).
597. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XII ("The Electors shall meet in their respective states
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an
inhabitant of the same state with themselves.").
598. Senator Ross misstated the problem in the Sixth Congress when he asked,
"Suppose they should vote ... for two persons who were both citizens of the same
State...?" 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1800); see also COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES,
supra note 3, at 451 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen) (making same mistake). There is no
constitutional requirement that an elector shall not vote for two persons of the same
state-the constitutional requirement is that an elector shall not vote for two persons of
the same state as herself. Translated into the recent past: Electors from forty-nine states
could constitutionally vote for both George Bush as President and Lloyd Bentsen as Vice
President; only Texas electors could not.
The Bush-Bentsen problem resurfaced in the presidential election of 2000. See
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problem appears to have actually occurred once in our history-in the
presidential election of 1872-but was discovered too late in the
electoral count for any debate. 99 During the Wisconsin Incident of
1857, Representative Humphrey Marshall pointed to the Bush-
Bentsen problem as the paradigm case for congressional power to
exclude unconstitutional electoral votes. The Bush-Bentsen problem
is undoubtedly the least discussed problem of the electoral count in
the Electoral Count Act debates or in the legal academy, and yet the
trickiest problem of all.
There are only four possible answers for the joint convention to
deal with the Bush-Bentsen problem during the electoral count: (1)
count both votes, (2) reject both votes, (3) count the vote for
President and reject the vote for Vice President, or (4) count the vote
for Vice President and reject the vote for President. It is not at all
difficult to winnow the set of answers by eliminating answer number
four-the Office of President is simply more important than the
Office of Vice President.60° This argument, however, would have
been impossible before the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment
which requires electors to cast "distinct ballots" for President and
Vice President and to prepare "distinct lists" of the persons voted for
as President and Vice President.6°1 Assuming that the Twelfth
Amendment did not expand the range of possible answers to the
Bush-Bentsen problem, we may further winnow the set of answers by
eliminating answer number three. This leaves us with the rather
Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713, 715 (N.D. Tex. 2000), aff'd, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
34148 (5th Cir. Tex. Dec. 7, 2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1062 (2001) (dismissing suit by
three registered voters in Texas who alleged that Richard B. Cheney was an "inhabitant"
of Texas and that, under the Twelfth Amendment, Texas electors were prohibited from
voting for both George W. Bush and Richard B. Cheney). For two recent discussions in
the legal literature of this (putative) problem, see Ho, supra note 195, passim, and
Levinson & Young, supra note 195, at 932-54.
599. See text accompanying supra note 154.
600. Under our Constitution, we are never without a President, but we may be without
a Vice President. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 1-2. Moreover, the President, unlike
the Vice President, wields the power of an entire branch of Government. See U.S. CONsT.
art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America."). At least two commentators seem to agree that electoral votes for President
are to be preferred to those for Vice President. Levinson and Young argue that:
Common-sensically, the correct outcome is most certainly [to count the electoral
votes for President and throw out the electoral votes for the Vice President],
since it would seem obvious that preferences for President should be preferred
over preferences for Vice President.... But this answer is hardly the only
plausible resolution, and it is certainly not derived from the barebones text [of
the Twelfth Amendment].
Levinson & Young, supra note 195, at 935 n.37.
601. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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binary choice of counting both electoral votes for Bush and Bentsen
or rejecting both electoral votes for Bush and Bentsen. Which is the
correct answer?
The Bush-Bentsen problem is not different in kind than the other
two problems of the electoral vote. The joint convention must count
both votes for Bush and Bentsen. The joint convention may not
judge the acts of electors-period. There are two additional points to
consider. First, the anonymity principle of the Electoral College
Clauses indicates that the Bush-Bentsen problem is uniquely directed
to electors, not to the joint convention.' It would be impossible for
the joint convention to even detect the Bush-Bentsen problem, except
in rarest cases of mathematical certainty. Second, the Presidential
and Vice Presidential Eligibility Clauses do not require that the
President and Vice President be inhabitants of different states. The
command of the Electoral College Clauses is violated the moment a
Texas elector votes for both Bush and Bentsen, but the Presidential
and Vice Presidential Eligibility Clauses are not violated if Bush
becomes President and Bentsen becomes Vice President. We might
therefore think about the Bush-Bentsen problem in a broader
context, just as we might think about presidential impeachment in a
broader context.6°3 The command of the Electoral College Clauses
probably was inserted to enhance the legitimacy of presidential
election by lessening the probability that the ultimate choice would be
made by the House of Representatives, but the Framers thought that
most presidential elections would be decided by the House anyway.6°4
602. See supra notes 587-88 and accompanying text (discussing anonymity principle of
Electoral College Clauses).
603. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, An(Other) Afterword on the Bill of Rights, 87 GEO.
L.J. 2347, 2358-59 (1999) (criticizing application of "blinkered textualism" to standard for
presidential impeachment and arguing that presidential impeachment requires a higher
standard than that for judges or cabinet officers, although the Constitution lumps
presidential impeachment with all other impeachments).
604. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 500 (remarks of George Mason)
("[Njineteen times in twenty the President would be chosen by the Senate."); id. at 512
(remarks of George Mason) ("[lt will rarely happen that a majority of the whole votes
will fall on any one candidate."); THE FEDERALIST No. 66, supra note 432, at 372
(Alexander Hamilton) ("The same house [House of Representatives] will be the umpire in
all elections of the President which do not unite the suffrages of the majority of the whole
number of electors; a case which it cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently
happen."). But see 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 501 (remarks of Abraham Baldwin)
("The increasing intercourse among the people of the States, would render important
characters less & less unknown; and the Senate [under the Constitution as adopted and
amended, the House of Representatives] would consequently be less & less likely to have
the eventual [presidential] appointment thrown into their hands."). History has proved
Mr. Baldwin to be correct.
Alexander Hamilton, for his part, probably did not think the Bush-Bentsen
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3. Conclusions
What shall we make of this rearrangement of the deck chairs on
the Titanic? The problems of the electoral certificate relate to
judging the authenticity of the acts of electors, whereas the problems
of the electoral vote relate to judging the acts of electors. The
Constitution trusts the joint convention to do the former, but not the
latter.
The counting function inherently requires some sort of a rule of
recognition for deciding what is to be counted and what is not (this is
the "thinnest" conception of judging). The President of the Senate
receives a lot of mail, and the joint convention must be able to decide
what mail contains an authentic electoral certificate and must be
counted, and what mail contains the legal equivalent of a Publishers
Clearinghouse sweepstakes entry and must be discarded. The
Constitution specifies the criteria for authenticity and trusts the joint
convention to judge the authenticity of the acts of electors.
Moreover, the problems of the electoral certificate may be resolved
without any knowledge of the persons receiving votes. We should
therefore be less suspicious of undue interference or manipulation by
the joint convention because the joint convention could (and should)
be behind a veil of ignorance as to the problems of authenticity of the
acts of electors.
The problems of the electoral vote are of a fundamentally
different order. The rule of recognition does not address these
problems which require knowledge of the persons voted for in the
presidential election in order to be solved. The threat of undue
interference or manipulation by the joint convention is hence more
pressing. The Constitution does not trust the joint convention to
judge the acts of electors, but plainly contemplates that the electors
shall have the last word on who shall receive votes.
B. The Twentieth Amendment
Although the joint convention may not solve problems of the
electoral vote, we are not resigned to the possibility of
unconstitutional Presidents or Vice Presidents (if electors do truly go
bananas). It turns out that We the People remedied (without really
knowing it) the thorniest problem of the electoral count-the
requirement to be all-important. His private, unadopted draft of the Constitution contains
a provision providing that electors "shall proceed to vote by ballot for a President, who
shall not be one of their own number, unless the Legislature upon experiment should
hereafter direct otherwise." 3 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 622-23 (emphasis added).
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presidential or vice presidential ineligibility problem-with the
adoption of the Twentieth Amendment in 1933. Section 3 of that
amendment provides:
If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the
President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice
President elect shall become President. If a President shall
not have been chosen before the time fixed for the
beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have
failed to qualifr, then the Vice President elect shall act as
President until a President shall have qualified; and the
Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a
President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified,
declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in
which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person
shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall
have qualified.60 5
Section 3 contains a "textually demonstrable commitment"6"6 of
power to Congress to remedy the situation when electors go bananas:
"Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a
President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified .. "607
The text of this section of the Twentieth Amendment does not
declare who decides whether the President-elect or Vice President-
elect have failed to qualify or when they shall have qualified.
Constitutional structure strongly suggests that neither the President
nor Congress makes these determinations.60 These determinations
seem very much like judicial ones subject to the province of the
judicial department.6°9 These determinations are surely no less
605. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3 (emphasis added).
606. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962).
607. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3. Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment
embarrassingly does not specify who shall act as Vice President when electors go bananas.
The Twenty-fifth Amendment only complicates this problem: "Whenever there is a
vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President
who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress."
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2. The spirit of section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment
suggests that this person is to act as Vice President until a Vice President shall have
qualified.
608. See supra notes 400-24 and accompanying text (presenting intratextual argument
of House Judging Clause); supra notes 447-56 and accompanying text (presenting
structural argument of anti-Congress principle of presidential election); supra notes
457-59 and accompanying text (presenting structural argument of anti-President principle
of presidential election).
609. See also Amar, supra note 10, at 222-23 & 231 n.22 (noting that question of
whether presidential or vice presidential candidate dies or becomes incapacitated shortly
before election day is a judicial question).
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justiciable than deciding whether a Representative-elect has met all of
the qualifications set forth in Article I, Section 2, Clause 2.610
The Twentieth Amendment provides a constitutional solution to
the presidential or vice presidential ineligibility problem of the
electoral vote. The Twentieth Amendment guarantees that we will
not be without a constitutionally-qualified President when electors go
bananas.6 n What does the Twentieth Amendment mean for the
counting of electoral votes? The Twentieth Amendment "preempts"
the joint convention in judging the acts of electors. The joint
convention must count electoral votes contained in authentic
electoral certificates.
There is an important difference between the constitutional
solution provided by the Twentieth Amendment and any rough-and-
ready solution that may be provided by the joint convention. Take a
much less silly case than Professor Paulsen's Gus-the-Dog
hypothetical.612 Imagine that in the next presidential election a
majority of the whole number of electors appointed vote for
presidential candidate Smith. Smith is exactly thirty-four years of age
as of noon on January 20, 2005, the date fixed by the Constitution for
the beginning of the next presidential term,613 and is therefore not
constitutionally-qualified to be President.614 If the joint convention
rejected these electoral votes for thirty-four year old Smith as not
"regularly given," the joint convention would trigger a contingency
election in the House of Representatives, and Smith would be
excluded from the Office of President for the next four years. But if
these unconstitutional electoral votes were counted, then Smith's
running-mate (who we will assume is constitutionally-qualified to be
Vice President) would simply act as President, until Smith shall have
qualified for the Office of President on January 20, 2006. To be sure,
610. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,516-49 (1969).
611. There is one truly exceptional situation that the Twentieth Amendment solves
that the joint convention could not. Imagine that all of persons voted for by the electors
for President and Vice President were unconstitutional. Even though the joint convention
could pursuant to the Electoral Count Act reject enough of these unconstitutional votes to
trigger contingency elections for President in the House of Representatives and for Vice
President in the Senate, the House and the Senate would be required to choose the
President and Vice President, respectively, from a list of unconstitutional candidates.
612. See Paulsen, supra note 555, at 222.
613. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XX, § 1 ("The terms of the President and Vice President
shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and
Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would
have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then
begin.").
614. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
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this hypothetical situation could never apply to the cases when
electors really go bananas-when they vote for dead persons or law
professors' dogs as President or Vice President. The important point
for present purposes is that the joint convention must count electoral
votes contained in authentic electoral certificates because the
Twentieth Amendment carefully prescribes the result when the
electors shall have made an unconstitutional choice.
C. Revising the Electoral Count Act
Assume that Congress may by law bind the joint convention and
future joint conventions in counting electoral votes, and that
Congress has the font of implied power to enact such a law. In other
words, assume that some electoral count act is constitutional. If we
are to revise the Electoral Count Act to make it constitutional (and
better), what should it look like?615
The Electoral Count Act should be revised in the following ways.
First, some Senator or Representative then and there present at the
electoral count shall be the presiding officer of the joint convention,
not the Vice President as the President of the Senate. Second, the
quorum for the joint convention shall be two-thirds of the total
number of Senators and Representatives, keeping in spirit with the
Constitution's requirement that a quorum in the House of
Representatives for choosing the President be a Member or Members
from two-thirds of the states.616 Third, the phrase not "regularly
given" shall be narrowly construed only to include problems of the
electoral certificate and to exclude problems of the electoral vote,
clarifying that the joint convention may judge the authenticity of the
electors' acts, but not the electors' acts themselves. Fourth, any and
all objections in counting electoral votes shall be addressed by the
joint convention voting on a per capita basis, thereby avoiding the
presentment problem of the Electoral Count Act. Fifth, the
proceedings of the joint convention shall be public. Sixth, in the
event the electors fail to make a choice for President or Vice
President, the choice of the President by the House of
615. Other commentators have taken initial stabs at this question. See Glennon, supra
note 517; L. Kinvin Wroth, Election 2000: The Disease and the Cure, VT. BJ. 53, 53-54
(2001); L. Kinvin Wroth, Congress Can Clean Up Its Electoral Act, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan.
5,2001, at 31.
616. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XII; see also 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 518
(describing James Madison's motion at the Philadelphia Convention that a quorum in the
Senate for choosing the President in a contingent election be two-thirds of the Members).
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Representatives and the choice of the Vice President by the Senate
shall be made in the presence of the joint convention.
CONCLUSION
Just because a certain constitutional problem is peculiar and rare
is no reason to ignore it--especially when the stakes are an entire
branch of government. To borrow the words of Senator Morton
describing the Twenty-second Joint Rule, the Electoral Count Act is a
"a torpedo planted in the straits with which the ship of state may at
some time come into fatal collision." '617 When this happens, it will
happen, by definition, at a worse time. We should be thinking about
the constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act now-well in advance
of a constitutional crisis-when the political facts of the moment are
least likely to distort our considered legal judgment. Both Houses of
Congress should immediately hold hearings on the constitutionality of
the Electoral Count Act and perhaps on the desirability of the
electoral college mode of presidential election more generally.
Consider that we came perilously close to facing the
constitutionality of 3 U.S.C. § 15 head on just a short while ago.
Imagine the following hypothetical:
The Supreme Court does not intervene in Bush v. Gore on
December 10, 2000 or on December 12, 2000. The recount in Florida
proceeds. A slate of Bush-Cheney electors, appointed by the Florida
Legislature on December 12, 2000, gives its votes on December 18,
2000. This electoral certificate is certified by Florida Secretary of
State Katherine Harris. The recount in Florida proceeds. Vice
President Gore and Senator Lieberman are declared the winners of
the popular vote for President and Vice President respectively. A
slate of Gore-Lieberman electors, appointed under Florida election
law, gives its votes on some day after December 18, 2000, but before
January 6, 2001. And now the important twist-this electoral
certificate is also certified by Florida Secretary of State Katherine
Harris.
The joint convention convenes on January 6, 2001 for the
purpose of counting the electoral votes. The electoral count proceeds
smoothly until Vice President Gore opens both certificates from the
State of Florida and hands them to the teller for reading, when the
joint convention borders on disorder. Objections are made, received,
and read before the joint convention by Vice President Gore. Some
objections state that this is a case of single returns, and pointing to 3
617. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 3, at 525.
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U.S.C. § 5, state that the electoral votes contained in the Bush-
Cheney electoral certificate must be counted, unless both Houses
concur in rejecting them. Some objections state that this is a case of
single returns, and pointing to the precedent of Hawaii in 1961, state
that the electoral votes contained in the Gore-Lieberman electoral
certificate must be counted unless both Houses concur in rejecting
them. Some objections state that this is a case of double returns, and
pointing to § 15, state that none of the electoral votes contained in
either the Bush-Cheney or Gore-Lieberman electoral certificates
must be counted unless the two Houses concur in accepting one of
them. Both Houses will likely not concur, with the House controlled
by the Republicans and the Senate evenly split among Republicans
and Democrats (put aside, for the moment, the legal fiction of Vice
President Gore breaking any tie in the Senate in favor of himself and
the Democrats). If none of Florida's electoral votes are counted, the
result of the electoral count will likely be 268 votes for Vice President
Gore and Senator Lieberman and 246 votes for Governor Bush and
Mr. Cheney. Gore and Lieberman will not have a majority of the
whole number of electors appointed if Florida's twenty-five electors
are counted as properly appointed electors, but will comfortably have
more than a majority of the whole number of electors appointed if
Florida's twenty-five electors are not counted. The Senate and House
immediately withdraw to decide on the objections not at all knowing
what will happen when they reconvene. What result?
We need not wait for the Supreme Court to decide the
constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act in a moment of
constitutional crisis. Members of Congress take an oath or
affirmation to support the Constitution. A conscientious legislator
should vote to repeal the Electoral Count Act and a conscientious
President should sign such legislation. This will not be enough. The
problems of the electoral count are festering sores in our
Constitution. A very conscientious legislator should vote to propose
a constitutional amendment to solve the problems of the electoral
count once and for all.
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